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PREFACE
Rainer Bauböck and Milena Tripkovic 
European University Institute
This book discusses the challenges that the 
contemporary refugee and migration crisis, which 
culminated with the arrival of more than 1 million 
asylum seekers in 2015, poses to traditional 
approaches to immigrant integration employed 
by the European countries affected.1 These 
challenges arise from a host of factors particular 
to the ongoing patterns of immigration: the 
unprecedented number of migrants and refugees 
that have recently entered Europe; the mostly 
unregulated and uncontrolled nature of this 
new immigration; the burden that this puts on 
European countries that had previously had very 
little experience with immigration and integration 
but also the opportunities it provides in terms of 
addressing the key social and economic challenges 
that Europe will be facing in the next 30 years; 
the desire of immigrants and refugees to settle 
in specific countries (particularly Germany and 
Sweden); and the security concerns that have 
arisen in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. The 
contributions, both individually and in their 
entirety, seek to explore the medium and long-
term impacts of these and other challenges on the 
debate and to measure the success of immigrant 
integration. The book is divided into four sections, 
addressing the impact of this new wave of 
immigration on: (I) access to citizenship and legal 
statuses, (II) educational integration, (III) labour 
market integration, and (IV) cultural integration. 
1 The book is based on contributions first presented at a 
conference on the Integration of Migrants and Refugees within 
the EUI Forum on Citizenship, Migration and Demography on 29 
and 30 September 2016. The Forum series was initiated in 2015 
by former EUI President J.H.H. Weiler and the Director of the 
Robert Schuman Centre Brigid Laffan. All the contributions to this 
volume have been revised after the conference. 
The new challenges
Even before the current refugee/migrant crisis, 
population movements towards developed 
countries had been steadily increasing over 
time. Since 2000, the immigrant populations 
in both the EU and the OECD have grown by 
30%.2 Although research shows that the rise 
in immigration does not have a negative effect 
on the success of integration,3 the specificity of 
the current crisis might pose altogether new 
challenges to ‘traditional’ integration mechanisms 
and processes. 
There are many reasons to think that circumstances 
are different this time round. First, the number of 
refugees and migrants currently entering Europe 
is unprecedented. In 2014, around 219,000 people 
crossed the Mediterranean, while the number grew 
to around one million in 2015.4 There were almost 
1.3 million asylum applications in the EU countries 
during 2015.5 The high number of refugees 
and migrants has already caused difficulties for 
both transit and recipient countries, which are 
struggling to provide conditions for satisfying 
basic needs such as food, shelter and healthcare. 
However, it is not only the numbers – the nature 
of immigration has also been transformed by 
becoming much less regulated and controlled, 
thus preventing the destination countries from 
predicting and planning the necessary resources to 
host the immigrants. The prospect of a persisting 
2 OECD (2015), ‘Indicators of Immigrant Integration 
2015: Settling In,’ available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-
issues-migration-health/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-
2015-settling-in_9789264234024-en (last accessed August 22, 
2016).
3 Ibid.
4 Hume, T. and Pawle, L. (2015), ‘Number of Migrants 
Reaching Europe this Year Passes 1 Million’, available at: http://
edition.cnn.com/2015/12/22/europe/million-refugees-enter-
europe/ (last accessed August 22, 2016).
5 Eurostat (2016), ‘Asylum Statistics’, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_
statistics (last accessed August 22, 2016).
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flow of refugees and migrants in the coming years 
makes integration a crucial issue for the future of 
Europe.
Second, both demands for and obstacles to 
burden-sharing between EU countries through 
redistributing refugees and forced migrants from 
over-burdened Greece and Italy to other EU 
member states have increased dramatically. Many 
countries that have so far not had much experience 
with immigration – and immigrant integration – 
have been asked to accept significant numbers of 
newcomers. This has already triggered negative 
reactions and explicit hostility in some Member 
States. For instance, in August 2015 Slovakia 
announced that it will only accept Christians,6 
while Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
stated that accepting immigrants will serve 
to spread terrorism7 and called a referendum 
to block the implementation of EU decisions 
regarding the relocation of refugees.8 The lack of 
experience of such countries with hosting and 
integrating immigrants, combined with hostile 
attitudes towards them, compounds the problems 
in countries that are currently overburdened 
and does not augur well for the integration of 
refugees in the most reluctant host states. Most 
refugees/migrants entering Europe before the 
effective closure of the previously-open Balkan 
route since November 2015 resolutely aimed for 
specific destinations and mainly wanted to settle 
in Germany or Sweden.9 However, if the EU plan 
which aims to relocate and resettle 160,000 people 
6 BBC (2015), ‘Migrant Crisis: Slovakia Will Only 
Accept Christians’, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-33986738 (last accessed August 22, 2016).
7 Feher, M. (2015), ‘EU Migrant Distribution Will Spread 
Terrorism, Hungary’s Orban Says,’ available at: http://www.wsj.
com/articles/eu-migrant-distribution-will-spread-terrorism-
hungarys-orban-says-1447698602 (last accessed August 22, 2016).
8 The referendum of 2 October 2016 resulted in 98.36% of 
the voters endorsing the government position but failed to reach 
the required turnout of 50%.
9 Economist (2015), ‘Germany, the EU Country which 
Takes the Most Asylum Seekers, is Straining’, available at: http://
www.economist.com/news/europe/21661941-wanting-burden-
shared-germany-eu-country-which-takes-most-asylum-seekers-
straining (last accessed August 22, 2016).
across Europe by September 2017 is carried out as 
intended,10 many people will be sent to countries 
other than those of their preference. Refugee 
destinations will stop being a matter of personal 
choice. While this process may be necessary 
for the sake of fair burden-sharing, it will most 
probably negatively influence both the capacity 
and willingness of immigrants to integrate into 
their new communities and public opinion in 
countries where refugee relocation is seen to be 
imposed by ‘Brussels.’ 
Third, the public debate on how to handle the 
crisis has steadily been shifting towards a focus 
on the security threat posed by the uncontrolled 
influx of refugees and migrants. In the wake of the 
Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, Poland 
withdrew its earlier promise to accept 7,000 
individuals as part of the EU plan.11 Further terrorist 
attacks in Brussels and Nice have only deepened 
security concerns. The massive, apparently 
organised, sexual molestation and assaults by 
Muslim-background immigrants on women on 
New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne soured the public 
mood and support for the ‘culture of welcome’ 
for newly arriving refugees that had prevailed in 
Germany and Austria in summer 2015. Although 
civil society organizations continue to provide 
crucial support for newcomers, public opinion 
has shifted dramatically. While anti-migration 
rhetoric and the securitization of the crisis had 
previously been the domain of right-wing populist 
parties and politicians, the very real security 
anxieties arising from these events negatively 
influence the public attitude towards immigration 
and integration in all European states. 
These problems are only the three most apparent 
and immediate obstacles to proactive integration 
10  European Commission (2016), ‘Relocation and 
Resettlement: Positive Trend Continues, but More Efforts Needed’, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2435_
en.htm (last accessed August 22, 2016).
11 Wall Street Journal (2015), ‘Paris Terror Attacks 
Transform Debate Over Europe’s Migration Crisis’, available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-terror-attacks-transform-
debate-over-europes-migration-crisis-1447608944 (last accessed 
August 22, 2016).
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policies for refugees and migrants in the host 
societies. In the absence of realistic prospects of 
ending the violent conflicts that are the cause of 
the current refugee crises, disputes about burden-
sharing and a pandering of politicians to hostile 
public opinion cannot change the fact that Europe 
will become the new permanent home for most 
of the refugees. This makes it imperative to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of the past, when integration 
policies were delayed in order to encourage return 
and deter potential migrants, or were ineffective in 
preventing social segregation and discrimination 
of first- and second-generation immigrants.  
The current debates on the integration of refugees 
and immigrants therefore need to consider how 
the new circumstances challenge conventional 
wisdoms. ‘Traditional’ immigrant societies 
have experienced and solicited immigration 
for many decades and have developed a set 
of normative ideas on how to best achieve 
integration and social cohesion. In the 1990s, 
the academic literature distinguished different 
national models or ‘philosophies’ of integration, 
often categorized into exclusionary, laissez-faire, 
assimilationist and multicultural approaches. In 
the 2000s, the internal consistency and practical 
relevance of such national models has been widely 
questioned.12 The uncontrolled influx of a high 
number of refugees and immigrants provides 
a new context for this debate, confronting host 
countries with similar problems – even if the 
politics of immigrant integration still largely 
depend on national contexts, such as previous 
immigration experiences or the electoral strength 
of right-wing populist parties. Instead of focusing 
on comparing national approaches, this book will 
therefore be structured by different ‘sectors’ of 
integration. Within each of its four sections, the 
12  See, e.g., Christian Joppke (2007), Beyond national 
models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western 
Europe, West European Politics, 30 (1): 1-22; Christophe Bertossi 
and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2012), National models of immigrant 
integration: The costs for comparative research. Comparative 
European Politics 10 (3): 237–247.
contributions aim to take the nationally specific 
impact of numbers of new arrivals and of public 
attitudes into account as an important context that 
requires specific strategies and policy responses. 
Four dimensions of 
integration: citizenship, 
education, employment and 
culture
The book covers four dimensions of integration: 
citizenship and legal statuses, education, labour 
market integration and cultural integration. 
On each of these topics there is a specially 
commissioned keynote paper and this is 
followed by shorter commentaries that provide 
complementary views. A comprehensive overview 
of pertinent challenges presented by the current 
migration and refugee crisis is set out in the 
introductory chapter by Rainer Münz. It provides 
statistical data about the core dimensions of 
integration, which are subsequently discussed in 
greater detail in other contributions. The chapter 
particularly emphasizes the changes in Europe’s 
demography that have come about as a result of 
decreasing emigration and increasing immigration 
over the last few centuries. Furthermore, Münz 
gives special attention to the fundamental 
transformation in the domain of immigration 
policy – the fact that the reasons for accepting 
newcomers have now become predominantly 
humanitarian, which has critical importance for 
the development and application of new policies. 
In the section on citizenship and legal statuses, the 
contributions focus on the complex relationship 
between naturalisation and integration. In his 
keynote paper, Maarten Vink goes a step further 
than merely trying to establish that citizenship 
matters for integration by exploring why, under 
which conditions, and to whom citizenship 
acquisition matters. This perspective allows him 
to offer a more nuanced understanding of the link 
between citizenship and migrant integration and 
to conclude, for example, that the acquisition of 
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citizenship most improves the opportunities for 
those immigrants who need it the most (such as 
refugees and more generally immigrants from less 
developed countries). Restrictive policies thus 
have a particularly negative impact on those in 
the most precarious situation. Even more nuances 
can be observed – as Kees Groenendijk suggests 
– if we take into account how laws in countries 
of origin and destination interact in determining 
access to legal statuses. Countries of origin are 
particularly important as their laws and practices 
often interplay with those of the host country to 
create difficulties in the legalisation of irregular 
statuses. Additionally, Groenendijk identifies 
the transition from the status of temporary to 
permanent migrant and the effects that this 
change has on integration as an important topic 
for further research. Vink’s observation that 
citizenship is of great importance to certain 
categories of immigrants even if acquisition rates 
are low is further developed by Ines Michalowski, 
who examines a number of specificities of the 
acquisition of citizenship status by refugees. Most 
importantly, these concern: the lack of value of 
their original citizenship; a number of obstacles 
which do not necessarily characterise other 
categories of immigrants (lack of educational and 
professional skills and lack of financial resources); 
and citizenship conditions that are more difficult 
to meet for refugees (residence and language, 
income and civic knowledge tests). Barbara 
Oomen’s contribution takes an additional angle on 
the mostly state-centric debate on the link between 
legal policies and integration by emphasising the 
role of sub-state units (particularly cities). These 
units often enhance the legal status of immigrants 
by providing them with additional rights and 
privileges which not only extend beyond but also 
above the state, as these entitlements are commonly 
couched in international human rights. 
The section on the educational integration of 
refugees opens with a keynote paper by Maurice 
Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie 
and Safoura Ghaeminia. It compares four 
cases (Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Turkey) which reflect different approaches 
to the integration of the children of refugees 
in institutions of compulsory education. The 
contribution by Michael Teutsch recognizes the 
difficulties created for education systems by the 
current refugee inflow: the number of refugees, 
the high percentage of new arrivals of young 
people who are still in need of compulsory 
education, the often low probability of them being 
accorded refugee status, and the polarisation of 
the education and skill levels that they possess. 
However, Teutsch still believes that challenges 
can be turned into opportunities to reform 
the educational sphere. While the differences 
observed by Crul et al. are undeniable, Teutsch’s 
contribution also sheds light on some positive 
changes (for instance, in Germany) and proposes 
a more flexible understanding of ‘success’ when it 
comes to educational achievement by recognizing 
that for some groups of students (particularly 
those who arrive at an age corresponding to the 
last few years of compulsory schooling) the clock 
cannot be turned back and more effort ought to 
be put into finding appropriate ways of engaging 
them in vocational training for jobs requiring less 
formal school education. Crul et al.’s contribution 
suggests that diverse educational philosophies 
identified in the four countries covered by their 
analysis shape the professional destinies of refugee 
children – ranging from those that provide 
the best possible educational opportunities 
in the given circumstances in Sweden, where 
quick mainstreaming (also secured by intensive 
language teaching) is the dominant approach, 
to those where the outcome is often to divert 
refugee children into vocational tracks (less in the 
Netherlands and more so in Germany), and finally 
to those where a lack of resources and a policy 
of temporary protection rather than integration 
results in a lack of access to public schools and 
substitute education geared towards return to 
Syria, as is the case in Turkey. 
The contributions on the topic of labour market 
integration discuss two crucial and at the same 
time contradictory trends: on the one hand, the 
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long-term economic opportunities for ageing 
Europe created by the newly arrived migrants 
and refugees and, on the other hand, the short-
term problems in providing effective employment 
opportunities for these categories of newcomers. 
Klaus F. Zimmermann’s keynote chapter outlines 
how and why the influx of refugees must not 
only be perceived as a problem but ought to 
also be seen as an opportunity. He suggests 
that the most benefits could be reaped from 
early profiling of refugees and their allocation 
in line with the relocation quota system. After 
this, free mobility within the country should be 
permitted even before the recognition of refugee 
status, and recognized refugees should be free to 
move to other EU countries if they have a work 
contract. However, this positive outlook on the 
opportunities created by contemporary migratory 
movements is overshadowed by a number of 
obstacles and on average refugees take as many as 
20 years to fully integrate into the labour market. 
Martin Ruhs identifies some of the problems: the 
size of the population concerned; the pressure that 
this puts on the receiving states; the (un)feasibility 
of particular policies in the host state; the fact that 
refugees might stay permanently; and the lack of 
cooperation between states. To this, Alessandra 
Venturini adds another dimension: problems 
created by the lack of any cooperation between 
the state of origin and the host state. Cooperation 
between these countries is one of the best tools 
for a speedy and comprehensive integration of 
immigrants. In the case of refugees it is clearly 
missing, but other (transit) states appear as actors, 
which complicates matters and makes integration 
more difficult. However, some positive trends 
are described in the chapter by Iván Martín, who 
presents results of empirical research which reveal 
a clear policy trend in the majority of EU countries 
towards facilitation of the integration of migrants 
and refugees, as opposed to the previous (pre-
2015) trends which sought to introduce barriers 
to their integration. A number of instruments are 
used to facilitate labour market integration, such 
as skills assessment, introductory programmes 
(cultural and other kinds of orientation), language 
learning, and job mediation services. 
The contributions on the topic of cultural 
integration clearly recognize a trend towards the 
securitization of migration and a shifting of the 
blame for any failures in the integration process 
onto the newcomers. Ruth Wodak’s keynote 
paper discusses both the different dimensions of 
integration and the culturalization of integration 
policies. She identifies a tendency in Europe 
towards more demanding conditions for 
citizenship acquisition – primarily with regard to 
language competence and civic knowledge tests. 
This trend is, at least to some extent, caused by a 
hostile political discourse which blames integration 
failure on the newcomers’ unwillingness to 
integrate. Instead of ethnic and national conflicts, 
religion has become the main divisive force in 
contemporary Europe, as Anna Triandafyllidou 
argues in her paper. Rejecting members of other 
religions coincides with natives turning towards 
the nation-state to provide them with security. 
Tamás Szűcs’ contribution shows how public 
opinion and the political discourse on immigrants 
have been moving towards considering migrants 
as a security threat and demands for stronger 
borders to keep the migrants out. To counter 
such trends, for more than a decade the EU has 
consistently and coherently tried to also promote 
the inclusion of newcomers in cultural domains, 
such as the arts and sports. These programmes 
provide funding for creative – and unobtrusive 
– ways of integrating immigrants. However, the 
extent to which Member States use opportunities 
of EU funding for such initiatives greatly varies 
and depends on their general approaches to 
integration. 
A particular value of this book is that it reaches 
a number of cross-sectional conclusions that 
establish links between different domains of 
integration, making the success of integration 
in one domain critical for outcomes in another. 
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For instance, Münz and Zimmermann discuss 
the importance of appropriate educational 
skills for the full labour integration of refugees 
and better labour market outcomes. Similarly, 
language proficiency is considered critical for 
both educational prospects (Crul et al.) and 
for labour market integration (Martín). Crul 
et al.’s contribution argues that the acquisition 
of particular statuses – such as the recognition 
of refugee status – is of utmost importance for 
optimal educational opportunities and subsequent 
labour market integration. Zimmermann also 
argues that a proper legal status allows for quicker 
employment integration and the much-needed 
worker mobility. This shows that all integration 
domains interact with each other and that policies 
introduced in one area will affect other areas as well, 
which calls for a comprehensive understanding 
and policies on immigrant integration.
In summer and autumn 2015, German Chancellor 
Merkel and the leaders of the EU institutions 
emphasized that agreeing on a common policy 
on refugee admission and fair burden-sharing 
between the Member States was an even greater 
challenge than steering through the Euro crisis. At 
the end of 2016, the sense of urgency has become 
somewhat weaker, with smaller numbers of new 
inflows and other crises – such as that triggered by 
the Brexit referendum – occupying the minds of 
European policymakers. However, the difficulties 
raised by the long-term task of integrating 
refugees and migrants for whose arrival European 
societies had been unprepared will remain high 
on the agenda for years to come. In the absence of 
innovative approaches, the resulting problems will 
feed into the rise of nationalist populism that is 
already shaking the foundations of the European 
building. 
Florence, 30 December 2016
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THE INTEGRATION 
OF MIGRANTS 
AND REFUGEES 
– A EUROPEAN 
SYNOPSIS
Rainer Münz 
EPSC, European Commission1
For centuries, Europe was a continent of 
emigration, exporting a considerable part of 
its growing population. Between the Age of 
Discoveries and the mid-20th century, some 70 
million people left their European homelands 
for overseas destinations. Among them were 
colonial settlers, adventurers, labour migrants 
and refugees.2  Since the 19th century, Europeans 
have also moved – and continue to move – from 
peripheries to urban areas and regions with higher 
economic growth. However, a fundamental shift 
occurred in the 1980s. Three decades ago, for the 
first time in modern history the number of third-
country nationals entering the EU started to be 
larger than the number of EU citizens leaving for 
overseas destinations. Only since that time can 
we truly speak of Europe and the EU as a region 
of immigration. It took even longer before the 
integration of migrants and their children became 
an issue of political concern, although since the 
1950s many countries in Western Europe had 
recruited foreign labour and accepted refugees. 
Initially, most of these refugees were people fleeing 
communist regimes and socialist economies.   
1 Rainer Münz is policy advisor at the European Political 
Strategy Centre, the in-house think tank advising the President of 
the European Commission. The analysis and proposals expressed 
in this text are the author’s personal views and do not necessarily 
represent positions of the European Commission.
2 See: http://www.european-emigration.com/; Bade 
(2003). The peak period was 1840 to 1940, with 55 million 
Europeans leaving (Tara 2016).
Migrants in Europe
Today, some 57 million citizens and residents of 
the EU live outside their country of birth. They 
represent over 10% of the EU’s total population.3 
About a third of them (2014: 36.9%, Fig. 1) are 
mobile EU citizens.4 The others have come as 
labour migrants, dependent family members, 
international students or asylum seekers and 
refugees. Of these ‘others’, one in five is from Asia 
(2014: 20.6%),5 one in six from Africa (16.9%)6 
and one in seven from other European countries 
(non-EU: 14.6%; Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1: Mobile EU citizens and non-EU born 
migrants by continent of origin
3  This number is calculated from stock data available for 1 
January 2015: 34.3 million people born outside of the EU-28 were 
living in an EU Member State on 1  January 2015 + 18.5 million 
persons born in an EU Member State other than the one where 
they were resident = 52.8 million (Eurostat 2016c). Given the net 
inflows since January 2015, the total number on 1 January 2017 is 
likely to be 57 million. 
4 With Poland and Romania being the most important 
sending countries (Eurostat 2016c).
5 Mostly from southern Asia (India, Pakistan; Eurostat 
2016c) and since 2015 also Afghanistan and Syria (Eurostat 2016a).
6 Mostly from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia; Eurostat 2016c).
8Fig. 2: Share of mobile EU citizens and non-EU born migrants in the total EU population, in the 
population aged 15-64, and in the economically active population aged 15-64 in 2014
In 2014,7 the share of non EU-born residents was 
6.7 percent of the total EU population and 7.9 
percent of economically active persons. Mobile 
EU citizens constituted 3.5 percent of the total 
population and 4.4 percent of economically active 
persons (Fig. 2).8 An estimated 6 percent belonged 
to the second generation, having one or two 
foreign-born parents.9
In relative terms, Luxemburg, Cyprus and Ireland 
reported the largest proportions of mobile EU 
citizens, while Estonia, Croatia, Latvia,10 and 
7  The data are from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
ad-hoc module 2014 covering mobile EU citizens and EU residents 
born outside the EU (including people admitted as asylum seekers 
or refugees prior to 2014). See Lien 2016.
8  European Commission 2016b. The large inflow of 
irregular migrants and refugees during the years 2014-2016 has 
increased the size and share of the non-EU born population, but – 
so far – has had no lasting impact on the non-EU born workforce 
as the majority of them have not yet become economically active.
9  Precise information is only available for the EU 
population of main working age (15-64). Among these, in 2014, the 
second-generation totalled 18.4 million people (6.1% of this age 
group), of which 13.3 million (4.4%) had at least one parent born in 
the EU, whereas 5.1 million (1.7%) had both parents born outside 
the EU. These data do not include information on Denmark, 
Ireland and the Netherlands.                                                                                              
10  Most foreign-born residents of Estonia and Latvia moved 
prior to 1991 as Soviet citizens from other Soviet republics to the 
Baltics and only became ‘foreign-born’ when the Baltic countries 
Sweden hosted the largest shares of non-EU born 
migrants (Fig. 2).
Asylum seekers and refugees
In the years 2014-16, the focus of public attention 
was on the irregular entrance gate as over 1.5 
million irregular migrants and refugees entered 
Italy and Greece via the Mediterranean – the 
majority of them moving on and asking for asylum 
in various northern and western EU countries.11 
This extra inflow – in addition to some 2 million 
first residency permits issued to third-country 
nationals arriving in a regular manner – was 
unprecedented in size. In fact, in the years 2000-
2013 the EU countries had only admitted less than 
4 million asylum seekers and refugees altogether, 
on average less than 300,000 per year.12 
Another difference also plays a role: between 2000 
and 2013 some 80 to 90 percent of all the newly 
arriving third-country nationals entered the EU 
declared independence. A considerable proportion of them were 
never naturalised and are now stateless or have meanwhile acquired 
Russian citizenship (Eurostat 2016c). 
11 See http://migration.iom.int/europe/ and http://data.
unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php .
12 Eurostat 2016a.
Source: DG EMPL, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
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reasons.13 In 2015 the share of those admitted for 
humanitarian reasons was over 35 percent.
Entrance gates
Over the last two decades the main ‘entrance gates’ 
to EU countries have been:
(a) the free movement of EU citizens 
within the EU; 
(b) dependent family members joining 
regular migrants and refugees already 
living in an EU country;                                                                    
(c) the recruitment of skilled and unskilled 
foreign labour;                                                                                                
(d) the admission of foreign students 
(playing a somewhat smaller role);                                    
(e) admission for asylum and humanitarian 
protection (playing only a minor role – 
with the exception of 2014-2016).
From a quantitative point of view, free movement 
and family reunion were the most important 
’entrance gates’.
These ‘gates’ define the initial terms of residence 
and they clearly create selection effects. This is 
not only relevant when migrants settle in an EU 
country but it also has a long-term influence on 
migrant integration.
Integration: Refugees vs. 
other immigrants
Integration only matters for migrants who intend 
to stay for a longer period of time or – in the case 
of refugees – are prevented from returning to their 
country of origin. Although the integration of 
migrants and their children is multifaceted, four 
dimensions stand out:
• Labour market outcomes
13  Eurostat 2016c.
• Education 
• Language and culture
• Legal status and citizenship
Data that would allow a systematic comparison 
between regular migrants and refugees across 
Europe are not available for all four dimensions,14 
but the accessible data give us an idea of the 
differences and similarities. Existing research also 
gives us an idea of the obstacles to integration that 
immigrants and their European host countries 
have faced in the past. The main findings are:
• The economic integration of migrants takes 
time and has – on average – become more 
difficult in recent years.
• This is particularly an issue for those admitted 
as asylum seekers/refugees and for those 
joining parents or a spouse already established 
in an EU country (family reunion). It takes 
seven to ten years until the employment rates 
of these groups of migrants reach 50 percent. 
• High educational attainment speeds up the 
integration process. Skilled migrants, however, 
face systemic barriers in access to work for 
which they have initially been trained.
• The education systems of countries with 
larger numbers of migrants on average have 
difficulties coping with children that have a 
migrant background. They have significantly 
lower PISA scores and a much higher share of 
early school leavers. In the EU 25 percent of 
all young non-EU citizens leave the education 
system without graduating.
• Over time only six out of ten third country 
nationals residing in Europe acquire 
citizenship in an EU country. At the same time 
European citizenship does not necessarily lead 
to a full identification with European values 
and traditions
14  Eurostat 2011, 2016c.
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Employment in the formal 
sector
Economic activity is at the core of the inclusion 
process. This key variable relies on the ability of 
migrants and refugees15 to generate income from 
gainful employment. This, in turn, depends on 
the trajectory defined by the entrance gates, the 
personal skills of migrants, their duration of stay, 
the general economic and labour market situation 
and legal conditions in the receiving country.16 
It is, therefore, no surprise that those admitted 
to an EU country as skilled or unskilled workers 
initially have the highest employment rates (0-4 
years of residence: 83%). Over time, some of these 
become unemployed or economically inactive and 
the rate drops with a longer duration of stay (20+ 
years: 65%). Third-country nationals admitted as 
students remaining in the EU after the end of their 
studies only reach their maximum employment 
rates about ten years after arrival (10-14 years: 
80%) and usually remain economically active at a 
15  The analytical part of this text is based on data gathered 
before 2015. Many results are based on the EU Labour Force Survey 
ad-hoc module 2014 (EU LFS). Irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers arriving in 2014-2016 are not included in this survey. 
When speaking of ‘refugees’ the text refers to people residing in 
the EU who were admitted as asylum seekers or for humanitarian 
reasons prior to 2014.
16  For refugees, the possibility of accessing and competing 
in the labour market depends on the reception (and integration) 
policies adopted in the country granting asylum, such as whether 
they provide for specific language and vocational training 
programmes. In many countries, asylum seekers who are granted 
subsidiary protection face greater restrictions than those enjoying 
refugee status.
high level (Fig. 4). This is clearly related to the fact 
that – by definition – all of them are highly skilled. 
By contrast, migrants arriving for family reunion 
or as asylum seekers take 7-10 years on average 
before reaching an employment rate of 50% (Fig. 
4). In the case of refugees, this is related to several 
factors. On average, they have lower educational 
attainments than the citizens of the country which 
processes the asylum claim.17 Access to labour 
markets is usually delayed by asylum procedures. 
Refugees need time to adapt, learn the language 
of the receiving country and get their skills 
evaluated, recognised or upgraded. The more 
regulated labour markets are, the more difficult it 
is for refugees to find a job.18 
Over time, differences in labour market outcomes 
disappear. Employment rates converge for those 
with more than 20 years of stay and the reason for 
which the initial residency permit was issued no 
longer plays a decisive role. 
The overall employment rate of migrants with 
non-EU backgrounds increases with the duration 
of their stay, rising from 51.1% for those residing 
in the country for less than five years to 68.3% for 
those who have already spent at least ten years in 
the EU. 
17  Among recent asylum seekers (2014-2016) who have 
come to Europe, only two groups include a relevant share of tertiary 
educated people: Syrians and Iranians (UNHCR 2015, Rich 2016).
18  OECD 2015.
Fig. 3: Labour market outcomes of non-EU-born persons by type of initial residency permit in the 
European Union.  Ages 15-64 in 2014
Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
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Fig.4: Employment rates by type of initial residency permit and years of residence in the European 
Union. Ages 15-64 in 2014
 
Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
Labour market outcomes are also strongly 
influenced by the general economic situation. 
As a result of the recent financial and economic 
crisis, the employment chances of newly arriving 
non-EU migrants clearly deteriorated for those 
arriving after 2006 (Fig. 5).19
Fig. 5: Employment rates of non-EU-born 
migrants by years of residence in the EU. Ages 
15-64, years of arrival: 2004-2013 
Source: DG EMPL, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
Labour market outcomes are strongly influenced 
by educational attainment and skills. Tertiary 
educated refugees and other migrants of working 
age have employment rates that are about 25 
percentage points higher than those of refugees 
and other migrants with primary education 
(Fig. 6). This is true for both regular migrants 
19  European Commission 2016b.
and refugees who have come more recently and 
for those with longer durations of stay. The gap 
reflects the demand for skills, which gives people 
with higher education better opportunities in the 
labour market. At the same time, it might be less 
challenging for people who have spent more time 
in the education system to learn the host country’s 
language, which in turn also facilitates labour 
market integration.  
Another relevant factor is work experience. 
Eurostat‘s Labour Force Surveys (LFS) do not 
provide information on this issue, but a recent 
study by the German Migration and Asylum 
Agency (BAMF) shows that three in four (75%) 
male asylum seekers arriving in the year 2015 
were employed before leaving their country of 
origin but only one in three women (33%) seeking 
asylum in Germany during that year were.20
Outcomes also vary widely between countries. In 
Belgium, France, Italy and Croatia, those admitted 
as refugees fare better than other non EU-born 
migrants. Conversely, in Finland, the UK, Spain 
and Portugal, the employment rate of recognised 
refugees is at least 10 percentage points lower.21 
20  Rich 2016.
21  OECD 2016b.
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Fig. 6: Employment rates of regular migrants and refugees  in the EU by educational attainment. 
Ages 15-64 in 2014 in 2014
The unemployment rates of refugees differ 
significantly between EU countries, ranging from 
15 percent in the UK to more than 50 percent in 
Spain. Although other non-EU born migrants 
also have higher unemployment rates (16%) than 
the native born (10%), at least in Spain, Finland 
and Belgium they have considerably lower 
unemployment rates.23
For those who are unable to find gainful 
employment over a longer period of time, 
other forms of integration need to be explored 
– including opportunities to contribute via 
voluntary and non-paid work.24
Education
On average, third-country nationals who have 
moved to the EU are less well educated than 
mobile EU citizens and EU nationals residing 
in their country of birth. More than four in ten 
refugees (43%) and a little fewer than four in ten 
other non-EU citizens (38%) residing in the EU 
only have primary education, compared to less 
than a quarter of EU nationals (23%; Fig. 7).25  
A quarter of (other) non-EU citizens (25%)26 have 
tertiary education. Among refugees, the share 
23  OECD 2016b.
24  Papademetriou and Benton 2016.
25  Referring to the population age 25+.
26  Excluding refugees.
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
By far the largest challenge is the labour market 
inclusion of refugee women. Their average 
employment rate is 45 percent (some 17 
percentage points lower than that of refugee men). 
This is partly related to refugee status itself, which 
initially reduces employment chances (Fig. 4). To 
some extent these underwhelming labour market 
outcomes are related to the fact that nearly half 
of all refugee women residing in the EU in 2014 
had a low level of education or no education at 
all and the majority had no work experience, a 
substantially higher share than that for any other 
migrant group.
In this context, it is important to narrow the 
gap between arrival or admission and economic 
integration. It is, however equally important to 
ensure that those entering Europe‘s labour markets 
find opportunities for upward mobility and that 
hidden barriers do not contribute to brain waste.
Unemployment
In 2014, among the refugees available for the 
labour market, one in five were unemployed (19%), 
of whom one in eight for more than a year (12%). 
In comparison, refugees faced unemployment 
rates twice as high as that for natives (10%, Fig. 
3). Unemployment was also high among third-
country nationals (16%), in particular among 
those coming from Africa and the Middle East.22 
22  European Commission 2016b, OECD 2016b.
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is only one in five (20%).27 The share of tertiary 
educated refugees has decreased in recent years, as 
refugees who have arrived in the past 10 years are 
less likely to be tertiary educated than those who 
came 10-20 years ago.28 This will gradually change 
over time as some of the recently arrived refugees 
will complete their education in Europe.
The opposite trend is observed for other non-EU-
born migrants. Among these, the share of tertiary 
educated persons has increased, reaching 34% 
among those who have arrived in the EU during 
the period 2004-2014. This clearly shows a shift in 
the composition of immigrants: from less qualified 
labour migrants and dependent family members 
joining them to better qualified workers and third-
country nationals completing their education in 
Europe and remaining in the EU. 
Fig. 7: Educational attainment by place of 
birth. Ages 25+ in 2014
Source: EPSC, Eurostat, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module
In western and northern Europe, children with 
a migrant background constitute a growing 
proportion of all the children of school age. Some 
27  For comparison, among recent asylum seekers in 
Germany (arriving in 2014-2015), 18% have tertiary education 
while 30% have low or no education (Rich 2016). The share 
of tertiary educated asylum seekers is highest among Iranians 
(35%) and Syrians (27%). The share of asylum seekers with low 
or no education is largest among Afghans (54%), Serbs (71%) and 
Macedonians (67%; Rich 2016). This is partly explained by the 
fact that many asylum seekers from the western Balkans belong to 
local Roma communities which are marginalised by the respective 
domestic education systems.  
28  OECD/EU 2015.
have moved with their parents and therefore 
belong to the first generation; others belong to the 
second generation. PISA test results clearly show 
that children with a migrant background have 
lower scores on average than native children in all 
three areas analysed in the OECD’s global study: 
reading, mathematics and IT problem solving. The 
average gap is in the 10-12% range and is almost the 
same for the first and the second generation (Fig. 
8). This reproduction of differences in educational 
attainment across generations clearly indicates 
that not only young migrants but also the children 
of immigrants will face a certain disadvantage 
when entering the labour market.
The gap is aggravated by the fact that one in 
four young non-EU citizens growing up in an 
EU country leaves the education system without 
graduating (25%). Among native children, the 
proportion is only one in ten (10%). Under current 
labour market conditions in Europe, a large 
proportion of early school leavers are unlikely to 
find a proper job. As a result, one in five young 
non-EU citizens (21%) are neither in gainful 
employment nor in education nor in training 
(NEET). Among their native peers the NEET rate 
is only one in eight (12%; Fig. 9). 
The over-proportionally high rates of early school 
leavers with migrant background are aggravating 
existing integration problems and increasing the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion. The high rate 
of NEET young migrants not only hints at a lack 
of demand for unskilled and untrained labour 
but will almost certainly translate into long-term 
exclusion from formal labour markets. 
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Fig. 8: PISA scores of children aged 15 with 
native and migrant backgrounds in the EU in 
2012 
Source: OECD, PISA 2012
Fig. 9: NEET population (aged 15-24) and early school leavers (aged 18-24) by citizenship in the 
EU in 2015
Belgium, Germany and Sweden.29 At the same 
time, migrants with a university degree are over 10 
percentage points less likely to be in work relative 
to similarly educated natives in Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden 
(OECD, 2015a).
Formal over-qualification has partly to do with 
the fact that most economically active refugees 
have obtained their degrees in education systems 
that are very different from those in their host 
countries, possibly resulting in lower skills at 
the same level of education.30 Employers usually 
have difficulties in evaluating such skills. For this 
reason, formal over-qualification is more closely 
related to the origin of the qualification than to 
the origin of the migrant.31 A certain number of 
refugees also lack documents that would allow a 
proper specification of their degrees. This creates 
considerable obstacles in the formal process of 
recognition. Another reason for lower valuations 
of migrants’ qualifications is a lower proficiency in 
the host-country language (Fig. 10). 
29  OECD 2016b.
30  Bonfanti and Xenogiani 2014 assume that between 
one-third and one-half of the observed level of over-
qualification of migrants compared with the native-born can 
be explained by lower skills at given qualification levels. Also 
see Damas de Matos and Liebig 2014.
31  Papademetriou and Benton 2016.
On the other hand, qualifications and skills do 
not necessarily translate into expected labour 
market outcomes. Employed refugees are much 
more likely to be over-qualified (60%) than other 
non-EU-born migrants (30%) or natives (21%). 
The differences are particularly large in Austria, 
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS 2015
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Social welfare
The recent inflow of refugees and asylum seekers 
has revived the debate on “welfare migration”32 
suggesting that certain categories of immigrants, 
in particular those with lower skills, are more 
inclined to choosing countries with well-
established welfare systems as their destination. 
The fact that most irregular migrants and refugees 
entering Europe in 2014-2016 choose  Germany, 
Sweden, Austria, France and Italy to launch 
their asylum requests33 seem to suggest that both 
the accessibility of asylum and the generosity of 
related transfers seem to have a major influence.
If these dynamics were generally true for labour 
migrants and dependent family members, this 
could constitute a major obstacle to economic 
integration as it might discourage certain groups 
of migrants eligible for social benefits from 
entering the labour market. For migrants not using 
the asylum system as entrance gate the empirical 
evidence is rather mixed.34 This, however, does 
not prevent a larger public to voice concern and 
to assume that immigrants – as well as mobile 
EU citizens – receive social benefits without 
sufficiently contributing to the welfare system 
through taxes and contributions.35 
Language
Cultural integration is not easy to measure, but 
language proficiency can be used as a proxy. In any 
case, migrant integration requires command of the 
main language spoken in the receiving country. In 
2014, less than half (45%) of the refugees residing 
in the EU reported having an advanced knowledge 
32  One of the economists starting this debate was G. Borjas 
1999.
33  Eurostat 2016a.
34  For an overview: Barrett 2012; Giulietti and Wahba 
2012.
35  A 2009 Eurobarometer survey showed that one in two 
adult Europeans did believe that immigrants do not contribute 
to taxes as much as they benefit from social services and welfare 
programs (European Commission 2010).
of such languages, compared with two thirds 
(64%) of other migrants from non-EU countries. 
As empirical data show, knowledge of the host-
country language is partly influenced by selective 
migration, e.g. Latin Americans migrating to 
Spain, natives of other former Yugoslav republics 
residing in Croatia and Slovenia, and Slovaks 
living in the Czech Republic. 
Literacy and command of the host-country 
language tend to improve with a longer duration 
of stay in a particular country. It is, however, 
striking that only one in two refugees (49%) with 
more than ten years of residence in the EU has 
acquired advanced knowledge of the host-country 
language, while the share is 69 percent among 
other non-EU-born migrants with a long duration 
of stay.36 
Fig. 10: Advanced knowledge of host country 
language among refugees vs. other non-EU 
citizens. Ages 15-64 in 2014
 
Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module                                                           
Literacy also matters. The ability to use the host 
country‘s dominant language is influenced by 
the ability to read texts written in the language. 
The OECD‘s ‘Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies’ (PIAAC) 
clearly shows that – depending on the EU country 
36  OECD 2016b. Lack of motivation and/or opportunity 
to learn the host-country language can partly be explained by the 
presence of larger diasporas in the host country, which makes 
resorting to the native language much easier.
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and the structure of its migrant population – non-
EU-born migrants have literacy scores that are 
on average 35 points below those of natives. The 
gap is particularly pronounced in Scandinavian 
countries. Mobile EU citizens seem to have fewer 
problems, but also score some 15 points below 
natives (Fig. 11).
Fig. 11: Difference in the literacy scores of mobile EU citizens (born in the EU), non-EU-born 
migrants and natives by region of birth (PIAAC 2012)
Source: OECD, PIAAC 2012, Bonfanti and Xenogiani 2014
Nationality and citizenship
In the context of migrant integration, citizenship 
is primarily about rights and duties, but it also 
creates a sense of belonging. Between 2009 and 
2015 some 6 million people acquired citizenship 
in an EU country through naturalisation – 
between 800,000 and 1 million per year. The 
number and share of new EU citizens varies from 
county to country depending on the amount 
and composition of non-nationals theoretically 
qualifying for naturalisation as well as on the 
respective citizenship laws and naturalisation 
practices. 
Ideally, naturalisation should be an integral part of 
migrant inclusion, as non-citizens never become 
full and equal members of society. In reality, some 
mobile people show no interest in changing their 
citizenship status even if they meet all the legal 
requirements. This is particularly true for EU 
citizens residing in another EU country, who enjoy 
almost the same rights as native citizens. Others 
are reluctant if naturalisation in the country of 
residence requires them to renounce their original 
citizenship. 
At the same time, depending on national laws 
regulating access to citizenship, migrants who want 
to naturalise have to meet a series of requirements 
that may become relevant obstacles, such as 
uninterrupted residency of 5-10 years, passing 
language and national history tests, meeting 
required income levels, etc.37 As a result, in 2014 
only 2.8% of all non-citizens residing in the EU 
naturalised. The rates vary substantially across 
Europe, with some countries being much more 
restrictive than others. In 2014, Sweden, Portugal, 
the Netherlands and Spain naturalised some 4.4-
37  See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ and Estramina et al. 2014. 
In 2014, over 60% of all refugees and 55% of all other non-EU-born 
migrants had been residing in their current host country for more 
than ten years and would therefore meet a basic requirement for 
naturalisation.
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6.4 percent of their foreign resident populations.38 
During the same year, the rates were below 1 
percent in Slovakia, Austria and the three Baltic 
States (Fig. 12).39
In absolute numbers Spain had the highest number 
of naturalisations (2014: 206,000), followed by 
Italy (130,000), the UK (126,000) and Germany 
(111,000).40
Empirical data show that migrants who naturalise 
have somewhat better labour market outcomes 
than those who remain citizens of their country 
of origin. Some call this a citizenship premium. 
However, this does not necessarily constitute a 
causal relationship. It might well be that those 
who manage to acquire citizenship are also more 
successful in the labour market. As the difference 
disappears over time, it looks as if immigrants on 
the path to naturalisation enjoy faster integration 
rather than a permanent advantage on the labour 
market.
38  Hungary also reported a rate above 6%, but this 
calculation is problematic as the vast majority of those acquiring 
Hungarian citizenship were non-resident ethnic Hungarians living 
in neighbouring countries and applying for naturalisation from 
abroad. 
39  OECD 2016b.
40  Eurostat 2016b.
The data available also suggest that migrants 
who were initially admitted as refugees are more 
likely to naturalise in the host country than other 
third-country nationals. In 2014, 61% of all the 
refugees with more than ten years of residence in 
the EU had taken up the host-country nationality, 
compared with 57% of other non-EU-born 
migrants. Among refugees, the take-up rate was 
higher for women than for men.41 
Quite a few EU countries have both low 
naturalisation rates and legal provisions that do 
not extend citizenship to children of immigrants.42 
This creates a growing gap between the electorate 
(or demos) and the resident population. With 
gross immigration being larger than the annual 
number of naturalisations and a growing numbers 
of EU-born children becoming foreigners at birth, 
the number of people not represented in our 
political system is growing. Whatever long-term 
consequences this may have, it is definitely not 
making integration more likely.   
41  OECD 2016b. In this context, it should not be overlooked 
that naturalisation requirements are sometimes less strict for 
recognised refugees than for other third-country nationals (http://
eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition).
42  This is the norm in a majority of EU countries (http://
eudo-citizenship.eu/).
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Source: Eurostat 2016b, Acquisition of citizenship statistics
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At the same time, we see that a certain number 
of naturalised as well as EU-born citizens with 
a migrant background are not fully identifying 
with their country of citizenship, but rather see 
themselves as a diaspora. In other cases there is 
identification with radical interpretations of Islam. 
43 This is a trend which apparently affects young 
EU-born people with a migrant background, i.e. 
the second generation and recent converts more 
than the first generation of immigrants.44 Young 
European-born Muslims joining radical groups 
fighting in the Middle East and North Africa are 
the most extreme cases.45 This clearly indicates 
that European citizenship does not necessarily 
lead to a full identification with European values 
and traditions.
Large-scale immigration together with irregular 
entry and the reaction of domestic audiences in 
several receiving countries have brought back 
questions of national identity. A growing number 
of natives see the newcomers as a challenge or 
even threat to their national identity. This is 
particularly true when a considerable number of 
those arriving in Europe become part of visible or 
religious minorities.
So far, European governments have had 
difficulties establishing a clear line on how to 
best address the cultural and civic integration 
of recent newcomers.46 Approaches range from 
outright restrictions47 to more liberal forms of 
accommodation. In any event, the political, 
social and residential segregation of ethnic and 
religious communities can become both drivers of 
anxiety among natives and barriers for those cut 
off from social interaction, political inclusion and 
economic participation.
43 European Parliament 2015a.
44 http://www.cfr.org/religion/europes-angry-muslims/
p8218
45 See, for example: Jourova 2015; The Sufan Group 2015.
46 Papademetriou and Benton 2016.
47 For example, burkini bans in France.
Conclusions
Data that would allow for a systematic comparison 
between regular migrants and refugees across 
Europe are not available for all dimensions,48 but 
existing data give us an idea about differences and 
similarities.
Employment outcomes depend on the entrance 
gate, skill levels and gender. The situation is 
more difficult for people admitted as refugees or 
for family reunion and in particular for migrant 
women with lower educational attainment. Over 
time, newcomers make progress in entering the 
labour forces of receiving countries. However, it 
takes 15 to 20 years before differences by entrance 
gate fully disappear. Nevertheless, throughout 
their working lives immigrants remain over-
represented in low-skilled work. 
Skilled migrants often face entry barriers to jobs 
for which they would be qualified. Despite progress 
in recognising qualifications, newcomers face 
more limited opportunities than natives hinting 
at a permanent ‘brain waste’ of those migrants 
with higher skills. The main exception is migrants 
arriving as students, finishing their degrees in an 
EU country and remaining in the host country. 
In many parts of Western Europe, a quarter or 
more of young people now have a migration 
background. The education systems of receiving 
countries have difficulties in coping with these 
children. As a result, they are more susceptible 
to leaving school early and to then not being in 
education, employment or training (NEET). 
The consequences are obvious. They not only 
have significantly lower PISA scores but are 
also underrepresented in higher education.49 
Consequently, young adults with a migrant 
background belonging to visible minorities 
generally display lower labour force participation 
levels.
48 Eurostat 2011, 2016c.
49 Not counting newly arriving migrants admitted as 
students.
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These empirical results are particularly problematic 
as finding work is the most important route to 
integration in general. It also plays a crucial role 
in ensuring that a majority of natives trust existing 
immigration and integration systems. Integration, 
however, is not a one-way street. It requires efforts 
on the part of immigrants and their children but it 
also requires that Europe’s receiving societies give 
newcomers a fair chance.
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1. Introduction
In European migration-receiving countries, the 
integration of migrants and especially refugees has 
traditionally been based on the assumption that 
their stay is temporary rather than permanent. As 
a result, integration policies have been ad hoc at 
best and have lacked a focus on the comprehensive 
immersion of migrants in the host societies. 
One of the best ways to become a full and equal 
member of society is by securing a route towards 
citizenship through naturalisation. Citizenship is 
an important measurement of integration because 
it extends rights to unconditional residence and 
political participation, and because naturalisation 
represents a deliberate choice by immigrants to 
link their future with that of the host country. 
Nevertheless, citizenship acquisition rates in 
Europe remain relatively low – with significant 
variation between countries and between migrant 
groups – and policies outlining comprehensive 
1 The research discussed in this paper draws on ongoing 
collaboration within the European Union Democracy Observatory 
on Citizenship (EUDO CITIZENSHIP) and within the Maastricht 
Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE), 
in particular with Floris Peters and Hans Schmeets. The paper also 
outlines a research agenda for a new five-year project ‘Migrant 
Life Course and Legal Status Transition’ (MiLifeStatus), funded 
by a Consolidator Grant from the European Research Council 
(grant no. 682626). See https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
milifestatus/. 
pathways towards citizenship are the exception 
rather than the rule. “Citizenship policies remain 
a major area of weakness for most European 
countries,” concludes the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index (MIPEX). “The highly discretionary 
and costly path to citizenship often discourages 
rather than encourages immigrants to apply and 
succeed as new citizens.”2
Recent comparative research on citizenship for 
immigrants has focused on issues such as the 
conditions for acquiring the citizenship of the 
host country, how they differ between countries, 
how they change over time and how they 
distinguish various classes of would-be citizens. 
Recent research has also examined the overall 
effect of citizenship and naturalisation policies 
on various integration indicators (Bauböck et al, 
2013; OECD 2011). The available evidence on the 
‘citizenship premium’ for integration provides a 
mixed picture, across domains, across migrant 
groups and across countries. Generally, however, 
permanent residence and ultimately citizenship 
are seen as crucial opportunities, especially for 
those migrants who are most in need of a secure 
legal status and those who face the greatest hurdles 
along the way towards building a new life in the 
host society.
Regarding the long-term status of refugees that are 
currently entering Europe, the more immediately 
relevant question is that of what kind of legal statuses 
and protection the new refugees are offered. In this 
chapter, I reflect on the relevance of citizenship 
acquisition – and legal status transition more 
broadly – for migrant integration. After reviewing 
the literature on citizenship and integration, I 
present and discuss existing evidence with regard 
to three questions. First, what do we know about 
the variation in requirements for citizenship 
acquisition across European countries? I focus 
especially on ordinary naturalisation procedures 
and compare them with those providing facilitated 
2 Quoted from http://mipex.eu/access-nationality 
[accessed 16 September 2016].
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access to citizenship for refugees. Second, what 
do we know about the extent to which migrants 
actually acquire citizenship? I present the available 
statistics and key findings from the literature with 
a focus on cross-national variation. Third, what 
do we know about how citizenship matters for 
integration? I present and discuss the key findings 
from the literature and identify some notable gaps. 
I conclude the chapter with a reflection on how 
these findings can be used to contribute to current 
policy debates and on some key theoretical and 
empirical challenges.
2. Citizenship and immigrant 
integration
For foreign-born residents and their children, 
obtaining citizenship in the host country 
confers membership, rights and participation 
opportunities, and encourages a sense of 
belonging (Bloemraad 2006). However, whether 
and especially under which conditions citizenship 
stimulates integration remain open questions. 
Both immigrant naturalisation rates and the 
associated integration outcomes are characterised 
by significant heterogeneity. To put it simply, not 
all migrants have an equal interest in acquiring 
destination country citizenship, and even when 
they naturalise this new status does not bring the 
same consequences for all. 
Citizenship is a legal status and a relationship 
between an individual and a state that entails 
specific legal rights and duties, such as the right 
to reside without restriction in the territory of the 
state of citizenship, the right to vote in elections 
and the right to hold public office or be employed 
in selected public sector jobs.3 If migrants hold 
the citizenship of the country where they reside, 
3  See, e.g., the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Citizenship Glossary 
at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary/
glossary#Cithip [accessed 13 September 2016]. In some countries, 
the status may be called ‘nationality’ rather than citizenship and 
persons holding the status are referred to as nationals rather 
than citizens. For the sake of consistency, I refer to ‘citizenship’ 
throughout the paper, except when citing legal documents that 
directly refer to ‘nationality.’
this is commonly viewed as the most advanced 
legal status they can obtain. However, a range 
of alternative legal statuses may be available to 
them, either related to the grounds on the basis 
of which they have been admitted to the territory 
of the state, such as residence permits related to 
work, study, family reunification or humanitarian 
grounds, or a residence status proving the right to 
permanent residence, such as the Green Card in 
the US or the permit in the EU for so-called ‘long-
term resident third-country nationals’, i.e. persons 
without the citizenship of one of the EU member 
states “who have resided legally and continuously 
within the territory of a member state for five 
years immediately prior to the submission of the 
relevant application” (Directive 2003/109/EC, art. 
4, under 1).4
In this chapter, I understand integration in a broad 
sense as the process by which immigrants become 
accepted into society, both as individuals and 
as groups (Penninx 2003). This definition 
deliberately views integration as a process rather 
than as an endpoint and is also deliberately open 
as to what precisely determines the acceptance 
of immigrants in a society, which may after all 
vary from one receiving society to another. In a 
formal sense, the acquisition of citizenship itself 
may be viewed as the ultimate form of integration 
as naturalised migrants acquire a status that 
provides (nearly)5 equal rights to those of the 
majority population, such as the right of abode, of 
diplomatic protection, of political franchise and of 
access to public sector jobs that are restricted to 
citizens. In a practical sense, citizenship may not 
‘matter’ much, if naturalised immigrants continue 
4  Citizens of EU member states do not need a residence 
permit and have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states, within the constraints set by 
Directive 2004/38/EC.
5  In some countries, the rights of naturalised immigrants 
may be restricted in that some selected high political offices are 
only open to ‘natural born’ citizens. Countries may also apply 
denaturalisation rules, which allow deprivation of citizenship 
within a certain time period after naturalisation (e.g. for being 
convicted for major crimes or terrorist activities), which in practice 
leads to a form of conditional citizenship.
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to face discrimination – e.g. in the labour market 
– or they lack the human capital to make full use 
of their newly acquired status. For some migrants, 
the security of residence and access to the labour 
market tied to permanent residence may provide 
sufficient legal security and opportunities, without 
them seeing a need to naturalise.
Investigating the relationship between citizenship 
and integration poses methodological challenges, 
as better-integrated immigrants are also more likely 
to naturalise (OECD 2011). A key limitation of 
existing studies is also that they mostly investigate 
these relationships within only one societal 
context. This is problematic if one assumes, as I do 
(building on Yang 1994; Dronkers and Vink 2012; 
Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers 2013; Peters 
and Vink 2016; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016a, 
b), that: 
• migrants have different motivations to natu-
ralise and these are partly associated with 
origin factors and the individual life course 
– hence demographic contexts and family 
situations matter greatly; 
• pathways into citizenship are conditioned by 
the institutional contexts in both origin and 
destination countries with regard to accept-
ance of dual citizenship, length of required 
residence, language and integration require-
ments and the socioeconomic context; and 
• the potential ‘integration premium’ associated 
with naturalisation is conditioned by the tra-
jectory into citizenship – especially the time 
to naturalisation. 
Hence, citizenship does not matter in the same 
way when it is acquired by a young immigrant 
of working age after only a few years of residence 
in the destination country as when it is acquired 
by an older immigrant near the end of her or 
his working life after having already lived in the 
country for years. Immigrants naturalising to 
secure citizenship for their children, as is often 
necessary in Europe, also tell a different story 
to that of educated immigrants in the US whose 
native-born children are already citizens since 
birth and who seek better employability in the 
public sector.   
From this perspective, the ambiguous findings in 
the literature on the consequences of citizenship 
are hardly surprising (cf. Peters and Vink 2016). 
For example, whereas some find evidence of a 
positive association between citizenship and 
labour market integration (Bratsberg et al 2002; 
Steinhardt 2012; Helgertz et al 2014), others 
find no such effect (Chiswick 1978; Bevelander 
and Veenman 2006; Scott 2008). Remarkably, 
however, these varying outcomes are often seen as 
undermining the overall significance of citizenship 
for migrants, with some scholars and decision-
makers arguing for the existence of a citizenship 
premium and others against it, especially in the 
context of labour market integration. However, 
rather than focusing on whether immigrant legal 
status transitions matter, especially those from 
being a foreigner to being a citizen, I argue that 
the focus should be on why, how and for whom 
such transitions matter. 
There are two key implications of this view of 
naturalisation, which builds on recent applications 
of the sociological life-course paradigm to the 
literature on migration and integration (Wingens 
et al 2011). First, we should think about the 
relevance of legal status transitions from a double-
context perspective: the relevance of naturalisation 
depends both on the institutional context under 
which citizenship (or alternative legal statuses) 
is made available; and on the personal context of 
the country of origin and the life situation of an 
individual migrant. Second, viewing the relevance 
of legal status transitions within the life-course 
trajectory of migrants also means that we should 
think less of citizenship acquisition as a one-off 
transition from foreigner to citizen, and more as a 
pathway or a ‘road to citizenship’ (Aptekar 2015). 
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Whereas most of the literature is focused on 
the citizenship premium in the labour market, 
or on citizenship and political participation, 
there is additional – though patchy – evidence 
on how legal status transitions matter for living 
conditions, mobility trajectories and educational 
outcomes among migrant children, among other 
things (see Bloemraad 2017 for a broad overview). 
The remainder of this section will briefly review 
the state of the art in these various domains. 
Citizenship and socioeconomic 
integration6
Given the structural challenges immigrants face in 
the labour market (Algan et al. 2010), citizenship 
provides the potential to mitigate some of these 
disadvantages as it removes restrictions on public 
sector jobs, increases employment opportunities 
and lowers the administrative costs of hiring 
and retaining a migrant (Bauböck et al 2013). 
However, the sociological life-course approach 
points to a hypothesis, which has not yet been 
systematically tested, that the impact of citizenship 
acquisition on labour market outcomes is 
conditioned both by the institutional setting of 
the destination context and by the demographic 
composition of its migrant population. Sweden, 
for example, houses a relatively large number of 
refugees who are highly motivated to naturalise 
in order to reinforce their legal position in the 
host country. However, refugees are particularly 
disadvantaged in the labour market (Krahn et 
al 2000), which may go some way to explaining 
ambiguous findings on the relationship between 
citizenship and labour-market integration in 
Sweden. Understanding the potential impact 
of a life event such as naturalisation requires a 
biographical perspective. For example, Steinhardt 
(2012) finds that naturalisation offers no wage 
benefit to women, which may be understandable 
from the perspective that women who have 
chosen to remain highly active in the labour 
6  This section builds on Peters and Vink (2016).
market in spite of alternative life-course patterns 
(part-time work or leaving the labour market) are 
positively selected. The challenge is thus to identify 
how the impact of naturalisation is mediated by 
factors (being married and having children, and 
contextual factors that facilitate integration in the 
labour market) which in themselves influence 
the propensity to naturalise. In other words, 
while recognising that naturalisation is a selective 
process and may be reversely influenced by labour 
market performance, both individual-level and 
contextual factors are expected to mediate this 
relationship. 
Citizenship and political 
participation
Beyond work and income, citizenship is closely 
tied to democratic participation, as naturalisation 
gives access to rights that are often, though not 
always, exclusive to citizens. Besides voting, 
however, citizenship may encourage political 
participation in a broader sense. Examples of 
non-electoral forms of political participation 
include conventional acts (such as contacting a 
politician or government official, participating 
in a political campaign or becoming a member 
of a political party) and ‘unconventional’ types 
of political activity (participating in protests 
and boycotts, and signing petitions). In liberal 
democracies, these forms of non-electoral 
participation are, at least theoretically, equally 
open to natives and immigrants (whether citizens 
or non-citizens) alike, yet one would not expect 
all residents in a country to be equally active. 
A number of individual resources are typically 
viewed as prerequisites for political participation 
– time, money, civic skills, civic engagement and 
language skills – and differences would in the first 
place be expected on the basis of socio-economic 
background, especially educational attainment. 
In addition to such factors, immigrants often 
come from countries with dramatically different 
political cultures to those of the countries of 
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destination. For them, participation in political 
activities, especially those that go beyond the 
act of voting, requires additional effort and is 
less self-evidently possible than for natives. It is 
sometimes argued that citizenship, as the most 
secure legal status provided to immigrants and as 
it includes a set of entitlements providing access 
to co-determining political decision-making in a 
country, may encourage immigrants to engage in 
political activism beyond the exercise of suffrage.
Previous research, however, has produced mixed 
results. Some North American studies (e.g. Verba 
et al. 1995; Barreto and Muñoz 2003, Levin 2013) 
have found little correlation between citizenship 
status and participation, while others (e.g. Leal 
2002) have found the opposite. In Europe, some 
single-country or limited multi-country studies 
suggest the existence of a positive relationship 
between citizenship and the non-electoral political 
participation of foreign-born residents (e.g. Giugni 
and Passy 2004; Bevelander and Pendakur 2011). 
On the basis of a larger comparative study, Just 
and Anderson (2012) reveal a positive relationship 
between citizenship and non-electoral political 
participation among foreign-born residents, but 
find that citizenship is a statistically significant 
determinant of political action only among those 
respondents who arrived from less democratic 
countries, and only for non-institutionalized 
political acts. De Rooij (2012: 469) draws similar 
conclusions, determining that the effect of 
citizenship on unconventional participation is 
only significant for non-Western immigrants.
Citizenship and living conditions
Employment and income are evidently crucial 
to the societal incorporation of immigrants and 
reflect the relative success of migrants in this regard. 
However, labour market outcomes only tell part 
of the story. One important area that has received 
some attention in the literature, although mostly in 
the American context, is the role of citizenship in 
relation to immigrants’ living conditions. The key 
indicators in this area are, among others, quality 
of housing – measured in terms of the physical 
quality of accommodation and its location – and 
levels of home ownership. Research consistently 
shows better outcomes among naturalised 
immigrants (Borjas 2002; Hutcheson and Jeffers 
2012). However, doubts have been raised as to 
whether citizenship status can overcome the 
broader phenomenon of residential crowding, 
net of increased employment opportunities and 
income premiums associated with naturalisation 
(McConnell 2015). Improvements in living 
conditions are likely to significantly depend on 
demographic background, life-course stage, the 
economic resources of individuals and contextual 
conditions, such as public sector involvement in 
housing (Arbaci 2007). Based on these previous 
findings, it is expected that most upward mobility 
in terms of living conditions can be explained 
by positive selection into naturalisation and, for 
selected groups (e.g. highly educated immigrants), 
by a citizenship premium in the labour market. For 
home ownership, which requires interaction with 
financial and legal institutions, one may expect 
an additional positive impact of naturalisation 
for these groups. These hypotheses have so far 
not been tested systematically in a cross-national 
context with appropriate longitudinal data. 
Citizenship and out-migration
While a legal status transition from foreigner to 
citizen may be viewed as full assimilation in the 
destination context, transnationalist theories point 
to a more complex reality where migrants do not 
either settle in the destination country or return 
to their country of origin but may share intensive 
interactions in both contexts (Faist 2000). Rather 
than resulting in the stable settlement of migrants 
in the destination contexts, naturalisation may 
encourage return migration to the country of 
origin or out-migration to another destination. 
In this light, having dual citizenship provides 
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opportunities for circular mobility (Alarian and 
Goodman 2016). Return migration can be viewed 
as part of an optimal life-cycle residential location 
sequence (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). However, 
the naturalisation literature is almost completely 
focused on the single transition from foreigner 
to citizen rather than viewing this as part of a 
larger life-course trajectory. One exception is a 
paper by Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt (2012), 
who find that out-migrants are less likely to be 
naturalised German citizens and on average 
have spent fewer years in Germany than their 
counterparts who stay in the country. The study 
demonstrates the need to consider heterogeneity 
among immigrants, as this ‘negative mobility’ only 
applies to non-Turkish immigrants. It is unclear 
whether these findings can be generalised beyond 
the German context and, if so, whether the timing 
of naturalisation and/or having children with 
destination country citizenship matter for these 
out-migration decisions. 
Citizenship and the life course 
of migrant children
Citizenship also plays a crucial role in the lives of 
children, either directly through their citizenship 
status or indirectly through that of the parent(s). 
Granting citizenship at birth is ‘likely to exert an 
effect on children’s human capital because it raises 
the likelihood of a future in the host country and 
thus parents’ expectations about returns on specific 
host-country human capital investments (Saurer 
and Felfe 2014: 8). In contrast, growing up in a 
country without being formally recognized as a full 
member of society can adversely affect assimilation 
processes in a context where socioeconomic 
background and racial discrimination already 
challenge modes of incorporation. Nevertheless, 
the role of citizenship in the life course of native-
born descendants of immigrants (2nd generation) 
and children arriving in the destination country 
before adolescence (1.5 generation) has so far been 
largely overlooked in the literature. Especially in 
Europe, citizenship is predominantly attributed by 
descent from citizen parents (Vink and De Groot 
2010). As a result, children of second or even 
subsequent immigrant generations only acquire 
residence country citizenship at a later age, if at all. 
The most significant policy change in recent times 
has been in Germany, where since 2000 children 
born in the country automatically receive German 
citizenship under certain conditions. Studies show 
a positive impact of this introduction of birthright 
citizenship on educational attainment (Saurer 
and Felfe 2014). However, comparative research 
is scarce. Kilpi-Jakonen (2014) demonstrates 
that, after controlling for the higher propensity 
of immigrant children whose parents have higher 
education to have citizenship, second-generation 
students with Finnish citizenship are more 
likely to choose general rather than vocational 
upper secondary education compared to their 
peers without Finnish citizenship. Given the 
potential occupational and earnings opportunities 
associated with citizenship, the naturalisation of 
parents also impacts the educational attainment 
of migrants’ descendants (Bean et al 2011). These 
hypotheses lack systematic comparative testing so 
far.
3. Access to Citizenship 
According to international convention, states 
are sovereign in determining their constituent 
populations, which entails that within certain 
limits set by international law they can exclude 
populations inside their territory from citizenship 
or include others beyond their borders. As a 
result, there is significant variation between states 
with regard to both the rules governing access to 
citizenship and its loss (see Vink and Bauböck 
2013; Vink 2017).
For access to citizenship, on the one hand we 
can distinguish between ascriptive membership 
conceptions, mostly applicable through the 
acquisition of citizenship at birth, and voluntary 
membership conceptions, which imply a degree 
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of openness in terms of individual choice, both 
regarding acquisition (e.g. through ordinary 
naturalisation) and loss of citizenship (e.g. through 
voluntary renunciation of the status). Most states 
in Europe prioritize descent-based transmission 
of citizenship but use territorial access to 
citizenship to prevent what is generally accepted 
as the undesirable phenomenon of statelessness, 
as in the case of new-born babies whose descent 
cannot be established found in the territory of 
a state (Vink and De Groot 2010; cf. Vink and 
De Groot 2016). In contrast, other countries – 
such as most states in the Americas – prioritize 
territorial access to citizenship but simultaneously 
maintain rules allowing citizens residing outside 
the territory of the state to transmit citizenship to 
their offspring, with varying restrictions. In the 
sense that citizenship for most people is tied up 
with the mere fact of being born to citizens or in 
the territory of the ‘right’ country, there is a strong 
degree of arbitrariness in the way in which welfare 
entitlements associated with citizenship are 
distributed among the world population (Shachar 
2009). 
In addition to regulations determining citizenship 
at birth, states also maintain a variety of rules 
regarding the acquisition of citizenship after birth, 
such as by ordinary naturalisation or by facilitated 
naturalisation for the spouses of citizens, persons 
with a cultural affinity to the political community 
or refugees. Not only do rules on the acquisition 
of citizenship vary between states but so do rules 
on the loss of citizenship too. Due to limitations 
of space, I focus here exclusively on rules on 
the acquisition of citizenship after birth, and 
in particular provisions related to ordinary 
naturalisation and facilitated naturalisation for 
refugees.7 
7 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition and http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
loss for a comparative database of the existing regulations on the 
acquisition and loss of citizenship in 77 countries. 
Ordinary naturalisation
Ordinary naturalisation is a mode of acquisition 
after birth of a citizenship not previously held that 
requires an application by the person concerned 
or his or her legal agent. Whereas naturalisation 
was traditionally conferred with a discretionary 
act granting citizenship by a public authority, 
countries in Europe are increasingly adopting laws 
that provide for the nearly automatic acquisition 
of citizenship by a person who evidently fulfils 
the eligibility criteria and is thus entitled to such 
acquisition upon application. However, only 7 
of the 28 EU member states currently have such 
an entitlement to citizenship in their ordinary 
naturalisation procedures.8 Hence, in most 
countries the acquisition of citizenship remains 
based on a discretionary decision usually made by 
administrative officials.9 Such discretion reflects 
a contractual view of citizenship, where explicit 
consent is required, both by the person applying 
for citizenship and the community granting it 
(Orgad 2017). 
Apart from the legal uncertainty deriving from 
discretionary application procedures, a key 
implication of the contractual view – which 
seems widely held among the politicians and 
electorates designing these procedures – is that 
the way in which the eligibility requirements for 
naturalisation and other procedural requirements, 
such as fees, are designed is structurally biased 
towards the ‘supply side’, i.e. the state ‘supplying’ 
citizenship.10 In other words, certainly in the 
8  See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition, mode A06 [accessed 15 September 2016]. Also see 
Goodman (2010) for a comparative report on naturalisation 
policies in Europe.
9  Until recently in Switzerland, some municipalities used 
referendums to decide on the citizenship applications of foreign 
residents. Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013), using an original 
quasi-experimental design, demonstrate that discrimination on the 
basis of applicants’ origin-country characteristics had a significant 
impact on naturalisation rates among immigrant groups.
10  A further consequence, which I do not elaborate on 
here, is that a contractual view implies conditional allegiance by 
both parties to the contract: ‘allegiance and protection are the quid 
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economically most developed states in Europe, 
naturalisation policies reflect a seller’s market 
where there is much demand but limited supply, 
and ‘buyers’ of citizenship are at the mercy of what 
‘sellers’ demand for it.11 Such asymmetry between 
the interests of the citizenship-granting state and 
the citizenship-requesting individual is at odds 
with the ‘citizenship stakeholder’ principle, which 
assumes that the interests of the community and 
the prospective citizen are mutually constitutive 
(Bauböck 2017a, 2017b). In this alternative view, 
naturalisation policies should take into account 
not just supply-side concerns but also demand-side 
concerns and provide a pathway to citizenship to 
newcomers and their children as part of a general 
concern for democratic inclusion. 
pro quo of a mutual contract in which each is given in return for 
the other’ (Orgad 2017). The increasing popularity of citizenship 
deprivation rules can be viewed as a consequence of such a view: 
certain (criminal and terrorist) acts are seen as violating the 
citizenship ‘contract’ and thereby constitute a legitimate ground for 
ending the contract.
11 The ‘citizenship for sale’ or ‘golden visa’ provisions in 
some countries reflect a different scenario, where states seek to 
attract economic investment through offering facilitated access 
to citizenship or residence (Dzankic 2012; Schachar and Bauböck 
2014).
The European Convention on Nationality (ECN), 
signed by 29 states and ratified by 20, provides 
‘that internal law should contain rules which 
make it possible for foreigners lawfully and 
habitually resident in the territory of a State Party 
to be naturalised’ (Article 6, under 3). While the 
ECN allows considerable discretion for states to 
‘fix other justifiable conditions for naturalisation, 
in particular as regards integration’ (ECN, 
Explanatory Report, Article 6, paragraph 3), it 
does set a maximum period of residence which 
can be required for naturalisation, namely ten 
years (before the lodging of an application). When 
we look at the current residence requirements in 
all 28 member states of the EU, we see that no 
state exceeds the maximum of ten years, yet there 
is considerable variation ranging from the most 
common requirement of 5 years in 12 countries to 
a 10-year requirement in Austria, Italy, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Spain (Figure 1). The average 
residence requirement is 6.8 years.
Figure 1. Residency requirement for ordinary naturalisation in EU28 (in years)
Source: www.eudo-citizenship.eu (situation 1 January 2016)*
* Additional residence requirements may apply.
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The nominal residence requirements in citizenship 
laws need to be interpreted with great care, as 
additional residence requirements often apply, 
such as a need for the residence period to be 
uninterrupted or the requirement of a permanent 
residence, either at the moment of application or 
even at the moment of starting to count the years 
of residence (Goodman 2010: 8-9). For example, 
although in Poland the citizenship law nominally 
requires 3 years’ residence, persons need to be in 
possession throughout this period of a permanent 
residence permit or a long-term EU residence 
permit, for which 5 years’ residence are required. 
Hence the minimum residence requirement for 
ordinary naturalisation in Poland is 8 years in total. 
In Portugal, 6 years’ legal residence is required, 
without any need to have permanent residence. 
In Denmark, by contrast, 9 years’ residence is 
required with a permanent residence permit at the 
time of application. In Austria, by far the country 
with the strictest residence requirements, 10 years 
of continuous residence is required, of which the 
5 years immediately before the application must 
be with a permanent resident permit. In practice, 
such additional residence requirements can have a 
significant impact on eligibility for naturalisation.12 
Access to ordinary naturalisation is also 
conditioned by the existence of, among other things, 
a) language requirements, b) so-called integration 
requirements, c) economic requirements, d) the 
fees required to start the application procedure, 
and e) a requirement to renounce one’s previous 
citizenship. Regarding language requirements, 
we find that most EU member states nowadays 
have a formalized language requirement, either 
at level A2 (‘Can understand sentences and 
frequently used expressions related to areas of 
most immediate relevance’) or level B1 (‘Can 
understand the main points of clear standard input 
on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, 
school, leisure etc.’) from the Common European 
Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). 
12  See EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory 2016 for a more 
detailed measurement of ‘citizenship law indicators’.
Some states maintain high, but unstandardized 
language requirements, as is the case in Hungary, 
Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Spain (MIPEX 
2015). Only two countries, Ireland and Sweden, 
have no formal language requirements at all in the 
citizenship law (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Language requirements for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28
Source: MIPEX (2015)
While having language skills enables a person to 
participate in society, for example in the labour 
market and in political decision-making (e.g. 
elections), and thus ensures a basis for active 
citizenship, overly high requirements may 
also provide a significant barrier to accessing 
citizenship. The obstacles may relate both to literacy 
requirements and to the costs associated with 
acquiring such language skills, as in many states 
it is up to the immigrant to arrange and finance 
her or his own language training. According to 
Goodman (2010), the number of countries with a 
formal language test increased from six in 1998 to 
sixteen in 2010.
Integration requirements also vary significantly 
between states. Such requirements demand 
sufficient knowledge of a country’s history, 
political institutions and/or the habits and 
traditions of its society and are often seen as 
part of a trend towards ‘fortifying citizenship’ 
(Goodman 2012).13 They may be found either 
13  How to categorise and measure such integration 
requirements is subject to considerable controversy (Goodman 
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as requirements for permanent residence or for 
citizenship, or for both. Whereas the argument for 
language skills is that they provide an important 
basis for a migrant’s integration within society, 
requiring migrants to obtain and reproduce such 
‘civic knowledge’ has been much more contested 
(e.g. Bauböck and Joppke 2010). According to 
information from MIPEX (2015), in 2015 eleven 
EU28 states required a formal citizenship test. 
Two states, Belgium and Luxembourg, only 
required applicants to have taken an integration 
course, whereas in six states integration was 
assessed in an informal interview. Nine states had 
no formal integration requirement for citizenship 
acquisition. Barriers to citizenship relate both to 
intellectual requirements and the costs associated 
with acquiring sufficient knowledge, as in many 
states it is up to the immigrant to arrange and 
finance her or his own training. Only in two 
countries where there is a formal test (Estonia 
and Germany) does the state provide sufficient 
courses. In the other nine countries it is up to 
the immigrant to arrange this for herself (MIPEX 
2015). 
Figure 3. Integration requirements for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28
Source: MIPEX (2015)
In terms of economic requirements, about half of 
the EU28 states, mostly in Central and Eastern 
Europe plus Austria, Denmark and Italy, require 
applicants to demonstrate that they have a stable 
2010; Michalowski and Van Oers 2012).
and sufficient source of income, or some similar 
type of requirement. Other states, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK, do not have such income 
requirements but instead require applicants to pay 
a considerable fee. In the Netherlands, a single 
application for naturalisation costs €855 and an 
application for a family of two parents and two 
children would amount to €1343. Note that these 
fees are to be paid irrespective of the outcome 
of the application and do not include additional 
costs for language training and civics courses.14 
In the UK, the fee for ordinary naturalisation is 
£1236 for each adult applicant and £936 for each 
child under the age of 18 (plus an additional £80 to 
cover the ceremony fee if the child turns 18 during 
the application process).15 According to MIPEX 
(2015), the average fee in the EU28 is around €250 
per person, yet there is considerable variation. 
Only in 11 states are the application costs below 
€100 per person, whereas in 17 other states the 
fees exceed €100. In two states (Austria and the 
UK) they even amount to more than €1000 per 
person. This makes naturalisation prohibitively 
costly.
Figure 4. Fees (in euros) for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28
Source: MIPEX (2015)
Additional procedural requirements may still 
discourage immigrants from applying or may lead 
14  See https://ind.nl/EN/individuals/dutch-citizenship/
costs-income-requirements [accessed 26 January 2017].
15  See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fees-
for-citizenship-applications [accessed 17 September 2016].
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to rejections for those who do apply. For example, 
in the Netherlands the Research Department 
of the Ministry of Security and Justice recently 
investigated why so few migrants whose asylum 
applications had been rejected but who had been 
granted regular residence status as part of an 
extraordinary regularization in 2007 had submitted 
an application for naturalisation (only around 
30% have naturalised). Not being in possession of 
the right documents from the country of origin 
was indicated as by far the main obstacle for the 
respondents to a survey (71% indicated they did 
not have the appropriate documents, even though 
nearly all said they had tried to obtain them). 
Whereas recognized refugees are exempted from 
such identity requirements, as they cannot be 
expected to return to the country from which they 
have fled, these ‘regularized migrants’ had to meet 
the regular identity requirements, even though 
many cite opposition from authorities, difficulties 
traveling to the country of origin and the high 
costs involved in trying to obtain the proper 
paperwork as the main problems they encounter. 
Under current regulations in the Netherlands 
it is difficult to prove that one cannot get the 
documents needed and exceptions are rarely made 
(WODC 2015). 
Finally, whereas most states in the EU (and 
Denmark as one of the most recent to do so in 
2015) have now removed the somewhat outdated 
provision of asking a naturalising immigrant to 
renounce her or his previous citizenship, there are 
still eight states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Slovenia) that maintain such a renunciation 
requirement.
Facilitated naturalisation for 
refugees
The 1951 Refugee Convention requires that 
‘Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate 
the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. 
They shall in particular make every effort to 
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce 
as far as possible the charges and costs of such 
proceedings’ (Article 34). In his commentary on 
the Convention, Grahl-Madsen (1963) emphasizes 
that ‘[n]aturalization in a country of refuge is one 
of the possibilities for putting an end to a person’s 
refugee character’ (comment 1 on Article 34). 
What is meant in Article 34 is in fact the laying 
of foundations, or stepping stones, so that the 
refugee may familiarize himself with the language, 
customs and way of life of the nation among 
whom he lives, so that he – without any feeling of 
coercion – may be more readily integrated in the 
economic, social and cultural life of his country of 
refuge. 
Language courses, vocational adaptation courses, 
lectures on national institutions and social pattern, 
and above all stimulation of social contacts 
between refugees and the indigenous population, 
are but some of the means which may be employed 
for the purpose. 
By facilitating “assimilation” the Contracting 
State is to a certain extent also facilitating the 
naturalisation of refugees: In the sense the word 
is used in Article 34, “assimilation” is “an apt 
description of a certain stage in the development 
of the life of the refugee and of the general refugee 
problem”; indeed it “clearly corresponded to the 
conditions the refugee should fulfil in order to 
qualify for naturalisation” (ibid., comment 3). 
Naturalisation may be facilitated in a number of 
ways, for example by a ‘less rigid implementation 
of financial criteria’, by waiving the requirement 
to be released from one’s former citizenship, or by 
a shorter residence requirement. Grahl-Madsen 
argues that Article 34 of the Convention requires 
fair treatment of refugees, but no better treatment 
than that accorded to other aliens if that treatment 
is a favourable one (ibid., comment 4). 
A comparable requirement to facilitate the 
acquisition of citizenship for ‘recognised refugees’ 
can be found in the ECN (Art. 6, under 4(g)). The 
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Explanatory Report clarifies this obligation as 
follows:
In order to comply with this paragraph, 
it is sufficient for a State Party to ensure 
favourable conditions for the acquisition 
of nationality for the persons belonging 
to each of the categories of persons 
listed in the sub-paragraphs. Examples 
include a reduction of the length of 
required residence, less stringent language 
requirements, an easier procedure and 
lower procedural fees. States Parties still 
retain their discretion to decide whether to 
grant their nationality to such applicants. 
Where the generally required conditions 
are already very favourable (for example a 
short period of residence for all applicants 
for naturalisation), such States are not 
required to take additional measures 
(Explanatory Report to the ECN, Art. 6, 
paragraph 4, consideration 52). 
Looking at the existing regulations in EU member 
states, it is remarkable that eight states have no 
specific provisions related to refugees. In other 
states, facilitation is minimal. In the Netherlands, 
the only facilitation mentioned in the law itself 
is a waiver of the requirement to renounce 
one’s previous citizenship (additionally, the 
naturalisation fee is lowered from €840 to €625). 
In Denmark, the residence requirement is lowered 
from 9 to 8 years. Overall, whereas the average 
number of years of residence required for ordinary 
naturalisation in the EU28 is 7 years, for refugees it 
is 4.5 years. While this amounts to a considerable 
facilitation, in 7 member states the residence 
requirement for naturalisation by refugees is still 
six years or more. One state (Lithuania) requires 
the same extraordinary length of time (10 years) 
for both ordinary naturalisation and that of 
refugees. Such requirements clearly violate what 
the UNHCR considers best practice ‘in order 
to restore an effective nationality to refugees 
and to enable their full integration into society’, 
namely a residency requirement not exceeding 
five years (UNHCR 2009: 3). UNHCR is also 
concerned that time spent by refugees prior to 
determination of their application does not “slow 
down refugees’ route to citizenship” (ibid.). In 
Ireland, discretionary exemption from residence 
and other requirements is possible and in practice 
refugees are exempted from income requirements, 
yet time spent in the country as an asylum seeker 
is not reckonable for the purpose of making an 
application, according to a High Court judgment 
(Becker and Cosgrave 2013: 4). 
4. Acquisition of 
Citizenship 
So what do we know about how many migrants 
acquire citizenship in the EU? Overall, based 
on statistics reported by the member states, we 
know that on average around 850,000 persons a 
year acquired the citizenship of one of the EU28 
member states between 2009 and 2014 (Eurostat 
2016). 
In a population of over 500 million inhabitants, 
that number is not very significant (around 0.17 
percent). Even when looking at the citizenship 
acquisition rate among the resident foreign 
population (a standard measure of the relative 
societal impact of the number of naturalisations), 
only 2.6 in a hundred resident non-nationals were 
granted citizenship in one of the EU’s member 
states in 2014 (Figure 5). 
SECTION 1: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES | CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES IN RELATION TO THE 
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink
36
Figure 5. Annual rate of acquisition of citizenship per 100 resident foreigners, 2014
Table 1. Cumulative rate of acquisition of 
citizenship among foreign-born population in 
EU15 (per cohort of years of residence), in %, 
2008
Years of residence
6 to 10 11 to 19 20+
AUSTRIA 18.90 41.60 62.76
BELGIUM 24.07 50.40 55.52
DENMARK 14.36 52.13 61.86
FRANCE 18.54 36.91 60.55
GERMANY 28.72 56.97 46.38
GREECE 7.57 25.61 56.77
IRELAND 12.01 32.78 56.44
ITALY 7.98 17.66 60.19
LUXEMBOURG 2.05 8.22 19.61
NETHERLANDS 36.70 70.22 80.23
PORTUGAL 3.93 31.45 58.55
SPAIN 13.26 31.77 54.46
SWEDEN 60.94 85.40 79.18
UK 26.30 51.70 66.51
Mean 18.81 45.40 62.70
Source: Vink and Prokic-Breuer (2012)*
* Data from LFS Ad Hoc Module 2008. No data available for 
Finland
Source: Eurostat (2016: Figure 5)
* These numbers may include naturalisations both by persons resident in the territory of a state and by persons resident abroad.
More meaningful estimates of citizenship 
acquisition rates among the foreign-born 
population are available based on micro-data 
from comparative surveys. For example, on the 
basis of data from the 2008 Labour Force Survey 
Ad Hoc Module on the labour market situation of 
migrants and their descendants in the EU15, we 
find that an average of only 19% of the immigrant 
population had acquired citizenship after 10 
years of residence (Table 1). Nevertheless, there 
is significant variation, with up to 60% of the 
immigrant population having naturalised in 
Sweden but only 2% in Luxembourg. After twenty 
years of residence the average acquisition rate 
increased to 45% (and 85% in Sweden). Among 
the population resident longer than 20 years, on 
average 63% had naturalised in the EU15. While 
this is a significant percentage, it still means that 
there was a group of nearly 40% of immigrants 
(and 80% in Luxembourg) who had not naturalised 
after residing over 20 years in a country. 
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Analysing micro-level survey data also allows 
a better understanding of the relevance of 
individual-, origin country- and context-level 
factors to the acquisition of citizenship by migrants. 
The following paragraphs summarize the results 
of a comparative study by Vink, Prokic-Breuer 
and Dronkers (2013) on the effects of citizenship 
policies in European countries on the propensity 
to naturalise, taking into account not only 
characteristics of individuals, but also their origin 
country features. In particular, the study looked 
at the relevance of destination country policies in 
the context of origin country features, such as the 
level of development of the origin country, and 
dual citizenship policies. The study was based on 
a sample of 7,489 foreign-born residents in 16 
European countries collected by the European 
Social Survey. The study was innovative because 
where any comparative research had been done 
on the effects of destination country policies the 
conclusion had been that indeed ‘policy matters’ 
(Bloemraad 2002; Reichel 2011; Dronkers and 
Vink 2012) but few scholars had investigated the 
question of to whom citizenship policy matters 
most (if at all). 
Vink et al (2013) first look at typical factors, such 
as origin country and individual-level variables. 
The level of human development of countries 
of origin accounts for much of the difference 
among the propensity of immigrants to naturalise. 
Immigrants in Europe coming from medium and 
under-developed countries are on average 2.5 
times more likely to have citizenship than those 
originating from highly developed countries, 
including EU member states and other OECD 
countries. These findings are in line with the 
literature and can be understood in terms of the 
perceived payoff attached to citizenship (Jasso 
and Rosenzweig 1986: 303; Bueker 2005; Logan 
et al. 2012). Acquiring destination-country 
citizenship has a much higher potential pay-off 
for immigrants originating from low-income 
countries than for those coming from developed 
and more prosperous societies. 
Crucially, because large differences exist between 
immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, Vink 
et al (2013) show that the impact of citizenship 
policies varies for the above two groups (Figure 
6). As discussed previously, the legal frameworks 
set by the citizenship laws in destination countries 
account for different naturalisation rates, but only 
for immigrants from less developed countries. 
In fact, not only are these immigrants twice as 
likely to naturalise in countries with very open 
citizenship policies, but they are also the ones 
particularly affected by these policies.
Figure 6. The relation between citizenship policies and immigrant naturalisation rates, EU15 (by 
level of development of origin country)*
* HDI = Human Development Index
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Vink et al (2013) demonstrate the relevance of 
policy by introducing an indicator that captures the 
openness of citizenship policy in the destination 
countries for first-generation immigrants with 
regard to residency and integration requirements 
for naturalisation (MIPEX Access to Nationality). 
They observe that an increase of 1 unit on the 
MIPEX scale leads to a 2.4 percent increase in 
the likelihood of having destination country 
citizenship. However, only in the case of 
immigrants from under-developed countries 
do they observe a sharp increase in citizenship 
take-up rates. In other words, immigrants who 
are highly motivated to naturalise, in particular 
refugees or migrants from politically unstable 
countries more generally, are especially strongly 
affected by restrictive access to citizenship. For 
immigrants from highly developed and politically 
stable countries the positive relation between 
citizenship policy and naturalisation rates is 
weaker and not significant. 
We find a similar differentiated impact of 
citizenship laws on naturalisation rates when 
looking in more detail at longitudinal data from 
the Netherlands. In research with Floris Peters 
Figure 7. Cumulative acquisition rates (proportions not naturalised or foreign) among migrant 
cohorts 1995-1997 (a) and 2000-2002 (b), by political stability of origin country, in the Netherlands
Source: Peters et al (2016), Figure A1 
and Hans Schmeets, we analysed population 
register data from the Netherlands for the period 
since 1995. In this analysis, we looked at foreign-
born residents in the Netherlands and included 
statistical controls for the country of origin and 
the individual characteristics of immigrants 
(Peters et al, 2016a). We found that a restriction 
of the Dutch citizenship law in April 2003 had 
a significantly negative impact on immigrant 
naturalisation rates. Among immigrants who 
arrived in the Netherlands in 1995, 1996 or 1997 
on average 58 per cent were naturalised after 10 
years. However, among the cohorts from 2000, 
2001 and 2002, only 42 per cent were naturalised 
after a similar period. These differences are even 
greater if you look at the groups who are most 
in need of citizenship, such as immigrants from 
less developed countries or those from politically 
unstable countries (Figure 7).
We compared immigrants from cohorts that could 
still naturalise under the pre-2003 legislation and 
those who could only do so under the stricter 
2003 law. We found that for immigrants from 
politically stable countries the propensity to 
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naturalise is virtually the same for the pre- and 
post-2003 cohorts. However, for immigrants 
from politically unstable countries the difference 
is significant: immigrants from cohorts that fall 
under the stricter 2003 legislation naturalise later 
and less often. In other words, we see that policy 
does matter, especially for those immigrants who 
are most interested in acquiring the citizenship of 
the country in which they live. It is not just that 
under the 2003 law these immigrants postpone 
naturalisation, but they seem to be put off 
altogether. As a result of the demotivating effect 
of the restrictive measures, we expect that the still 
high cumulative naturalisation rates measured in 
the Netherlands in 2008 (Table 1) will gradually 
decrease over time.
5. Pathways to Citizenship 
and Socio-Economic 
Integration 
In this section I provide some brief evidence from 
ongoing research with Peters and Schmeets on 
the relationship between citizenship acquisition 
and socio-economic outcomes, in particular 
having paid employment, among migrants in the 
Netherlands. 
Anticipating citizenship (Peters 
et al, 2016b)
Can citizenship improve the economic integration 
of immigrants? In this paper we develop the 
argument that migrants anticipate the rewards 
of citizenship by investing in their human capital 
development, such as by acquiring language 
skills. In line with a life-course approach to 
immigrant naturalisation (Peters and Vink 2016), 
we hypothesize that this anticipation mechanism 
is reflected in improved labour market outcomes, 
not so much – or certainly not only – after 
naturalisation, as assumed in most of the literature, 
but already before the acquisition of citizenship. 
To test this argument, we use micro-level register 
data from Statistics Netherlands from 1999 to 
2011 (N = 94,320). To analyse these data in 
further detail, and in line with contemporary 
studies in the literature, we use individual fixed-
effects regression methodology (Bratsberg et 
al. 2002; Helgertz et al. 2014; Steinhardt 2012). 
The main reason for this approach is that it 
addresses the potential bias resulting from self-
selection inherent in the naturalisation process by 
controlling for differences between individuals in 
terms of unmeasured characteristics. 
The results show that immigrants who naturalise 
enjoy a one-off boost in the probability of 
paid employment after citizenship acquisition, 
constituting an increase of 12 and 13 percent for 
men and women respectively, everything else 
remaining constant. However, consistent with 
the notion of anticipation, their labour market 
performance already improves before the year of 
naturalisation and we observe a steep increase 
in the probability of having paid employment as 
migrants approach the moment of naturalisation. 
Labour market performance peaks in the year of 
naturalisation for male immigrants, and the year 
after naturalisation for female immigrants. At 
that point, both male and female immigrants are 
more than twice as likely to have paid employment 
compared to more than three years prior to 
naturalisation. This confirms that naturalisation 
is attractive to immigrants who struggle in the 
labour market. 
These findings contrast with the traditional 
causal theory of the citizenship premium in the 
literature, where positive labour market outcomes 
are assumed to be the direct result of citizenship 
acquisition (OECD 2011; Helgertz et al. 2014: 
344). The increase observed in the probability of 
having paid employment in the period leading 
up to the moment of naturalisation shows that 
immigrants anticipate the reward of citizenship 
and that employers recognize and respond to the 
developing skills of potential workers, rather than 
citizenship acquisition itself. As such, naturalised 
immigrants enjoy an accelerated integration 
process rather than a sustained long-term 
advantage in the labour market.
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The faster, the better (Vink et 
al, 2016)
In a second paper, we argue that the potential 
positive impact of citizenship acquisition on labour 
market outcomes is conditioned by the trajectory 
into the acquisition of this legal status, and we 
test the hypothesis that the longer the waiting 
period the smaller the impact of citizenship (cf. 
Bevelander and DeVoretz 2014). In line with 
a life-course perspective on naturalisation, the 
idea behind this hypothesis is that acquisition of 
citizenship no longer positively affects the labour 
market outcome after an immigrant has already 
resided in the destination country for a significant 
period. This is not to say that citizenship will not 
have specific benefits at that stage (e.g. it will offer 
more flexible mobility and may facilitate return 
migration) but we would not expect it to affect a 
migrant’s human capital development in the way 
that it would if the migrant naturalised after just 
a few years of residence (when it may encourage 
a fast-track integration trajectory through 
anticipation mechanisms, as demonstrated above). 
To test this argument, we use micro-level register 
data from Statistics Netherlands from 1999 to 
2011 (N = 197,245) and apply a logistic regression 
method to analyse the probability of having 
paid employment. We include a 1-year lagged 
dependent variable in the module to control for 
otherwise unobserved personal characteristics.
We show that the positive impact of citizenship 
is especially visible in the early years of residence 
in the new country, but that after seven years the 
rewards diminish significantly (Figure 8). Migrants 
who naturalise within ten years of having arrived 
in the Netherlands have a higher propensity to 
have paid employment. However, this propensity 
is significantly higher when migrants naturalise 
relatively early on, especially in the fourth year 
after arrival (59 per cent for men; 47 per cent for 
women).16 However, men who naturalise after five 
years of residence in the Netherlands (thus in the 
sixth year) still have a 20 per cent higher chance 
of having paid work compared to those migrants 
who do not naturalise at all; among women this 
propensity is even 32 per cent higher. From the 
eighth year of residence, naturalisation has a 
much lower impact (9 and 8 per cent for men and 
women respectively). From this perspective, there 
is no empirical evidence to support the current 
legislative proposal (approved by the Lower House, 
pending discussion in the Senate) to increase the 
residence requirement from five to seven years (or 
even to ten years, as some parties are proposing in 
their current electoral manifestos). These findings 
chime with evidence from Hainmueller et al 
(2016), who find that lengthy asylum processes 
16  Under Dutch legislation, these will be migrants with 
a Dutch partner, who are allowed to naturalise after 3 years of 
marriage or civil partnership. We include a statistical control for 
having a Dutch partner, either foreign-born or native-born, which 
has an independent significant positive impact on having paid 
employment.
Figure 8. Relative propensity of paid employment among naturalised immigrants in the 
Netherlands, cohorts 1999-2002, by years of residence at the moment of naturalisation
Source: Vink et al (2016)
Graph based on analyses controlling for years of residence, age at migration, partner status (foreign partner, foreign-born Dutch, native-
born Dutch, no partner), having young children in the household, country of origin (EU vs. third country) and a 1-year lagged dependent 
variable.
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decrease employment among refugees. For newly 
arriving refugees, what matters for their societal 
integration (through employment) is thus a clear 
pathway toward inclusion, both through a speedy 
asylum determination procedure and an accessible 
trajectory towards citizenship.
6. Concluding reflections
How can these findings inform targeted policy 
decisions aimed at maximizing the settlement 
success of immigrants and their children? Both 
the studies discussed in the previous section 
illustrate that citizenship status relates significantly 
to integration outcomes for immigrants, in this 
case with regard to paid employment, but that 
we should start thinking about the relevance 
of legal status beyond seeing it as some kind 
of ‘magical device’ that may provide struggling 
migrants with, e.g., better access to the labour 
market. Migrants actively plan their lives and 
anticipate the potential rewards and opportunities 
of naturalisation by investing in their own futures. 
However, approaching citizenship as a ‘reward for 
integration’, as is often heard in political circles, 
from this perspective is a self-defeating prophecy, 
as integration is not a clearly defined end-state 
but rather a process, and making citizenship 
conditional on ever-stricter criteria makes 
‘becoming more accepted in society’ an elusive 
ambition instead of a realistic goal.
Analysing how and under which conditions status 
transitions affect migrant life-course trajectories 
allows us to better inform policymakers on the 
outcomes of immigrant naturalisation policies. 
These policies have been characterised by two 
developments over the past three decades: on the 
one hand, citizenship has become increasingly 
instrumentalised as part of a broader immigrant 
integration agenda; on the other hand, these 
policies have also become increasingly politicised 
(Vink and De Groot 2010). These two trends clearly 
have contradictory effects in terms of whether 
they make citizenship more or less accessible to 
migrants and their offspring.
While researchers have provided significant input 
for evidence-based policy-making in this domain, 
in Europe (OECD 2011) existing research does not 
facilitate informing decision-makers for two main 
reasons. First and foremost, by focusing research on 
the binary question of whether citizenship matters 
for immigrants, the literature overlooks significant 
heterogeneity and misses out on identifying why, 
under which conditions and to whom citizenship 
matters. In other words, whereas heterogeneous 
outcomes are often seen as undermining the 
overall significance of citizenship for immigrants, 
scholars should recognize and communicate to 
policymakers that what matters is the pathway into 
citizenship, not just the acquisition of the status as 
such. Researchers should also invest further efforts 
not just in sophisticated methodological strategies 
to deal with ‘the causality problem’ in citizenship 
and integration, but also in theoretical models that 
allow us to hypothesize these differential pathways 
in a broad range of life-course domains. The 
examples presented in Section 5 illustrate such 
an approach in the most commonly investigated 
domain, of labour market integration, but as was 
outlined in the literature review in Section 2, these 
models can and need to be applied in other fields 
too.
Second, partly driven by the high demand for 
longitudinal data, the most advanced research 
in the field focuses on single countries or at best 
includes limited comparisons. As a result, existing 
research does not facilitate drawing conclusions 
on the question most relevant to policymakers, 
that of the variable impact of policies on 
naturalisation outcomes. This is partly because 
suitable longitudinal data are scarcely available 
(although data derived from population registers 
as in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries 
provide a promising starting point) or are under-
used (intra-country variation over time is not 
currently optimally utilised to analyse the impact 
of policy changes). Moreover, whereas much of 
the research focuses on the symbolically – and 
arguably in practice – most relevant legal status 
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transition, i.e. that towards citizenship, there is 
much less evidence on the relevance of other types 
of legal status transitions, such as from asylum 
seeker to recognized refugee, or from ‘dead-end’ 
statuses only offering temporary protection to 
being an immigrant with permanent residence 
and eventually a citizen of the host country. Again, 
this is partly a reflection on the available data (e.g. 
in surveys and population registers information 
on citizenship status is often included, yet 
information on other types of statuses is mostly 
lacking). Whereas increasingly better comparable 
data exist on citizenship and integration policies, 
how such policies affect the relevant outcomes still 
leaves much to be investigated.
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CITIZENSHIP, 
DIVERSITY AND 
MOBILITY 
Kees Groenendijk  
Radboud University, Nijmegen
Maarten Vink’s paper clearly illustrates how a 
new methodological approach to an old question 
can produce new insights. Vink’s longitudinal 
‘life course perspective’ and his combination of 
information from different sources allow him to go 
beyond the old debate about the causal relationship 
between naturalisation and integration resulting 
from the more limited data used in the traditional 
binary approach to this issue. His research also 
produces results that are highly relevant in the 
current political debate in several EU Member 
States. I mention two examples. His findings 
that the labour market participation of migrants 
peaks before and not after naturalisation is highly 
relevant in the debate in states where politicians 
propose extending the residence requirement for 
naturalisation. In the Netherlands, a bill is pending 
in the Senate which would extend the current five-
year residence requirement (in place since 1892) 
to seven years. In its electoral programme for the 
March 2017 parliamentary elections, the largest 
current government party (VVD) announced 
plans for a further extension to ten years. The 
justification for these proposals is that they 
would support immigrant integration. The results 
from Vink’s research illustrate that the extension 
would have negative effects on the labour market 
participation of those immigrants who are most 
interested in acquiring citizenship. Moreover, his 
paper makes it clear that five to ten years after 
their arrival considerable numbers of refugees are 
still living in the country of refuge, however much 
both they and the receiving societies would prefer 
an early return to their countries of origin.
My first question is whether by presenting 
aggregate data the author does not underestimate 
the diversity within the population researched. 
The migrant population in his data is composed 
of refugees, nationals of other EU member states, 
spouses of nationals, economic migrants and in 
some cases co-ethnics. The differences within 
and between these categories remain invisible in 
aggregate quantitative data. For instance, the data 
presented in Figure 8 of Vink’s paper result from 
widely different behaviours between refugees 
and nationals from other EU member states, 
the former category having high naturalisation 
rates and the latter generally having much lower 
rates. Vink points to the large differences in the 
perceived payoff from naturalisation between 
the different immigrant groups. However, 
within certain groups the payoffs and the actual 
naturalisation practice also vary considerably. 
In the Netherlands, the naturalisation rates of 
nationals of southern and eastern Member States 
are far higher than among EU nationals from the 
northern and the neighbouring Member States.
Second, I doubt whether naturalisation generally 
reflects a deliberate choice by the migrant 
to remain and integrate in the society of his 
country of residence. In his introduction, Vink 
presents naturalisation as “a deliberate choice by 
immigrants to link their future with that of the host 
country.” This image often dominates the political 
and public debate. It may be true for the majority 
of applicants, at least at the time of naturalisation, 
but the reality is more diverse. The paper mentions 
out-migration after naturalisation. Recent data on 
the Netherlands give a first impression of the size 
and diversity of that out-migration. In 2009-2013 
a total of 44,000 persons originating from nine 
refugee-producing countries were naturalised. 
Within two years of their naturalisation 14% of 
these new Dutch nationals left the Netherlands. 
Some returned to their countries of origin, while 
others migrated to other EU Member States. 
Within two years of their naturalisation almost 40% 
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of the naturalised former-refugees from Bosnia, 
Iran, Iraq and Sudan returned to their countries of 
origin. Among former refugees from Afghanistan, 
Sierra Leone and Somalia the return rate was 
considerably lower (below 10%). The former 
refugees, who used the right to free movement 
within the EU attached to their new nationality, 
migrated from the Netherlands primarily to the 
UK (40%), to Belgium (9%) and to Germany (7%). 
More than half of the 6,000 new Dutch nationals 
who left the Netherlands within two years moved 
to these three EU Member States.1 Naturalisation 
enhances the mobility of new nationals, both to 
their countries of origin and within the EU.
Apparently, refugees’ acquisition of the nationality 
of their country of refuge enables their return to 
the county of origin, because it reduces the risks in 
returning through the protection attached to the 
new nationality. It also grants the right to come 
back to the country of the new nationality if the 
country of origin turns out to not yet be safe or 
the prospects of successful re-integration in that 
country is not yet positive. From anthropological 
research, it appears that out-migration to other 
EU Member States may be triggered by various 
factors: better labour market chances (perceived or 
real), easier access to self-employment in the UK, 
the presence of family members, or a larger and 
stronger community of co-ethnics.2 Naturalisation 
may be a liberalisation for those asylum seekers 
who did not intend to migrate to the Netherlands 
but were trapped in the Dublin system. In these 
cases, naturalisation functions as a correction to 
that system, which almost completely disregards 
the well-founded wishes of persons seeking 
protection to go to a specific country in Europe.
These data indicate that it may be promising to 
1  Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Migatiegedrag van 
personene met een specifieke herkomst die in de periode 2006-2013 
de Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben verkregen, www.cbs.nl, visited 
27 September 2016, and B. Meindersma, Deel vluchtelingen wacht 
op paspoort en vertrekt weer snel, http://nos.nl/artikel/2134178.
2  Jill Ahrens, Melissa Kelly, Melissa and Ilse van Liempt, 
(2014) Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens born in 
Somalia, Iran and Nigeria, Population, Space and Place. ISSN 1544-
8444.
extend the life course perspective with a focus on 
the labour market position of new nationals who 
left the country during the first few years after 
their naturalisation. Moreover, information from 
longitudinal quantitative data should be combined 
with the results of empirical research focussing on 
the migrant perspective, rather than on the state 
perspective that is implicit in the data collected by 
government bodies.
In order to explain the naturalisation patterns of 
immigrants, Vink’s paper looks both at variables 
in the country of residence and in the country 
of origin. With regard to the latter variables, the 
focus is on the political stability and the stage 
of economic development. But I would suggest 
that nationality law and practice in the country 
of origin may be another relevant variable 
explaining the inclination of immigrants to 
apply for naturalisation. In the 1970s and 1980s 
the Dutch rule requiring immigrants who could 
renounce their first nationality to do so had the 
effect that Moroccan immigrants applied for 
naturalisation because they could not renounce 
their nationality and thus were not obliged to do 
so, whilst immigrants from Turkey rarely applied 
because under the Turkish nationality law they 
could renounce that nationality and were therefore 
required to do so according to Dutch nationality 
law. The difference between the naturalisation 
practices of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants 
became even more pronounced when in special 
broadcasts directed at Moroccan immigrants 
the head of the naturalisation department of the 
Ministry of Justice explicitly stated that acquiring 
Dutch nationality did not imply that applicants 
had to abandon their religion. Only after the 
renunciation requirement was de facto abolished 
in the 1990s did large numbers of Turkish 
immigrants start to apply for naturalisation, 
causing a peak in the Dutch naturalisation statistics 
in 1996. Naturalisation practice thus often results 
from the interplay between the nationality rules of 
the two countries concerned. 
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In the final part of Vink’s paper it is rightly 
suggested that much research focuses on the effect 
on immigrant integration of transition towards 
citizenship and less so on other types of legal 
status transition, such as from asylum seeker to 
recognised refugee or from temporary migrant 
to migrant with permanent status. I would 
suggest that the latter status transition is the most 
promising focus for future empirical research. 
The many legal barriers to integration attached 
to the status of asylum seekers (limited access to 
the labour marker, to language courses and to 
family reunification) and their relatively short 
length of residence in the country of refuge will 
make it hard to identify the effects of granting the 
stronger status that, on paper, allows free access 
to the labour market. Empirical research on the 
transition from temporary to permanent residence 
status will offer a better possibility of identifying 
the effects of status transition on integration. 
Moreover, it will allow testing of the hypothesis 
that the transition towards citizenship “arguably 
in practice [is the] most relevant legal status 
transition.” Here, I repeat my plea for longitudinal 
quantitative research to be combined with 
qualitative research focussing on the immigrant’s 
perspective.3 When the focus of research is on 
the effects of transition from one legal status to 
another, we should not forget that a stronger legal 
status does not always result in a better social 
position. In her interesting comparative study 
of different groups of Polish immigrants in the 
Netherlands, Cathelijne Pool found that before 
Poland’s EU membership immigrants with both 
Polish and German nationalities, who due to their 
status as EU citizens had the strongest legal status, 
nevertheless in practice had a clearly less secure 
labour market and social integration position due 
to their lack of knowledge of a language that was 
understood by the majority population (English 
3  Jill Ahrens, Suspended in Eurocrisis: new immobilities 
and semi-legal migrations amongst Nigerians living in Spain, Journal 
of Mediterranean Studies (22) 2013 22, pp. 115-140. ISSN 1016-
3476.
or German)4, their reliance on family contacts 
and their dependency on private employment 
agencies.5  Legal status is only one among 
many variables influencing the integration of 
immigrants.
4  For a long time Poles with German ancestry living in 
Poland could acquire German nationality without being proficient 
in the German language.
5  Cathelijne Pool, Migration van Polen naar Nederland in 
een tijd van versoepeling van migratieregels, Nijmegen 2011 (Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers). 
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TOWARDS A 
LIFE COURSE 
PERSPECTIVE ON 
NATURALISATION 
FOR REFUGEES
Ines Michalowski 
WZB, Berlin
According to the life course perspective on 
nationality acquisition developed by Maarten 
Vink, naturalisation rates can be understood as 
the outcome of interactions between national 
citizenship legislation on the one hand and 
individual decision-making based on a person’s 
life course on the other. Drawing on Elder’s 
(1974) sociological life-course paradigm, Floris 
Peters and Maarten Vink (2016: 368) explain that 
“trajectories are periods of time in life domains 
or institutions, such as education, work or 
health, in which transitions are embedded.” And 
“since migration and integration are life-course 
processes, the act of citizenship acquisition can 
be perceived as an important transition – from 
non-citizen to citizen – within this trajectory”. 
The precise shape of these trajectories, they argue, 
is influenced by “societal institutions, such as 
educational and occupational systems” (Peters 
and Vink 2016: 367). Thus, the researcher’s first 
task when trying to predict citizenship acquisition 
should be to identify the different life course 
trajectories that a particular individual is engaged 
in or has concluded. As Peters and Vink (2016: 
367) argue, “The key assumption here is that there 
is a temporal dynamic to life events, where past 
experiences and resources, as well as opportunities 
and ambitions for the future, promote or stifle 
certain choices and developments.” Thus, a person’s 
citizenship acquisition may be more likely in some 
moments of the life course than in others. The 
researcher will have to identify these particular 
moments where citizenship acquisition could 
become a relevant transition within a trajectory, 
while also dealing with less predictable  “turning 
points” in life and its social character, captured in 
the notion of “linked lives” (Peters and Vink 2016: 
368). Thus, the life course approach to citizenship 
acquisition is able to relate the influence of nation-
specific institutions to individual decision-making 
that takes into account changes in the individual’s 
life over time (Peters and Vink 2016: 365).
In what follows, I will start to think through a life 
course perspective on the specificities of citizenship 
acquisition by refugees. On average, refugees 
differ from most other migrants in terms of their 
higher naturalisation rates (e.g. for Germany, see 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). The most obvious 
explanation – which does not adopt a life course 
perspective but rather a utility perspective, as 
Peters and Vink (2016: 363) name it – is that 
refugees’ citizenship of origin is of little value. For 
example, it may be of little value for travelling to 
the country of origin, where the receiving country’s 
passport may be the safer choice (only, of course, 
if the origin country respects the rule of law). For 
refugees who oppose the political regime in their 
home country, acquiring a new passport and thus 
devaluing their origin country citizenship may 
also be an act of political expression. Moreover, 
in slightly more abstract terms, origin citizenship 
may have less value for refugees because they 
have fewer hopes of ever returning to their 
home country than other groups of immigrants. 
Whether these hopes are low or almost non-
existent certainly depends on the individual, 
but it may also depend on the situation in the 
country of origin, and specifically on whether this 
country is involved in an international conflict, is 
undergoing a long civil war, or has had an abrupt 
and successful change of political regime. Hopes 
of returning may also depend on the position that 
a particular group of refugees has on a conflict. 
For example, attitudes may differ between those 
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fleeing from a successful regime change (e.g. 
the Iranian Revolution, or the unification of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam) and those fleeing 
a civil war but harbouring at least some sympathy 
for the independence movement (which may have 
been the case for some Tamil refugees from Sri 
Lanka). Hope of returning might also vary as a 
function of the length and stage of the conflict in 
the country of origin. However – and this is where 
Peters and Vink’s perspective comes in – if hope 
for return materializes too late in the refugee’s life 
course in the receiving country, the refugee may 
decide to settle and acquire citizenship even if the 
situation in the country of origin improves. 
Generally speaking, and despite the fact that 
naturalisation rates may vary across groups of 
refugees as a function of these origin-country-
related differences (different countries, or same 
country at different moments in a conflict), the 
generally witnessed phenomenon is that refugees 
are more likely than many other groups to acquire 
host country citizenship. Given the above, this is 
logical but it is also surprising if we consider that 
citizenship acquisition is a somewhat demanding 
process. Thus, the structural motivation for 
refugees to acquire citizenship must be so much 
higher than that of other migrants that they are 
more likely to start and finish the naturalisation 
process even though they may have fewer 
resources at hand.
Going through the procedure of citizenship 
acquisition may be more cumbersome for refugees, 
first because the life course of refugees is likely 
to be more disordered than that of many other 
individuals. Refugees often come from countries 
where the state does not function well and does 
not provide an infrastructure that institutionalizes 
educational and professional trajectories. If 
refugees have engaged in educational and 
professional trajectories, these are usually 
interrupted by their flight. Without much doubt, 
the flight and the events that force an individual 
to leave his or her country can be classified as a 
turning point after which an individual’s life has 
to be thought through and rationalized anew. 
This reorientation of one’s life can be a long 
and difficult process, and can be slowed down 
further if psychological trauma is involved. After 
arriving in a receiving country, refugees often 
wait for months without work and individual 
housing. This waiting period also involves the 
insecurity of not knowing whether refugee status 
will be obtained, which Stewart and Mulvey 
(2014: 1028-1030) aptly describe as a struggle by 
refugees against a sense of temporariness. It does 
not need much imagination to understand that 
a long period of inactivity is detrimental to the 
integration process, which is a necessary condition 
for citizenship acquisition. Peters and Vink (2016: 
368) also underline the relevance of the concept 
of “linked lives” to citizenship acquisition. This 
entails that naturalisation decisions are often 
taken collectively or in view of the collective (e.g. 
to support children). In cases where refugees are 
separated from family members, this could result 
in increased efforts to integrate as the only activity 
that can help to prepare for the arrival of the family, 
but worries about the well-being of close family 
members can also easily lead to a loss of focus on 
the integration process in the receiving context. 
Studies have shown that on average refugees are 
less proficient in the host country language than 
labour and family migrants (Chiswick and Miller 
2001; Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005) and a 
study on refugees in the Netherlands found that 
“language skills are better among refugees who 
only lived in a refugee reception center for a short 
while, who completed an integration course, who 
received post-migration education, who intend 
to stay in the host country, and who have fewer 
health problems“ (van Tubergen 2010: 515). In 
addition, after arriving in the receiving country 
refugees usually do not have a large amount of 
money at their disposal. This may be necessary for 
a costly integration and naturalisation procedure. 
Moreover, their labour market integration is slow 
– studies on Germany predict at least ten years 
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before the majority of the refugees arriving will 
have integrated in the labour market (Brücker 
et al. 2015). Thus, refugees will find more value 
in the acquisition of host country citizenship 
as an important (since permanent) transition 
into a new professional, educational and maybe 
political trajectory in the receiving country, but 
the particular difficulties that they face as refugees 
might slow down the process of settlement and 
integration which is usually required for acquiring 
citizenship. 
Citizenship acquisition is a somewhat demanding 
administrative act. Beyond the fact that the 
candidate needs to be willing and able to go 
through a long bureaucratic procedure, there are 
many conditions that have to be met. Usually, 
candidates need to have resided in the receiving 
context for a certain number of years, sometimes 
they need to have a specific type of residence 
permit to request citizenship, and usually they 
should have no criminal record. Candidates for 
naturalisation may also have to meet income 
requirements, speak the language and/or pass 
a language test, pass a citizenship test and pay 
naturalisation fees. Peters and Vink (2016: 365) 
suggest that restrictive citizenship regulations 
disproportionately affect citizenship acquisition 
among more vulnerable groups. Similarly, Kibreab 
(2003) finds that citizenship rights which are 
often granted to refugees in developed countries 
increase the likelihood of refugees settling in these 
countries, whereas the denial of such rights that 
often occurs in developing countries increases 
the likelihood of refugees returning after the end 
of a conflict. Maarten Vink examines the efforts 
of EU member states to alleviate the citizenship 
acquisition procedure for refugees by means of 
special conditions. His findings from the EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory show that among the 28 
member states eight have no specific provisions 
for refugees (Vink 2016: 15) while facilitation 
often remains modest in the other cases. One of 
the most substantial forms of facilitation in the 
EU 28 is a reduction of the number of years of the 
residency requirement from an average of 7 years 
for regular migrants to 4.5 years for refugees. In 
addition, some countries reduce naturalisation 
fees or waive an income requirement for refugees. 
Vink mentions no facilitations in terms of 
integration requirements but Morillon (2001: 52) 
found a French administrative directive asking for 
benevolent treatment of refugees’ naturalisation 
applications. 
However, beyond these explicit facilitations 
for citizenship acquisition, other institutional 
conditions might also impact the citizenship 
acquisition of refugees and interfere with their life 
courses. Here, the contradictions regarding the 
legal regulations for the reception and integration 
of refugees come to mind. In Europe, refugees 
usually arrive as asylum-seekers and until a decision 
on their status is made it remains unclear whether 
they will settle in the country or be obliged to 
leave it. This is a difficult policy problem for liberal 
democracies, since any achievement in terms of 
social integration reduces the legitimacy of future 
expulsions. Short procedures of a maximum 
duration of three months would be the way out 
but are not easy to achieve. And while states want 
to impede the social integration of asylum-seekers 
during the asylum procedure, they seek to foster 
the social integration of recognized refugees. If 
we think of the importance of social integration 
for citizenship acquisition it might be relevant to 
take into account how long an individual has been 
maintained in ‘non-integration-mode’. 
A look at the recent changes brought about by 
the new German Integration Law of 31 July 2016 
illustrates this trade-off between migration control 
and social inclusion. The German government 
has found a more refined answer compared to its 
response to the last arrival of large numbers of 
refugees in the early 1990s. In fact, some 20 to 25 
years ago Germany, together with other European 
countries, tried to deter asylum-seekers from 
settling down permanently by denying all asylum-
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seekers the right to work, the right to move freely 
in the country and the right to participate in 
publicly-financed language courses. In the new 
2016 law, the old logic of preventing the integration 
of asylum-seekers whose claims might be rejected 
and who might have to leave the country has not 
disappeared. However, German law now officially 
distinguishes between asylum-seekers from 
countries classified as producing asylum-seekers 
who have good chances of acquiring a right to 
stay (gute Bleibeperspektive) and those without 
such chances, thereby anticipating its own asylum 
decision, which is delayed by lengthy procedures. 
It is current administrative practice that asylum-
seekers from countries with a previous recognition 
quota of above 50% are considered to have good 
prospects (Thym 2016: 244). Since this group 
receives privileges and is officially “allowed to 
integrate,” the non-inclusion of Afghani refugees, 
whose previous recognition rate has been just 
below the cut-off mark, has been the subject of 
lively debate (e.g. Lehner 2016). An additional 
difficulty for this group is that in early 2016 the 
average asylum procedure for them lasted for 
over a year, meaning that those who were finally 
allowed to settle in Germany were excluded from 
any proactive state-funded integration measures 
for the entire length of this period. This is easily 
perceived as an injustice. On the other hand, in 
2016, refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and 
Somalia were allowed to participate in state-funded 
integration measures even while their asylum 
procedures were still ongoing. Nevertheless, this is 
an important improvement in the legal framework 
for refugees in Germany as compared to the 1990s. 
In a way, one of the central beliefs that has been 
introduced to European integration policies since 
the turn of the century – namely the idea that 
integration has to start as early as possible – has 
finally made its way into regulations for refugees 
in Germany. 
Another element of 21st century integration 
policies has also made it into refugee integration 
measures: the work-for-welfare principle. This 
was initially introduced into German integration 
policy with the 2005 immigration law, which 
obliged new immigrants in Germany to participate 
in language and civic education courses that are 
provided by the state (Michalowski 2009). Thus, 
refugees who are considered to have a good 
prospect of staying in Germany are offered 600 
to 900 hours of language tuition plus 100 hours 
of civic education (40 more hours compared to 
those offered to other immigrants) even if their 
asylum procedure is still ongoing. Because of their 
lack of income, most refugees and asylum-seekers 
are exempted from the contribution of €1.95 an 
hour to the cost of these courses. Moreover, each 
year 100,000 refugees can participate in a work 
for welfare programme which is ‘remunerated’ 
at a rate of 80 cents an hour for a maximum of 
30 hours a week and a maximum duration of six 
months. These measures are exclusively offered by 
state-run organizations and are mostly located in 
refugee camps, which raises questions as to their 
capacity to transfer to the real labour market. If a 
refugee fails to comply with the work for welfare 
measures and/or language and civic integration 
measures, the monetary support from the 
government can be cut entirely and the state will 
only guarantee for the individual to be able to eat, 
wash, dress and live in a heated place. To further 
facilitate the labour market integration of refugees, 
most German federal states have abolished the 
labour market test for refugees, but some of the 
16 federal states have decided to impose a three-
year residency requirement even for recognized 
refugees in order to better distribute the costs 
associated with refugee reception. However, there 
is an obvious trade-off in terms of the degree of 
free movement that might be necessary for labour 
market integration (Brücker, Möller and Wolff 
2016: 21). To address these concerns, a somewhat 
bureaucratic system of discretionary case-by-case 
decision-making has been introduced. Finally, 
contrary to the 2005 regulations, permanent 
residence can only be acquired after a period of 
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three years if the refugee demonstrates German 
language skills at the C1 level of the Common 
European Reference Framework. To acquire 
permanent residence after 5 years, refugees need 
language skills at the A2 level. Research findings 
from the UK suggest that even after physical 
safety is acquired, refugees long for emotional and 
psychological safety and stability, which can be 
undermined by future revisions of their residence 
status (Stewart and Mulvey 2014: 1033-1034).
From a life course perspective, the German 
example raises several questions. Does the 
preferential institutional treatment of refugees 
who are considered to have good prospects of 
staying have a positive influence on citizenship 
acquisition? Here, a comparison of refugees who 
fell under the two different regimes but were both 
granted refugee status would be very interesting. 
A comparison with the refugees from the 1990s 
might also be of interest. To get closer to the life 
course perspective, a very detailed analysis could 
try to answer the question of whether specific 
groups of refugees – e.g. according to marital status, 
age, educational and professional background, 
number of children, or duration of separation 
from family members – are particularly affected 
by a long waiting period after arrival in terms of 
later citizenship acquisition. 
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In September 2016, the mayors of Paris, London 
and New York wrote an op-ed in the New York 
Times calling on “world leaders assembling at the 
United Nations to take decisive action to provide 
relief and safe haven to refugees fleeing conflict 
and migrants fleeing economic hardship, and to 
support those who are already doing this work.”1 
In making this plea for inclusivity, they set out 
how they were already doing their part, providing 
services and programmes to all those residing 
in their cities, including diverse immigrant 
populations. One example put forward was that of 
the municipal ID programmes in Paris and New 
York, which provide every city dweller – whether 
undocumented, homeless or otherwise – with 
certain rights and access to services. This instance 
illustrates the central point that I wish to make in 
response to Maarten Vink’s paper on citizenship 
and legal statuses – the importance of considering 
the role of local authorities as well as the nation 
state in shaping citizenship, and thus the type of 
integration that citizenship status leads to.
Vink’s insightful analysis of why, how and for 
whom citizenship transitions matter adds nuance 
to citizenship studies but departs from a relatively 
binary understanding of citizenship – as a door to 
pass through to have access to full social, economic 
1  De Blasio, B., Hidalgo, A. & Khansept, S. (2016, 20 
September 2016), Our Immigrants, Our Strength., New York Times. 
and political rights. This point of departure does 
not recognize the degree to which citizenship 
as a legal status with specific related rights and 
responsibilities is increasingly given its formal 
content within other polities than the nation-state 
alone.2 There is the ‘world community,’ which 
bestows rights upon all individuals via an ever-
expanding system of international human rights 
treaties and monitoring mechanisms, thus giving 
meaning to cosmopolitan citizenship. There is the 
European Union and European citizenship, with a 
wide variety of rights attached that it has formally 
created and which makes the added value of 
national citizenship differ considerably for those 
who do or do not possess it. Additionally, although 
this has received less recognition in the literature 
to date, local authorities increasingly formally 
bestow rights upon those living within their 
borders, creating a type of urban citizenship. All 
this leads to an interplay between local, national, 
regional and international layers of government 
in defining and recognizing migrant rights. This 
is called ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ by lawyers 
and ‘constitutional pluralism’ by anthropologists, 
adding a spatial dimension to citizenship that 
is critical to understanding of its relation to 
migration.3 
Of all these polities shaping citizenship, the focus 
here will be on local authorities, such as cities. Over 
the recent years, cities have increasingly been given 
and have claimed formal powers to both recognize 
and give meaning to the rights of those residing 
within their boundaries, resulting in a wide range 
of divergent practices impacting directly upon the 
main markers of integration set out by Vink – the 
2  See, among a wide range of literature on the topic, Isin, 
E. F. & Nyers, P. (2014), Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship 
Studies: Routledge; and, for instance, Benhabib, S. (2008), 
Investigating Citizenship., in E. F. Isin, P. Nyers & B. S. Turner 
(Eds.), Citizenship between Past and Future (pp. 18-35), Abingdon: 
Routledge.
3  Pernice, I. (2015). Multilevel Constitutionalism and 
the Crisis of Democracy in Europe., European Constitutional 
Law Review, 11(03), 541-562; Walker, N. (2002). The Idea of 
Constitutional Pluralism., Modern Law Review, 65(3), 317-359. 
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labour market, education, political participation 
and access to housing. The following sections will 
briefly discuss the rise of local authorities as self-
acclaimed key players in the field of integration, 
and will subsequently set out how this also affects 
the legal status of migrants and their integration. 
One interesting aspect of this development is the 
interplay between cosmopolitan and local norms 
– leading to a type of glocal citizenship. This leads 
to a final reflection on how these developments 
could and should be taken into account in research 
on citizenship and migration. 
CITIES AS KEY ACTORS IN 
INTEGRATION
Over recent years, policy makers, scholars and – 
most importantly – cities themselves have come to 
recognize and explicate their key role in welcoming 
and integrating migrants. Where it concerns 
refugees, for instance, movements all over Europe 
such as the International Cities of Refuge Network, 
the Cities of Sanctuary, the Save Me campaign 
and the Eurocities network specifically assert the 
independent role and responsibility of cities in 
welcoming refugees. The Global Parliament of 
Mayors, initiated by Benjamin Barber, author of 
the widely influential If Mayors Ruled the World, 
explicitly chose the notion of ‘Cities of arrival: 
Migration and Refugees’ as the theme for its first 
plenary session during its inaugural conference in 
September 2016.4 More widely, the policy network 
of Cities for Local Integration Policies (CLIP) 
unites 30 European cities working on the social 
and economic integration of migrants. 
The reasons for this rise of local authorities in the 
field of migrant integration are manifold. One 
is that a general trend towards decentralization 
has led to more local government autonomy, 
and more direct responsibility for a variety of 
social and economic challenges heightened by 
austerity measures. As for cities as such, there 
4  Barber, B. (2013) If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional 
Nations, Rising Cities., Yale: Yale University Press.
is also the general influx of urban population. 
Currently, more people live in the city than in the 
countryside, and cities are more diverse than ever. 
Scholars have also come to emphasize the degree 
to which cities are best suited as loci for migrant 
integration, be it because of the pragmatism of 
local policy-making (the local pragmatist thesis) 
or because of the differences between localities (the 
localist thesis).5 In all, recognition of the relevance 
of local authorities in migrant integration has led 
to a general local turn in migration studies, and a 
departure from ‘methodological nationalism.’6 
One key finding in this general literature on 
local governments and migration is the degree 
to which local governments seek to depart from 
national policies, a ‘decoupling’ between national 
and local policies.7 As national migration policies 
throughout Europe become more and more 
restrictive, cities often have both principled 
and pragmatic difficulties with such policies 
and seek ‘room for manoeuvre’ to steer towards 
more inclusive policies.8 Simultaneously, other 
local authorities witness protests against migrant 
influxes, particularly involving refugees, and yield 
by, for instance, refusing to take part in refugee 
reception. One result of the way in which local 
authorities increasingly claim the autonomy to 
make these choices is a variation in the degree to 
which migrants can meaningfully access political, 
social and economic rights, irrespective of their 
legal citizenship status.
5  Emilsson, H. (2015) A national turn of local integration 
policy: multi-level governance dynamics in Denmark and Sweden., 
Comparative Migration Studies, 3(1); Scholten, P. & Penninx, R. 
(2016) The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration., 
Integration Processes and Policies in Europe (pp. 91-108): Springer.
6  Schiller, N. G. & Çağlar, A. (2009), Towards a comparative 
theory of locality in migration studies: Migrant incorporation and 
city scale., Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(2), 177-202. 
7  De Graauw, E. & Vermeulen, F. (2016), Cities and 
the politics of immigrant integration: a comparison of Berlin, 
Amsterdam, New York City, and San Francisco., Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies, 42(6), 989-1012. 
8  Gebhardt, D. (2016). Re-thinking urban citizenship 
for immigrants from a policy perspective: the case of Barcelona., 
Citizenship Studies, 1-21; Eurocities (2016), Refugee reception and 
integration in cities., Brussels: Eurocities.
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An illustration of the variation in access to 
the labour market, to housing and to safety in 
general between local authorities is offered by 
the ‘migration location index’ put together by 
the Economist.9 The index is based on an equal 
weighting of job, housing and safety data from 
different German local authorities, and thus 
identifies the localities most suitable for newly 
arriving refugees. Whereas the jobs, houses and 
general security available to migrants in a given 
location result from a variety of factors, it is safe to 
assume that local policies pertaining to migration 
partially determine the variation that is revealed.
THE FORMAL DIMENSION OF 
LOCAL POLICIES
Cities thus form the space in which the citizenship 
that “gives substance and meaning to legal 
standing” practically takes shape.10 Additionally, 
9 The Economist Migration Location Index, “Refugees 
might be seeking asylum in the wrong places”, published on 25 April 
2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/04/
daily-chart-8
10 Staeheli, L. A. (2003), Cities and citizenship. Urban 
there have been more and more recent examples of 
cities actually expanding the rights that come with 
a particular legal status, for instance by granting 
refugees certain rights before formal recognition 
of their status. The city of Utrecht, for instance, 
seeks to connect asylum seekers to the city from 
the day of arrival.11  By offering them language 
lessons, lessons in entrepreneurialism and general 
education, the city departs from the general 
Dutch policy of only offering education to those 
who have already received a formal status. The 
city of Münster, to give another illustration, has 
rejected the notion of centralized asylum centres 
and immediately provides decentralized housing 
to those waiting for formal status.12 
Even more far-reaching are developments towards 
the creation of a formal urban citizenship explicitly 
destined to all living in the city, thus breaking 
down the divide between citizens and non-
citizens. Paris, for example, recently introduced 
a carte citoyenne which gives all Parisians access 
to municipal services, and which “carries the 
values of Paris, liberty, diversity and tolerance and 
connects Parisians to municipal life.”13  The card 
is modelled on the NYCID, the New York City 
ID card that is recognized for interactions with 
the police (such as reporting crimes), for opening 
bank accounts, and that gives all city dwellers 
– including undocumented migrants and the 
homeless – access to public services and also to 
museums. New York is only one of the ‘cities of 
sanctuary’ in the US that through such practices 
enable those without citizenship status to still 
exert political, social and economic rights.14
Geography, 24(2), 98. 
11 Huisman, C. (2016). Utrecht: asielzoeker direct binden. 
De Volkskrant, 27 April 2016.
12  http://www.stadt-muenster.de/zuwanderung/startseite.
html
13 “Paris lance une carte de citoyen”, Europe 1¸ 10 February 
2016, http://www.paris.fr/cartecitoyenne
14 Lippert, R. & Rehaag, S. (2012), Sanctuary Practices 
in International Perspectives: Migration, Citizenship and Social 
Movements., Routledge. See, for instance, www.citiesofmigration.
ca 
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GLOCAL CITIZENSHIP
One interesting aspect of the way in which cities 
shape citizenship, also in a formal sense, is the 
degree to which they often refer to cosmopolitan 
norms, such as international human rights law, 
in setting out and defending their positions. The 
mayor of Palermo, for instance, is a strong advocate 
of the recognition of mobility as an inalienable 
human right.15 Palermo’s ‘International Human 
Mobility Charter’ serves as the basis for migrant 
welcome and integration in this Sicilian city facing 
a large influx of refugees.16
More widely, these policies are in line with a trend 
of increasing numbers of human rights cities, 
which base their urban policies on international 
human rights law, often taking a more progressive 
stance than national governments.17 In Europe, 
for instance, 400 cities have signed the European 
Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in 
the City. Forerunners, such as Graz, Barcelona 
and Nuremberg, have human rights offices and 
engage in human rights monitoring, thus basing 
their urban policies on cosmopolitan norms. The 
way in which citizenship in a given locality and 
the rights that it has to offer become shaped in 
the permanent interplay between international, 
national and local authorities can be called ‘glocal 
citizenship.’18
15 Citta di Palermo, International Human Mobility Charter 
of Palermo 2015.  
16 Kirgaessner, S., (2015), From mafia city to a haven for 
refugees: Palermo moves on from its criminal past, The Guardian, 
27 December 2015.
17 Oomen, B., Davis, M. & Grigolo, M. (2016). Global Urban 
Justice: the Rise of Human Rights Cities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
18 See, for instance, Papisca, A. (2011), Relevance of human 
rights in the glocal space of politics: how to enlarge democratic 
practice beyond state boundaries and build up a peaceful world., 
in K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, C. Timmerman & G. Ulrich (Eds.), 
The Local Relevance of Human Rights (pp. 82-108), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
CITIES, CITIZENSHIP AND 
INTEGRATION
The examples quoted, and the developments 
mentioned show how the actual benefits 
associated with ‘national’ citizenship depend on 
its relationship and interplay with regional (EU), 
international and also local understandings of 
citizenship. For a variety of reasons, reaching from 
the general strengthening of cities as political actors 
to local discomfort with national policies, there is 
an increasing divergence between local policies 
with regards to migrants in general and refugees in 
particular. This divergence impacts on all the main 
markers of integration – from access to housing, 
education and work to political participation – 
and thus also affects the added value of citizenship 
status. This means that any understanding of how, 
why and for whom citizenship transitions matter 
should also include a spatial understanding of 
where – at the subnational level – this is the case. 
It could well be, after all, that the advantages of 
acquiring citizenship differ more between, for 
instance, Paris and Perpignan than between 
France and Belgium.
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“Despite broad agreement on the fundamental 
role of schools, varied standards of reception for 
newly arrived students, which result from a lack of 
policy, guidelines, and resources, are undertaken, 
and they seem to be an endemic problem that 
transcends national borders” 
(Jenny Nilsson and Nihad Bunar, 2016, 400)
Introduction
The research debate covering the so-called ‘refugee 
crises in Europe’ has largely been addressing 
issues like border control, EU policies – or the 
lack thereof – and the political backlash in the 
form of anti-immigrant sentiments. Follow-up 
questions about the integration of refugees and 
1 We would like to thank Alireza Behtoui for helping us 
find relevant English language literature on Sweden for this paper. 
their children into society, education and work are 
now slowly appearing on the agenda too. 
Although the current attention to the issue 
of the integration of the children of refugees 
into education is recent, several researchers in 
Europe have addressed the question for previous 
waves of refugees. The findings of one of the 
largest European studies on the topic, Integrace, 
a comparative study which includes Sweden and 
the Netherlands among other EU Member States, 
will figure prominently in this paper. Next to this 
study there are smaller national and local studies 
that are often descriptive or evaluate examples 
of so-called good practice in cities and schools. 
We do not claim to have a full overview of the 
studies conducted, but our first impression is that 
compared to the huge number of studies on the 
education of the children of immigrants, attention 
to refugee children in education has been 
somewhat limited and often refugee children are 
not distinguished separately (Bloch et al. 2015). 
While, for instance, data on the school results of 
the children of immigrants are usually readily 
available at a national or city level, this sort of data 
is lacking for refugee children. Sometimes groups 
can be identified because of their national origin, 
knowing that most of the people in that particular 
group came as refugees. The limited data show 
that refugee children usually face more barriers 
than the children of immigrants (Mc Brien 2009; 
Bloch et al. 2015; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011). 
A further observation is that most studies on 
refugee children fail to differentiate between those 
who are born in the country of migration and 
those who came during the compulsory schooling 
period (the in-between generation). However, 
education research has shown time and again 
that this distinction is important when seeking to 
explain variations in outcomes, both within groups 
and between them (Bloch at al. 2015, 15; Crul et al. 
2012; Heath and Brinbaum 2007; Holdaway et al. 
2009; OECD 2010). Furthermore, there seems to 
be a lack of attention to the development of school 
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careers over time. Often researchers take a snapshot 
of the treatment of refugee children in so-called 
welcome, introduction or submersion classes. Of 
course, this is a crucial element for these children 
to be able to successfully start in education, but 
it only tells part of the story. What happens after 
these classes is equally fundamental. Into what 
sort of educational track are they admitted? Do 
they still get second language support or other 
additional support? Are they allowed to continue 
their studies after compulsory education?  An 
overview of the literature shows that most studies 
do not answer many of these crucial questions.
Furthermore, this paper is an attempt to draw 
away from what Nilsson and Bunar (2016, 
401) call singular factors, such as trauma or 
individual background factors. Instead, we will 
focus on institutional factors that influence 
the opportunities that refugee children have in 
education at the macro, meso and micro levels (for 
studies on the children of immigrants, see Crul et 
al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013; Keskiner 2013; Schnell 
2012). We analyse institutional educational 
arrangements comparatively across countries as 
formulated in Integration Context Theory (Crul 
and Schneider 2010; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; 
Crul et al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013; Crul 2016). This 
theory has its roots in research into the effects of 
differences in school systems on the educational 
and labour market careers of the children of 
immigrants. We make a cross-country comparison 
of seven important institutional arrangements that 
we identify as having an influence on the school 
careers of refugee children: (1) entrance into 
education; (2) so-called welcome, submersion or 
introduction classes; (3) pre-school arrangements; 
(4) second language instruction; (5) additional 
support; (6) tracking; (7) education after 
compulsory schooling. 
We identify both similar and different institutional 
arrangements at work in the case of refugee 
children. Institutional arrangements differ because 
of differences in school systems, the time lapse 
before entering formal education, the specific legal 
arrangements in terms of accessing pre-school, 
and the options for attending school after reaching 
the age when compulsory schooling ends. 
For our analysis of the impact of these institutional 
arrangements we make a literature overview, 
looking specifically at Sweden, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Turkey. We choose the three 
European countries because they have received the 
highest numbers of refugees and thus also have the 
highest numbers of refugee children entering their 
education systems. In addition, they have very 
different institutional arrangements for integrating 
refugee children in education. This makes it 
interesting to compare them. We additionally 
choose Turkey because we wanted to broaden the 
perspective beyond Europe by including a country 
that has also received thousands and thousands 
of refugee children over the past few years. It is 
important to note that most refugee children that 
fled Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea or Iraq reside 
outside Europe, and are entering – or not – the 
education systems in Jordan, Lebanon, Ethiopia, 
Pakistan and Turkey. Whether Turkey is able to 
cater for the educational needs of refugee children 
is of crucial interest to a European audience 
considering the Turkey-EU deal, which enhanced 
Turkey’s responsibility as a receiving country.  
This chapter addresses the importance of the seven 
institutional arrangements we have identified 
as key in separate sections. In the discussion at 
the end we try to tie together their effects on the 
school careers of the children of refugees. 
The challenges that the four countries face are 
very different in scope. The numbers of refugees 
entering Turkey and Germany are much higher 
compared to those arriving in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. To exemplify this with some numbers 
on the Syrian refugees in Turkey, according to a 
report by HRW (2015) as of October 2015 more 
than 1.9 million Syrian asylum seekers/migrants 
were registered in Turkey, of whom nearly 1.7 
million reside outside the refugee camps. Children 
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from 5 to 17 years old make up around 780,000 
of this population.2  While in the refugee camps 
90 percent of the children attend school, these 
children only represent 13 percent of the Syrian 
children of school age living in Turkey. The huge 
influx has resulted in much greater demands on the 
existing school facilities and in many temporary 
solutions to deal with the reality on the ground.
Different refugee populations have come to the 
four countries, creating different challenges for 
education. In Sweden, for instance, an additional 
challenge is that about half of the refugee children 
are unaccompanied minors (Rydin et al. 2012, 185; 
Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 2015). Children from 
different countries of origin also differ because 
some children have not been going to school 
for two or three years before reaching Europe. 
Integrating these children into schools requires 
additional measures. In addition to learning a new 
language of instruction and adapting to a new 
curriculum, they also need to adapt to being in 
a school environment again. Furthermore, they 
often lag behind in school subjects relative to their 
own age cohort, which means that they have to be 
in classes with children that are sometimes up to 
two or three years younger. 
A proper comparison would therefore require a 
comparison of similar groups that arrived in the 
same time period with similar educational histories 
in the countries of origin. Such detailed studies are 
not yet available for the countries studied in this 
paper.3 We are aware of these limitations but at 
the same time we think this should not prevent us 
from looking into differences across countries in 
terms of both the opportunities and the barriers 
that school systems and legal regulations present. 
   
2 Before the war in Syria broke out, the primary school 
participation rate was 99 percent, for secondary school the rate was 
82 percent. Participation was equal for male and female students. 
Today, according to UNICEF, approximately 3 million Syrian 
children in and outside Syria cannot go to school. 
3 See Bloch at al. (2015) for a comparison of the same 
refugee group in France, the UK and Switzerland. 
Entrance into Compulsory 
Education
Compulsory schooling covers different age groups 
in the four countries under comparison. In the 
Netherlands, compulsory schooling targets four- 
to sixteen-year-olds, but if students at the age of 
sixteen have not obtained a minimum lower post-
secondary vocational education yet they have 
to stay in education until the age of eighteen. In 
Germany and Sweden compulsory education 
covers the age range between six and sixteen. 
The right of entrance into compulsory education 
in all three European countries is guaranteed by 
law. All three of these countries have a policy that 
children of compulsory schooling age should have 
access to education as soon as possible. European 
regulations stipulate that children should be 
included in education within three months (article 
14 paragraph 1 European Regulations 2003/9/
EG). Sweden has put a further time limit of one 
month after arrival as the legally binding limit for 
entrance into school (Rydin et al. 2012, 193). In 
Germany and the Netherlands no such further 
legal binding limits exist. In practice, the time 
lapse between entering the country and entering 
school ranges from three months to even half a 
year in all three countries (for Sweden, see Rydin 
et al. 2012, 199). Especially in the last two years, 
when many refugee families have been housed in 
temporary shelters and camps and people have 
had to move several times before being housed in 
more permanent asylum seeker centres, education 
for children of school age has often been arranged 
in an improvised manner. 
In the Netherlands, participation in education is 
compulsory for refugee children of compulsory 
school age regardless of their status. In Sweden 
and Germany, however, there is no obligation to 
attend school for those who are still in the process 
of status definition and who therefore do not 
yet have a residence permit (Rydin et al. 2012, 
191; Bourgonje 2010, 47), although in Germany 
language courses in the reception centres are in 
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theory obligatory. This results in small groups of 
children not attending school in Germany and 
Sweden (for Sweden, see Rydin et al. 2012, 193) but 
it also affects the quality and amount of schooling 
children receive in these two countries (idem).  In 
Germany, for instance, in some cases children will 
receive language education for only a few hours 
a day in the asylum seeker centres rather than 
going to a regular school for regular school hours. 
Nilsson and Bunar report that also in Sweden 
children who are still in the asylum procedure 
are often offered 10 to 50 percent less schooling, 
and often only for a more limited number of 
school subjects than regular school children study 
(Nilsson and Bunar 2016, 403). 
Turkey is also legally bound to provide schooling 
to refugee children, irrespective of their status.4 
Moreover, in October 2014 a new regulation 
was published called the Temporary Protection 
Regulation (TPR), which became the main 
domestic law governing Turkey’s de facto 
temporary protection of Syrian refugees in the 
areas of education, health and social protection. 
TPR should ease the process of enrolment in 
schools, allowing refugee children who are 
registered in Turkey to enrol in public schools and 
in temporary education centres established for 
Syrian children (ÇOÇA 2015).5 However, research 
shows that most of the Syrians are not well-
informed about their children’s right to education 
(idem). Furthermore, the registration procedure 
does not always run smoothly due to a lack of 
infrastructure and many refugees are not able to 
register themselves. Because of lack of financial 
4 Turkey is party to the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, where article 22 obliges the signatory 
countries to provide protection and schooling to all asylum seeking 
and refugee children. In addition, Turkish law (5395) obliges the 
Turkish state to provide education and protection to minors, 
irrespective of their nationality.
5 Local authorities are held responsible for monitoring 
the registration of Syrian refugees in public schools to ensure their 
access to education (ÇOÇA 2015). In order to enrol, the children 
have to be registered with the local police office or the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Presidency, the state institution running 
the majority of the refugee camps for Syrians.
support, the majority of the Syrian refugee 
families experience severe economic hardship, 
which forms one of the major impediments 
against Syrian children participating in education 
(HRW 2015). The fact that Syrian refugees do not 
have permission to work has created a huge black 
labour market in Turkey, and this, in combination 
with the poverty of the families, has resulted in a 
situation where child labour has become common 
among Syrian children (Mutlu et al. 2015). 
Welcome, Submersion, 
Preparation, International 
or Introduction Classes
As the title of this section reflects, the names 
used for the classes in which refugee children 
are placed before going to regular classes differ 
between countries and, over time, also within 
countries. The actual pedagogical practices also 
differ greatly. When the children enter education 
they usually do not yet have any command of the 
national language. In all three European countries 
special provisions allow them to learn the second 
language, either in special classes or in special 
schools. 
In the Netherlands, during the period when the 
children are still in the asylum procedure, they 
are often taught in a special elementary school 
established on the premises of an asylum seeker 
centre (Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 263). Depending 
on how long they are in the procedure for being 
granted legal status as recognized asylum seekers, 
this can take up to two years. In other cases, for 
instance in the case of small-scale asylum seeker 
centres or when the centre is not located in a remote 
area but within a city or larger village, they will 
attend a regular elementary school. Depending on 
the number of refugee children in the school, they 
will first go to an immersion class for one year, 
although for some children, depending on their 
second language progress, this can be extended 
to two years. The timing of entering education is 
crucial, as in the Netherlands children are selected 
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for different school tracks at age twelve. Children 
older than twelve are directed to international 
transfer classes (ISK) in a local secondary school 
for one or two years (Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 
263; Stavenuiter et al. 2016, 7). 
In Germany, children attend so-called preparation 
or introduction classes for one or two years before 
they are transferred to regular classes. Depending 
on the Land, city, or even the school, this can be 
followed by more assistance with German as a 
second language if their German proficiency still 
lags behind. There are some preparation classes 
attached to Gymnasiums, but in general pupils 
attending preparation classes in secondary school 
are in Hauptschule or Realschule, i.e. lower- and 
middle-level vocational education. In Germany in 
the past two years, the sheer number of refugee 
children has been overwhelming and the task at the 
Länder and city levels has therefore been gigantic. 
In Hamburg, for instance, about 400 additional 
young children had to be placed in education 
each month up to the summer of 2015. Also at 
the level of secondary vocational education, every 
month four to five new classes had to be added in 
Hamburg alone. Over a period of about a year, 143 
new teachers had to be hired to teach the children 
in these new vocational classes (Pressestelle Senat 
Hamburg, November 2015).  
The situation in Sweden varies between schools. 
However, the general policy in Sweden is to keep 
children in international or immersion classes 
for only a very short period. Examples of schools 
keeping children in such classes for only two or 
three weeks are described as ideal cases (Rydin 
et al. 2012, 204). Pupils are then transferred as 
quickly as possible to regular classes, often with 
additional courses in second language education. 
This is partly enabled by the fact that Swedish 
schools offer second language education as a 
regular subject from elementary school up to the 
end of upper-secondary school, making it easier to 
incorporate students with a migration background 
– both refugees and others – into regular classes 
after a short period of time.
In Turkey, temporary education centres have been 
established to provide education to Syrian children 
both inside and outside the refugee camps (HRW 
2015).  Although these centres began as private 
initiatives, some have signed a protocol with the 
Turkish government and receive financial support 
and are free of charge, while others remain private 
with low fees, which are nevertheless unaffordable 
for many Syrians struggling with economic 
hardship. Furthermore, the temporary education 
centres are insufficient in number and capacity 
to cater for migrants’ educational needs. Of the 
81 municipalities where refugees are registered, 
the centres only exist in 19 cities. According to 
the HRW report (2015), in the academic year 
2014-2015 there were 34 centres inside and 232 
centres outside the refugee camps. Operating at 
the primary and secondary school levels, in 2014-
2015 more than 170,000 students were enrolled in 
temporary education centres, as opposed to only 
around 36,000 in Turkish public schools. This 
shows that the majority of Syrian refugee children 
receive their education in these centres. However, 
due to lack of sufficient funding many centres 
face closure, since the Syrian refugee population 
is not able to pay for the courses. For example, 19 
schools opened in Reyhanli in 2014 but only three 
were left by August 2015 due to lack of funding 
(Amos 2015). The centres follow an almost 
identical curriculum to that of Syrian schools – 
and the pupils receive classes in Arabic – which 
is prepared in cooperation between the Syrian 
Interim Government’s Ministry of Education and 
the Turkish Ministry of National Education (HRW 
2015). It is unclear how the students who attend 
these centres will be integrated into the Turkish 
education system to further their education. 
Pre-school Arrangements 
For very young refugee children it is important 
how access to pre-school is arranged. Compulsory 
schooling starts at different ages in the three 
European countries: in Sweden at seven; in 
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Germany at six; and in the Netherlands at four. 
Especially in Sweden and Germany, access to pre-
school is therefore very important because of the 
larger age group – and thus larger numbers – of 
young refugee children affected. 
In Germany, the development of pre-school 
facilities for disadvantaged children and the 
children of immigrants has been strongly 
stimulated in the last decade. However, as far 
as we know there are no figures available on 
the inclusion of refugee children in pre-school 
facilities. As soon as parents receive official 
asylum status they are treated like other parents 
in Germany and have access to pre-school under 
the same conditions. Costs for child care differ 
between Länder and even between cities. A special 
effort is made to include children in the last year 
before compulsory school starts at age six. In some 
Länder you can enrol your child in pre-school 
during this last year without any cost. 
In the Netherlands, pre-school education is 
generally organised very differently to that in 
Sweden or Germany. Middle class families with 
both parents working usually send their children 
to either private or publicly founded pre-school 
facilities five days a week for the full day. The 
considerable costs of attending these pre-school 
or so-called crèche facilities are paid partly by 
the parents and partly by the employer. Children 
from disadvantaged families, many of them with 
an immigrant background, can attend special 
subsidized pre-school facilities with an emphasis 
on second language learning three mornings or 
afternoons a week. This means that they spend 
many fewer hours a week in day care and are 
also mostly segregated from children whose first 
language is Dutch. Places in these subsidized pre-
school facilities, which also only exist in the larger 
cities, are limited. It is not known how refugee 
families can secure places for their young children 
in these facilities. 
In Sweden, refugee children of pre-school age, 
regardless of their status, are treated equally to 
children who have Swedish citizenship (Niemeyer 
2014, 17). This is interesting, since in Germany 
and the Netherlands access is linked to legal 
status. If a pre-school age child arrives in Sweden, 
he/she may attend what is called open pre-school, 
which is free of charge.  In the larger cities with 
a high proportion of children with a mother 
tongue other than Swedish, there are special pre-
schools focusing specifically on Swedish language 
acquisition (Rydin et al. 2012, 197). However, not 
all refugee parents are aware of this option to send 
their children to pre-school without paying. 
In Turkey, pre-school is mostly private and in our 
literature review we have not been able to find any 
provisions for refugee children. 
Second Language Instruction  
The provision of regular second language 
instruction is, again, very different across 
countries. In the Netherlands, refugee children 
in elementary school attend welcoming classes 
and children in secondary school in international 
classes get intensive training in Dutch as a second 
language for one or two years (Stavenuiter et al. 
2016, 7). In most cases, this takes place in small 
classes (15 children) and the teacher is trained in 
second language education and special teaching 
material is used. When the children are transferred 
to regular classes in elementary school, some extra 
second language instruction is often still provided 
by the regular teacher. In regular secondary 
education, however, second language instruction 
is not available. This obviously has negative 
consequences for the further school career (Van 
Hasselt and De Kruyf 2009, 9). 
In Germany, there is second language support 
in elementary school (up to age ten or twelve, 
depending on the Land). Niemeyer (2014, 57) 
emphasizes that “it is nowhere stated that German 
as a second language has to be taught in school.” 
The Mercator Foundation recently released a 
report saying that teacher training in second 
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language education is still insufficient in Germany 
(also see Niemeyer 2014, 47). Study methods and 
techniques for second language education were 
often lacking in the past (Niemeyer 2014, 48). In 
some German schools there is a separate second 
language teacher available; in others, school 
teachers are given additional training in second 
language teaching but this training usually lasts 
for only one day (idem). In daily practice, it is 
these regular teachers with little training that 
provide additional second language instruction 
in the classroom (Niemeyer 2014, 57). However, 
new programmes of second language education 
are quickly expanding. In 2014, second language 
teacher training was only compulsory for school 
teachers in one Land. Today, this is true for five 
Länder. 
In Sweden, Swedish as a Second Language (SSL) is 
offered in both elementary and upper-secondary 
school (up to age 18). The head teacher decides 
which students need to study SSL (Rydin et 
al. 2012, 196). The fact that second language 
education is also offered in upper-secondary 
schools is particularly important for refugee 
children who arrive aged twelve or more. This age 
group attends regular classes with extra support 
in Swedish as a second language very soon after 
entering the education system. Because regular 
second language instruction is absent in secondary 
education in Germany and the Netherlands, 
these pupils are taught in special submersion or 
introduction classes, which sets them back with 
their academic options. It is important to note 
that in Sweden Swedish as a second language is a 
subject with separate teaching materials (syllabus) 
and instruction, equal to teaching Swedish as 
a first language (Bourgonje 2010, 48 and 50), 
and SSL is taught by specially trained teachers 
(Nilsson and Bunar 2016, 409). Some reports, 
however, stipulate that the status of these teachers 
is considered lower than that of regular teachers 
of Swedish as a first language (Bourgonje 2010, 50; 
Nilsson and Bunar 2016, 409).  However, one can 
choose to take Swedish as a second language as an 
exam subject in Gymnasium and the mark for the 
subject is counted as a normal entrance mark for 
university (Rydin et al. 2012, 196). In Germany and 
the Netherlands, second language instruction is 
seen as additional to regular language instruction. 
As a result, the extent to which extra materials 
are used and the quality and number of hours of 
second language instruction differ from school to 
school and from teacher to teacher. 
For Turkey, our literature review shows that, next 
to economic hardship forcing many children 
into the black labour market, lack of language 
proficiency is the main obstacle Syrian children 
face in accessing education. While the Turkmen 
ethnic minority speak Turkish, Syrian refugee 
children do not; the most common languages 
among them are Arabic and Kurdish. The only 
possibility of receiving education in Arabic is at 
the temporary education centres discussed above. 
For the rest, the Turkish education system is 
highly centralised and leaves no room for public 
schools to cater for the urgent need for Turkish 
language training. Some Turkish language 
courses seem to be provided at the local level 
through initiatives by municipalities or NGOs, 
but these efforts remain very limited. In theory, 
Syrian children have the right to enrol in public 
schools, but there is no infrastructure for them 
to learn Turkish or attend any form of transition 
classes. In a report by the Istanbul Bilgi University 
Children Studies Department on the educational 
situation of Syrian children in Istanbul (where 
more than 300,000 Syrians reside), the researchers 
found three schools in three districts where no 
Turkish language courses were provided for the 
limited number of Syrian children attending the 
schools (ÇOÇA 2015).  This situation also leads to 
differential results for younger and older children. 
In its 2015 report, HRW underlined that younger 
Syrian children learn Turkish faster (and hence do 
better at school and are integrating faster), while 
the lack of language proficiency of older children 
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leads to their isolation in classrooms, dropping out 
of school, or even not being accepted for enrolment 
in the first place. Many of these older children end 
up entering the labour market working in very 
poorly paid and difficult conditions. Therefore, 
the HRW 2015 report called for more flexible 
administration procedures to cater for the needs 
of refugee students (such as enrolling a 10th grader 
in 9th grade) and emphasized the urgency of 
launching Turkish language courses on a national 
scale.6
Additional Support       
Most educational research has focused on 
gaps in the cognitive and language skills that 
the children of refugees suffer from because of 
the disruption of their school careers in their 
countries of origin and during their – sometimes 
long – travels to the destination country. They 
need to learn a new language, adapt to a new 
curriculum and sometimes also to a new learning 
style. Additionally, refugee children have often 
experienced traumatic events and sometimes 
lost close relatives and friends. A recent study 
showed that 79 percent of the Syrian children in 
a Turkish refugee camp had lost someone in their 
family in the war, and more than 60 percent had 
seen someone being kicked, shot or otherwise 
physically hurt. Nearly half (45 percent) of the 
children surveyed experienced PTSD symptoms 
(Sirin and Rogers-Sirin 2015, 13). Emotional 
and psychological help is often provided on an 
individual basis through the regular health care 
system, both within and outside schools (for the 
Netherlands, see Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 266).  
It is important that there are staff members in 
schools that act as confidants for refugee children 
to help and support them. This person can be the 
assigned class mentor, a specially assigned member 
of the school staff, a social worker or a guardian 
in the case of an unaccompanied minor. In all 
three European countries, a person performing 
6  HRW 2015
this particular role can usually be identified. These 
people usually intervene when school results 
drop or fail to meet expectations, when pupils 
show emotional or psychological problems, when 
important decisions need to be made about school 
or subjects in the curriculum need to be chosen, 
or, most importantly, when legal factors hinder 
access to schooling opportunities. 
In Germany and the Netherlands, there is no 
obligation for schools to assign such a support 
person to refugee children. Support therefore 
varies and is dependent on the regular existing 
support structure in schools.  In Germany, it seems 
that this role is often taken by a teacher (Niemeyer 
2014, 47), while in the Netherlands it is either the 
school mentor, someone from the school’s support 
staff or, in the case of an unaccompanied minor, 
the guardian. 
In Sweden, a person is assigned to support pupils 
that have attended an international class. Schools 
are obliged to allocate this additional support in 
the form of a support teacher. The support teacher 
starts giving support once pupils are transferred to 
a regular class (Bourgonje 2010, 48-50; Niemeyer 
2014, 23 and 55). This could be individual support 
or support in a small group or even in the regular 
class (Niemeyer 2014, 23). Although this comes 
across as the ideal situation, reports note that in 
practice support teachers often lack the time to 
give proper guidance (idem).
In Turkey, counselling facilities are available in 
public schools, but these facilities do not seem to 
be equipped to support Syrian children who have 
suffered serious traumas. The study by Istanbul 
Bilgi University Children Studies Department 
shows that the language barrier and a lack of 
motivation or qualifications of the already 
overloaded student counsellors are the major 
reasons for lack of support (ÇOÇA 2015). While 
school staff stated that they expected such help to 
be provided outside the school by NGO groups, 
none of the Syrian students who participated in 
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the study mentioned receiving any support outside 
school. Nevertheless, focus groups with Syrian 
children and students underlined the necessity of 
psychological support because of the serious war 
traumas experienced (idem). 
Tracking
The way the various school systems track pupils 
in secondary school is very different across the 
three countries. The effects of tracking have 
been extensively documented for children of 
immigrants (see Crul et al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013). 
The strongly stratified German school system 
with early selection makes it much more difficult 
for children of disadvantaged immigrant origin 
to pursue an academic track which prepares for 
higher education. The more open meritocratic 
school system in Sweden with its late selection and 
less selective tracking system offers many more 
possibilities of continuing into some sort of post-
secondary or higher education. The Netherlands 
lies in between, with rather early selection at age 
twelve and a tracking system that is comparable 
with the German system, but with ample 
opportunities to move from a vocational track 
to an academic track through alternative routes. 
Turkey has a comprehensive education system, 
slightly similar to the Swedish one, where there 
is no overt form of tracking in the compulsory 
education system. However, there are differences 
in prestige between selective and non-selective 
educational institutions in both the public and 
private domains which act as a covert stratification 
system with regard to access to higher education. 
The starting situation of refugee children is 
crucial because of the effects of tracking and early 
selection. In general, it can be said that age at arrival 
determines how much these children are blocked 
by the general institutional arrangements of early 
selection and tracking. Students who arrive in the 
Netherlands at age twelve or later have already 
missed the crucial national test that determines 
their tracking advice. They are placed in an ISK 
submersion class for one or two years (Dourelijn 
and Dagevos 2011, 95; Stavenuiter et al. 2016, 7). 
By the time they are admitted to regular classes 
they often lag far behind in terms of their level 
of instruction in subjects in the academic track. 
Regardless of their intellectual capacities, this will 
de facto mean placement in one of the vocational 
tracks in year 3 or 4. Year 4 is the exam year. 
Because of the short period they spend in regular 
classes, most of these pupils are then assigned to 
one of the lower levels of vocational education. 
According to a recent survey, 70 percent of the 
children attending ISK submersion classes go from 
there to the lowest forms of vocational education. 
For the average student of Dutch descent, the 
proportion is the inverse: only 30 percent attend 
this lowest track (VO raad 2016; for similar 
results on ISK classes from an earlier period, see 
Van Hasselt and De Kruyf 2009, 6). These levels 
only give access to short one- or two-year post-
secondary vocational tracks aimed at making the 
transition to manual jobs in the labour market. 
In the Netherlands, children with learning or 
behavioural problems are commonly assigned to 
these tracks and they are known for high levels 
of disruptive behaviour in class and high dropout 
rates. In certain tracks, the dropout rates reach 
40 or 50 percent. This school climate is hardly 
conducive for refugee children, who often have to 
deal with trauma and whose intellectual capacities 
often far exceed those of the other children in these 
tracks. Among those who are already older than 
15 or 16 and cannot enter secondary education, 80 
percent enter the lowest forms of post-secondary 
vocational education (VO raad 2016; for similar 
results on ISK classes from an earlier period, see 
Van Hasselt and De Kruyf 2009, 7). These one- or 
two-year tracks aim at direct transit to unskilled 
jobs in the labour market. One of the factors 
related to poor educational outcomes is a lack of 
second language teaching after the students have 
been transferred from the international classes 
to the regular classes (Van Hasselt and De Kruyf 
2009, 9). Another problem is that the international 
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classes continually take in new students, which 
disrupts the learning environment (idem, 11). 
A broader study on refugee groups, not only 
those who have been to an international class, 
shows the same poor educational outcomes for 
refugee groups. Less than half of the young Iraqi 
and Afghani adults between the ages of 20 and 
34 studied obtained a diploma for short post-
secondary vocational education. The majority of 
the remaining students did not even manage to 
obtain what are considered the lowest vocational 
certificates. Of the Somali refugees in this age 
group, only about a quarter attained this very low 
level of education (Dourelijn and Dagevos 2011, 
93), making their prospects in the labour market 
very bleak. The good news is that the younger 
cohorts who started their educational careers in 
the Netherlands in elementary school (after an 
introduction class) do much better. Children of 
Afghan and Iraqi origin are now almost on a par 
with children of Dutch descent when it comes 
to attending academic tracks (idem, 98). This 
only goes to show that it is particularly refugee 
children entering the Netherlands around or after 
age twelve who are getting crushed between the 
tracking wheels of the Dutch school system. 
In Germany, the situation is similar to the 
Netherlands, with the exception of some 
Länder where selection happens even earlier at 
age ten. Most of the refugee children arriving 
after elementary school age will be placed in 
Hauptschule or Realschule, the two vocational 
tracks. A brochure for unaccompanied minors in 
Germany is quite telling:
“In Germany all children and teenagers 
under the age of sixteen have the right 
and duty to go to school. This is called 
compulsory attendance. Usually you 
would start off with the “Hauptschule” 
where you have the possibility of getting a 
“Hauptschulabschluss” (secondary school 
qualification).  
Only a small proportion of pupils of German 
descent go to Hauptschule and many German 
parents will avoid this school at all costs. In the 
case of refugee children, however, for many 
teachers and policymakers this seems to be the 
highest aim (see also Niemeyer 2014, 46).      
At age sixteen, and in some cases even a year 
earlier, Hauptschule and Realschule pupils should 
enter an apprenticeship track. However, second 
language difficulties often impede refugee children 
from finding an apprenticeship. For children of 
immigrants who were born in Germany (the 
second generation), discrimination in finding an 
apprenticeship has already been clearly established 
(Crul et al. 2012). For refugee children, who 
are mostly not born in Germany, the chances of 
finding an apprenticeship place are often even 
lower because of German language weaknesses, 
lack of experience with the system and the resulting 
poor grades (Niemeyer 2014, 16). Furthermore, 
there is competition for apprenticeship places 
among students who have diplomas at different 
levels. It comes as no surprise that those who 
have a Gymnasium diploma are most favoured 
by employers, followed by those who have a 
Realschule diploma. Children with a Hauptschule 
diploma have the least chances of getting an 
apprenticeship position (Crul et al. 2012). The 
negative consequence is that students who leave 
school without doing an apprenticeship, in a 
system that relies so heavily on apprenticeships, 
also have great difficulties in entering the labour 
market and finding a steady job. More often than 
not, apprenticeships are the door to the first paid 
job. 
In Sweden, the first selection point is at age fifteen, 
when students choose, or are recommended to 
take, different programmes within Gymnasium. 
Although the choice made here limits options in 
further education, all programmes give access 
to higher education. However, the students 
who at fifteen go to more vocationally oriented 
programmes often continue a form of post-
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secondary vocationally oriented education which 
is not part of the higher education system at age 
eighteen. A report by Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 
focusing on unaccompanied minors presents 
some educational outcomes of refugee children. 
The group of unaccompanied minors is more at 
risk than children who came with their parents. 
Nevertheless, even for them the educational results 
for refugee children far exceed those in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Among 19-year-olds, 77 
percent of females still follow education in Sweden 
and 88 percent of males (Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 
2015, 15). Even among 21-year-olds, about half 
of this group are still in education. Among men 
aged between 24 and 27, about 40 percent are in 
undergraduate training and another third are in 
adult education. Among women, about a quarter 
are in undergraduate education and about a half 
in adult education (idem, 16). These figures show 
that a considerable proportion of these refugee 
children, who are to be considered highly at risk, 
reach higher education in Sweden.           
Since the Swedish system is geared towards getting 
as many students as possible into higher education 
by keeping opportunities open until the age of 
eighteen, those who do not manage to get into 
higher education, or fail in higher education, often 
find themselves in a precarious situation. They have 
two options to choose from: either continuing in 
adult schools (Komvux) or participating in some 
of the courses provided by employment offices 
to learn some practical skills to enter the labour 
market. In Germany and the Netherlands, many 
of those unable to access an academic track are 
able to follow apprenticeship tracks offering them 
entrance to the labour market. They can show a 
potential employer their apprenticeship track 
record. And, again, many indeed get their first 
paid job via an apprenticeship. 
In Turkey, the newly adopted 4+4+4 system, 
requires young people to go to school until 
the age of eighteen. While the system has no 
specific tracking moment as in the Netherlands 
or Germany, there are significant distinctions 
between selective and non-selective educational 
institutions and the quality of education, both 
in the private and the public domains. These 
distinctions become crucial when gaining access 
to higher education. The studies reviewed for 
this chapter only mention participation by Syrian 
children in non-selective public education and in 
temporary education centres (ÇOÇA 2015; HRW 
2015; Mutlu et al. 2016). While the experience of 
Syrian children varies in individual cases, younger 
children seem to have a more positive experience 
as they learn Turkish faster than older children, 
who seem to suffer more from the lack of Turkish 
language courses and problems of adaptation 
(ÇOÇA 2015). The studies underscore how 
Syrian children suffer from serious stigmatization 
and discrimination by other pupils, and also 
occasionally by school staff and other parents. The 
studies call for increasing awareness that education 
should be perceived as a ‘right’ for Syrian children 
rather than a ‘favour’ (Mutlu et al. 2015) and that 
school staff need further assistance in dealing with 
conflicts between pupils and providing a more 
peaceful school environment. Given these harsh 
conditions, the very few Syrian children who 
manage to attend a non-selective public school 
might face serious difficulties in accessing higher 
education.
Education after Compulsory 
School  
The three European countries differ when 
compulsory schooling ends (at sixteen or 
eighteen), but they also differ in terms of rights 
and opportunities to continue studying. The 
Netherlands provides an extensive loan system for 
studying after compulsory schooling. The right to 
a study loan applies to all whose asylum request 
has been granted and who have official refugee 
status. For others who do not have an official status 
yet, the right to study ends at age eighteen. Those 
who do not yet have the (temporary) residence 
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permit granted with refugee status at age eighteen 
cannot start to study in post-secondary or higher 
education. The process of obtaining this status 
takes up to a year or more, depending on the 
country of origin, after requesting asylum. Many 
of the refugees who started late in the Dutch 
education system are in level one of a two-year 
post-secondary vocational track, finishing it when 
they are around eighteen years old. If they have 
not obtained their status yet, they lose their right 
to further education. Even if they obtain the right 
to study again in the near future, it disrupts their 
studies and prospects. Another potential obstacle 
is the Dutch system of study loans. Youngsters 
get a study loan when they attend post-secondary 
vocational training. By the time they can finally 
climb up from post-secondary vocational training 
to higher vocational education (four or five years 
later) their student loan credit is already mostly 
or completely used up, meaning they can only 
continue their studies by relying on their own 
resources. In practice, this means they have to 
work at the same time as studying, which increases 
the chances of dropping out.     
Students who want to study in higher education 
first have to complete four language courses to 
obtain a Dutch language certificate at the level 
of academic Dutch (B2). This means that on 
average students can only start their studies after 
two or more years (Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 
266). Taking into consideration that much of the 
curriculum nowadays is in English, especially in 
Masters’ programmes, this seems an obstacle the 
students could do without.                                        
In Germany, compulsory schooling ends at the 
age of sixteen. For those who arrive later and 
do not have a high school diploma, most of the 
possibilities are in the field of vocational training. 
In most Länder there are now programmes to 
open more opportunities for these youngsters to 
be included in vocational education. The most 
problematic part is finding enough internship and 
apprenticeship places in the private sector, since 
this practical part is an important element in the 
so-called ‘dual system’ of vocational training in 
Germany. 
In Sweden, compulsory education ends at age 
sixteen, but pupils who are still in upper-secondary 
school when they turn seventeen or eighteen have 
the right to continue their education like regular 
students, even when they do not have recognized 
asylum seeker status. This is important, because 
particularly unaccompanied minors often 
arrive between the ages of fifteen and seventeen 
(Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 2015, 14). Young adults 
arriving after the age of eighteen can attend general 
adult education or Swedish for Immigrants (FSI), 
i.e. classes for adults to learn basic Swedish.
Adult education is an important route to 
educational qualifications for students who arrive 
at a later age. In the Netherlands, this route is 
often used by students who are too old to thrive 
in common secondary education but need a 
diploma from an academic track before they 
can enter higher education. Adult education in 
the Netherlands is quite marginal compared to 
mainstream education. Many refugee children and 
students are therefore not aware of the possibilities 
it can offer them. The big advantage is that in adult 
education they are often the younger students in 
the class, instead of being much older, and they 
meet people who are equally motivated to succeed.
In Germany too, there are plenty of possibilities 
of programmes for adult education, including 
ones leading to school qualifications and language 
certificates. The main problems in the German 
system are a lack of information and costs. In the 
face of the refugee crisis, many adult education 
institutions have started to offer free courses, at 
least at the basic level, but sometimes the costs 
are also covered by the government. Especially 
the state-owned Volkshochschulen have played 
an important role in this – as they did before for 
previous waves of immigrants and refugees. There 
has been a quite new initiative by universities 
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to offer free language courses to refugees (often 
organized by student organizations), to provide 
voluntary help to refugees as internships, and 
to establish mechanisms for the recognition of 
foreign diplomas and school certificates. 
In Sweden, adult education is a much more 
mainstream institution than in the Netherlands 
and Germany. Awareness of this option is therefore 
much greater. In the past too, adult education was 
an important entrance route into the education 
system for migrants. Many first-generation 
Turkish and Yugoslavian migrants went to adult 
education to learn Swedish as a second language. 
Therefore, adult education in Sweden is now 
very much attuned to the needs of new arrivals. 
An adult education diploma can be used to enter 
higher education or a form of post-secondary 
education. 
In our literature review, we have not come across 
adult education opportunities for Syrians in 
Turkey since the existing research concentrates 
mainly on the pressing situation concerning (the 
lack of) education for Syrian children. Regarding 
higher education in Turkey, there are provisions 
which allow Syrian university students to enrol in 
seven higher education institutions near the Syrian 
border with a ‘special student’ status. According to 
the Turkish Higher Education Institutions (YÖK), 
in the academic year 2014-2015, 3397 male and 
2163 female Syrian students were enrolled in a 
higher education institution (Mutlu et al. 2016, 
42). Participation by Syrian university students 
in Turkish higher education is, however, not 
widespread and these developments are merely 
seen as first steps, despite difficulties.
Conclusion and Discussion
This overview of the differences in these seven key 
institutional arrangements and their effects on 
school outcomes shows a clear distinction between 
favourable and less favourable institutional 
arrangements. High quality continuing second 
language instruction offered at all school levels – 
by properly trained teachers and using specifically 
developed teaching materials – is probably the 
most important institutional arrangement. Apart 
from this, accommodating access to all types 
of educational tracks (regardless of the age you 
enter education) is important. As we have seen, 
in Germany and the Netherlands only vocational 
tracks are open to many refugee children. For very 
young refugee children, immediate open and free 
pre-school arrangements are especially important. 
For refugees in the age group around the end of 
compulsory schooling, adult education – which 
also gives access to pre-academic secondary 
school diplomas and thus to higher education – is 
especially important.   
In a way, the most difficult group to integrate 
into the education system of the host country are 
pupils arriving at the end of elementary school 
or during secondary education. This is the time 
when important tracking decisions are made. 
School systems characterized by early selection 
and a strong stratification seem to waste much 
talent, because they direct the majority of these 
pupils along a vocational route. Because of second 
language problems, these children are often 
streamed towards the lower end of the vocational 
training system – a track that hardly suits the 
majority of these students given their intellectual 
capacities. Also in comprehensive systems, such as 
in Turkey, a lack of second language training denies 
children the full participation in the education 
system they need to realize their potential. 
To evaluate the impact of different institutional 
arrangements it is important to see them in 
relation to each other, for instance the more 
poorly organized second language instruction 
in Germany and the Netherlands (compared to 
Sweden) in relation to the early selection and 
tracking that results in an over-representation 
of refugee children in vocational tracks. These 
factors in combination create an accumulation of 
disadvantage. This also means that the Swedish 
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good practice of limiting the time in immersion 
classes cannot be transplanted as such to Germany 
or the Netherlands. In Sweden, the transfer to 
regular education is combined with continued 
instruction in the second language. Since this is 
not offered in Germany and the Netherlands, 
children would be destined to fail if they were 
transferred to regular classes too quickly.
It seems that there is also an important difference 
across countries in terms of their vision of what 
it takes to include newly arrived refugee children 
in education. In Sweden, it is clearly stated that 
the ambition is to give refugee pupils an equal 
chance to reach school outcomes on a par with 
children of native descent. This means that the 
aim should be for refugee children to also reach 
higher education, of course depending on their 
intellectual capacities. 
In Germany and the Netherlands, the aim 
seems much more limited and short-term. Most 
policy measures are aimed at, and limited to, the 
transition or immersion phase. The fact that most 
refugee students end up in the (lowest) vocational 
tracks as a result of how things are organized 
within the school systems seems to be more or 
less accepted as a given. In Germany, however, 
there is a hopeful recent development of also 
accommodating refugee children in immersion 
classes in Gymnasium schools. 
In Turkey, an excruciating two thirds of refugee 
children do not participate in education. Among 
those who do, the majority attend temporary 
education centres where they follow a Syrian 
curriculum. This shows that Turkey does not yet 
wish to see the refugees and their children as long-
term inhabitants who must be enabled to build a 
future. Of the 780,000 Syrian refugee children, 
only around 36,000 attend public schools. Studies 
on these public schools show that education is 
seen more as a ‘favour’ to these children, rather 
than there being the aim of providing them with 
equal chances to participate in education. 
The Swedish example, although not perfect, 
shows that support has to be given throughout the 
school career – the clearest example being second 
language instruction. Sweden has formulated 
ambitions for second language learning in the 
standard curriculum starting at pre-school and 
continuing all the way up to the end of upper-
secondary school and even into adult education. 
In the Netherlands and Germany, the ambitions 
are much more limited, with only a little amount 
of additional training in pre-school, elementary 
school and during the immersion or introduction 
year in secondary school. However, to learn a 
language to an academic level, one or two years of 
additional instruction are usually not enough.  
To expect governments to fundamentally change 
the school systems they have in place because of 
this relatively small group of pupils is, of course, 
unrealistic. Both in Germany and the Netherlands, 
alternative scenarios have to be developed to 
accommodate this particular group. Adult 
education could, for instance, play a much more 
prominent role in preparing talented students for 
high school exams. In post-secondary vocational 
education, shorter and faster routes could be 
offered to accommodate students that have the 
ambition to continue into higher education. Pre-
school education should be made available to the 
very youngest group (0-4) of refugee children 
immediately, regardless of their status, so that 
they are already fluent in Dutch or German before 
entering elementary school. Secondary schools 
should be offered the opportunity to extend 
the time they give additional second language 
instruction to bring it up to the level of academic 
Dutch or German. These measures can be taken 
keeping some of the Swedish good practice in 
mind.    
A last observation is that more researchers seem 
to be working on the topic of refugee children 
in education in Sweden than in Germany or the 
Netherlands, and they are also more critical of 
the specific educational policies developed in 
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Sweden than their German and Dutch peers. 
Swedish researchers critique, for instance, the 
segregation of refugee children and the fact that 
not all pupils who have the right to mother tongue 
teaching receive it (see, for instance, Nilsson 
and Bunar 2016). The irony is that in Germany 
and The Netherlands mother tongue teaching 
is simply unavailable and therefore also mostly 
remains undiscussed in research. In Germany 
and the Netherlands, refugee children are far 
more often segregated from regular pupils and 
for a much longer period than in Sweden but 
researchers seem far less critical about it than in 
Sweden. What is considered normal in a country’s 
policy also seems to extend to what researchers 
find normal. In Turkey, the studies we have been 
able to find on Syrian children are critical of the 
government. These studies do acknowledge the 
difficulty in accommodating the sheer numbers 
of Syrian refugee children, but nevertheless they 
also critique the gaps and provide concrete policy 
suggestions to improve the schooling situation. By 
comparing the four counties in detail both gaps 
and successful interventions become apparent. 
This is precisely why comparisons across countries 
are so valuable.  
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Table 1: Overview of Educational Institutional Arrangements for Refugee Children in Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey.
Sweden Germany The Netherlands Turkey
Access to school Within 1 to 3 
months and 
unlimited ac-
cess regardless of 
status
Within 3 months 
and limited to 
compulsory 
schooling age
Within 3 months 
and limited to 
compulsory 
schooling age
Mostly for primary 
school children. 
Most children, how-
ever, are not able to 
attend
Pre-school Open and free of 
cost
Limited Limited Unknown
Separate classes Short 1-2 years 1-2 years Mostly in separate 
Arabic language 
schools 
Second language 
instruction
Prolonged and 
from pre-school 
until upper-sec-
ondary school
For a limited pe-
riod and varying 
between Länder
For a limited 
period 
Mostly no second 
language instruction
Second language 
teachers
University trained 
teachers and 
specific subject 
materials and 
exams
Only short train-
ing and not all 
teachers are 
trained
Special but lim-
ited extra teacher 
training. Special-
ized materials 
available
Not applicable
Extra Support Special support 
teacher
Mostly regular 
teacher support 
Support staff in 
school and/or 
regular teacher
Psychological health 
support organiza-
tions
Tracking Late tracking and 
sustained second 
language support 
results in more 
access to higher 
education
Early track-
ing and limited 
second language 
support results 
in tracking into 
vocational tracks
Early track-
ing and limited 
second language 
support results 
in tracking into 
vocational tracks
Limited second lan-
guage support results 
in early school leav-
ing
Access after com-
pulsory school 
age
Unlimited access 
to upper second-
ary school, adult 
education and 
university train-
ing
Limited access 
to apprentice-
ship training 
programmes 
(depending on 
Länder) and ac-
cess for univer-
sity students with 
refugee status
No access after 
age 18 if refugee 
status not yet ob-
tained. Access to 
universities after 
Dutch language 
exam 
Limited access to 
secondary school 
and universities
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EDUCATION 
OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR RECENTLY 
ARRIVED MIGRANTS1
Michael Teutsch 
European Commission
1. Introduction
The large number of people arriving in Europe from 
the Middle East and Africa in 2015 represented a 
serious political and policy challenge. With around 
1.25 million arrivals, the number of first-time 
asylum applications in the EU in 2015 was twice 
the numbers of 2014 and about three times higher 
than in 2013. Due to the uneven distribution of 
migrants among Member States, the countries 
which received the highest numbers of asylum 
applications in 2015 registered figures around 1% 
or even 1.5% of their populations in only one year.
However, despite the 2015 crisis in which a high 
number of refugees arrived in a short timespan, 
it should be recalled that during recent decades 
migration has become an important characteristic 
of most European societies. There are currently 
20 million non-EU nationals residing in the EU, 
which corresponds to 4% of the Union’s total 
population. Migrants come to work, study or for 
family reunification. The international protection 
of refugees and asylum are only a part of the 
migration phenomenon, and in most Member 
States migration is not a new phenomenon either. 
There has been notable migration for decades 
and we have also already seen large numbers of 
refugees arriving before, such as during the Balkan 
wars in the 1990s.
Over the years, policymakers and practitioners 
1 This chapter reflects the personal views of the author. The 
European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use of 
the information contained herein.
have identified many examples of successful 
policies and practices (OECD 2015). Nevertheless, 
decision makers and key stakeholders in European 
education systems are still struggling with the 
inclusion of migrants in education. Similarly, 
most discussions on the implications of the 2015 
refugee crisis for European education systems have 
highlighted the challenges, the need for particular 
efforts and the difficulties to be overcome. 
The chapter in this ebook by Crul et al. also 
emphasises institutional obstacles to integration, 
in particular in the case of Germany and the 
Netherlands, while it sees the institutional 
conditions as particularly favourable in Sweden. 
Their analysis of the traditional institutional 
framework conditions in these countries is 
certainly correct. This chapter, however, argues 
that policy learning based on decades of past 
experience with more or less successful practices 
in education policy has created a basis for policy 
change. This, together with the nature of the policy 
challenge – the sheer size of the recent inflow 
of migrants and refugees in need of education 
– has led to policymaking on the ground that is 
more innovative and flexible than traditional 
institutional frameworks suggest. The most recent 
developments may eventually also accelerate 
changes in institutional settings as we know them.
In the next section, this contribution sets out the 
nature of the education policy challenge related to 
integrating the recently arrived migrants. It then 
presents the European Union’s policy response 
and an analysis of recent policy developments 
in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 
before finally discussing the role of traditional 
institutional settings and the incidence of policy 
change.
2. The policy challenges
The first key point characterising the policy 
challenge discussed here is the strong increase 
in the number of first-time asylum applications 
between 2013 and 2015. The numbers also 
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remained high in the first eight months of 2016, 
despite a lower number of new arrivals, which 
may partly be explained by the fact that some 
people who arrived during the second half of 
2015 only filed their asylum applications in 2016. 
Germany received 35% (442,000) of all EU first-
time applications in 2015, Hungary 14% (174,000), 
Sweden 12.4% (156,000), Austria 6.8% (85,000), 
Italy 6.6% (83,000) and France 5.6% (70,500). The 
share compared to the overall population was the 
highest in Hungary (1.8%)2 and Sweden (1.5%), 
followed by Austria (1%), Finland (0.6%) and 
Germany (0.5%). The share in the Netherlands was 
0.25% (European Commission 2016: 21; Eurostat, 
online code [migr_asyappctza], 2015).     
A second characteristic of the policy challenge 
is the prevalence of young people of school age 
and prime working age among the newly arrived 
migrants. Almost every fifth newly arriving person 
was younger than 14, another 10% were between 
14 and 17, and 53% between 18 and 34 years old 
(European Commission 2016: 21). In Sweden, in 
particular, the number of unaccompanied minors 
rose sharply from 7,000 in 2014 to more than 
35,000 in 2015.
Third, the prospects of the recently arrived 
refugees from the Middle East and certain African 
countries of being recognised as asylum seekers 
are very good. In Germany, for example, between 
January and October 2016 the great majority of 
the asylum requests from Syrian (98%), Eritrean 
(94%) and Iraqi (71%) citizens were accepted. In 
contrast, almost all the requests by citizens of the 
western Balkan countries were rejected. The rate 
for Afghan citizens stood at 51% (IAB 2016). 
Fourth, national studies conducted by the public 
employment services in Germany and Austria 
(IAB 2016, AMS 2016) show a polarisation of the 
2 The high number of first-time asylum applications in 
Hungary has, however, not translated into a major integration 
challenge in the country as many of the refugees were registered 
in Hungary and then travelled on to other countries, and because 
about 85% of the asylum applications in Hungary in 2015 were 
rejected (Eurostat figures).
education and skills levels of the newly arrived 
migrants. According to a recent survey carried 
out in Germany, a significant share have attended 
school for ten years or more, i.e. a level comparable 
with upper secondary education in Europe (55% 
among refugees compared to 88% of the German 
population). Almost one in five have participated 
in higher education (19%), and 13% have acquired 
a higher education degree. At the other end of 
the spectrum, 10% have only attended up to six 
years of primary education, 9% have never gone to 
school, and 26% hold no school leaving certificate. 
According to the above study, the greatest 
difference with respect to the host population 
can be found at the medium qualifications 
level. Only a few of those who have worked in 
technical professions or crafts also hold formal 
qualifications, which can mainly be explained by 
the fact that the respective countries of origin have 
not developed vocational education and training 
systems delivering such qualifications. Another 
challenge in this area is that due to different levels 
of economic and technological development, 
the types of skill acquired in such work may not 
match what is required in similar professions 
in advanced European economies. At the same 
time, the German survey found a high level of 
motivation to participate in education among 
refugees (IAB 2016).
Finally, it is important to stress that the policy 
challenge is not only defined by the characteristics 
of the incoming migrant population, but also 
by European experiences in dealing with past 
migration. Empirical data show that people with 
a migrant background have greater difficulties in 
making their way through European education 
and training systems than their native peers. The 
early school leaving rate is higher for the foreign-
born population than the native-born in all EU 
Member States except the United Kingdom and 
Ireland.3 In addition, young people from outside 
3 The ratios between native- and foreign-born youths 
are 1:2 in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Spain, France, Italy, 
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the EU have a higher early school leaving rate than 
those with an EU migrant background in Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Austria, and Sweden (European 
Commission 2016b: 40). Similarly, in the OECD’s 
PISA studies the results of immigrant students also 
lag behind those of non-immigrant students. The 
performance of immigrant students is correlated 
with their socio-economic status, which explains 
some of their disadvantage, but not all (European 
Commission 2016f: 20). In addition, even after 
decades of migration, in international surveys 
such as the OECD’s TALIS and national studies 
a high share of teachers respond that teaching in 
a multicultural or multilingual setting is among 
the areas where they have a most critical need for 
continual professional development (European 
Commission 2014: 63, Mercator/SVR 2016).
Taken together, the characteristics of the incoming 
migrants combined with knowledge of the 
difficulties that European education and training 
systems have in providing migrants with equal 
opportunities to succeed have made policymakers 
recognise a strong challenge and a need to act in 
order to deal with the consequences of this recent 
influx.
3. Policy response at the EU 
level
During the first months of the 2015 refugee crisis, 
the main attention was on providing shelter to 
the newly arrived, border control, fighting human 
trafficking and relocation. The European Agenda 
for Migration (European Commission 2015) 
set out immediate actions for saving lives at sea, 
targeting criminal smuggling networks, relocation, 
resettlement and partnership with third countries. 
The Agenda also announced support to Member 
States in promoting integration – primarily 
financial support through European funds – but 
at this stage did not yet set out specific measures. 
In the European Union, both integration and 
education are Member State competences. Member 
Luxembourg and Sweden, 1:3 in Austria and 1:4 in Greece, Cyprus 
and Slovenia.
States have to respect the minimum standards for 
newly arrived asylum seekers laid down in the 
Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), 
such as the obligation to grant minors access to the 
education system no later than three months after 
the lodging of an asylum application. However, 
actual policymaking on integration happens at the 
national, regional or local levels. 
The EU nevertheless supports Member States in 
this area. Common basic principles on immigrant 
integration policies in the EU were adopted by the 
Council in 2004. Moreover, in the context of the 
recent crisis the European Commission set out its 
priorities in its Action Plan on the integration of 
third country nationals of June 2016 (European 
Commission 2016). This action plan includes 
education as one of its pillars, alongside pre-
departure measures, employment, access to basic 
services, active participation and social inclusion. 
The action plan emphasises the importance of 
immediate action being taken as early as possible 
upon arrival (e.g. providing support in language 
learning and assessing skills). It stresses the need 
for measures allowing refugees and migrants 
to succeed in education on an equal footing 
with the native born in the medium term (e.g. 
teacher training, promoting participation in early 
childhood education and care). Finally, it sets out 
actions promoting active participation and social 
inclusion (including informal learning and sports). 
The action plan announces EU support to Member 
States through policy support and funding, the 
implementation of which has since started. Policy 
support mainly takes the form of peer learning (e.g. 
about welcome classes and language assessment) 
and the development of guidance tools (e.g. for 
early childhood education, and the recognition of 
skills and qualifications). EU funding is provided 
by the Erasmus+ programme (e.g. for online 
language courses and policy cooperation between 
countries and education institutions) and the 
European Funds (ESIF and AMIF). In sum, EU 
actions promoting integration through education 
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put a strong emphasis on mutual learning across 
Member States, which can provide a basis for 
policy innovation and development. 
4. Comments on the situation 
in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden 
Crul et al. emphasise the institutional differences 
between Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
and argue that these explain the much better 
chances refugees have of success in Sweden as 
compared to the Netherlands and Germany. More 
recent developments and data may, however, 
give rise to some optimism that the institutional 
obstacles in Germany and the Netherlands can be 
overcome. At the same time, Sweden also seems 
to be struggling with the integration challenge 
despite its favourable framework conditions. 
In Germany, empirical data show a strong influence 
of socioeconomic status on education results, but 
an important improvement over recent years, 
and in particular an improved performance by 
low achievers (OECD 2016a). Generally, both the 
participation rate and the education outcomes of 
those with a migrant background have improved 
over the last decade. About 90% of 4- to 5-year-
olds with a migration background participate in 
early childhood education and care (ECEC), an 
increasing proportion which is getting close to that 
of the native population. Participation in ECEC 
by those under 3 with a migrant background has 
doubled to 22% since 2009. This is also positive, 
even though native-born children of the same 
age still have a significantly higher rate (38% in 
2015). An important factor in this increase has 
been the establishment of a right to a place in early 
childhood education and care, in a first stage as 
of age 3 and now as of age 1. A German national 
education report emphasises that students with a 
migrant background are not a homogeneous group 
and that the participation in education of students 
with a migrant background very much varies 
according to country of origin and socioeconomic 
background. One of the key challenges is creating 
sufficient opportunities for learning German 
as a second language, with the system facing a 
shortage of teachers who are competent in this 
area (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 
2016, Massumi 2015, European Commission 
2016).
From a European comparative perspective, the 
Netherlands perform well when it comes to 
ensuring equitable outcomes in its education 
system. The participation rate in early childhood 
education and care is higher than the EU average 
and the early school leaving rate has been declining, 
while the impact of socio-economic background 
on PISA results is similar to the German results 
in PISA 2015. The national authorities identify 
challenges to the participation of low-income 
families in early childhood education and care, 
and related to educational inequality. As in 
Sweden, the municipalities are largely responsible 
for the education provided to asylum seekers and 
they work with schools to deliver it. The trend is 
to provide part-time introductory classes focused 
on learning Dutch as a second language combined 
with part-time mainstream education. Schools 
with asylum seekers are eligible for various types 
of financial assistance and can apply for additional 
funds from the Ministry when these do not suffice 
(European Commission 2016d).
In Sweden, the performance gap between foreign-
born and native-born students continues to be 
large despite the positive institutional setting. In 
PISA 2015, 41% of students with an immigrant 
background performed below the baseline level 
in science, as compared to 17% of the native 
population. The proportion of low achievers is 
even higher for first-generation migrants (50%), 
but second-generation immigrants partially catch 
up (33%, also see OECD 2016b). The transition 
between compulsory and upper secondary 
schooling is a particular hurdle for many foreign-
born students. While the national average for 
students who qualify for a ‘national programme’ 
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at upper secondary level is nearly 90 %, only 52 
% of students who migrated after the age of seven 
qualify. The age at arrival is crucial, as the above-
mentioned figure drops to 28% for those arriving 
in the last four years of compulsory schooling 
(aged 12-15). 
Since 2006 school outcomes have steadily 
deteriorated among those born abroad. The 
Swedish national agency for education attributes 
this to a higher proportion of students arriving 
in Sweden at an older age and to the fact that 
those who immigrated after the age of seven have 
increasingly come from countries with a weaker 
school system. Research evidence also suggests 
that their performance has been negatively affected 
by physical and organisational separation from 
mainstream education, poor mapping of students’ 
previous knowledge and a lack of individualised 
support (European Commission 2016e).
School segregation is also a challenge in Sweden. 
A two-year limit for introductory classes was 
introduced through legislation in early 2016 
because too many students stayed in separate 
classes too long, and because physical separation 
of integration classes from mainstream classes 
strengthened educational segregation. Residential 
segregation adds to the challenge. Sweden has 
taken many actions to tackle this problem, such 
as obliging municipalities to take socio-economic 
background into account in school financing and 
the new government regulation that came into 
force on 1 January 2016 reforming the process of 
receiving and schooling newly arrived students 
(European Commission 2016g). In addition, 
following the disappointing 2006 to 2012 PISA 
results, significant measures were taken to 
support the continual professional development 
of teachers such as a series of “Boost for Teachers” 
programmes, “Boost for Mathematics”, “Boost for 
Reading” and a career development reform, which 
contributed to a reversal of the trend in PISA 2015 
(European Commission 2016f). 
More generally, as regards the pros and cons of 
organising so-called welcome or introduction 
classes as compared to immediate integration 
into mainstream classes, the policymakers who 
participated in a peer learning event organised 
by the Swedish Ministry of Education jointly 
with the Commission in April 2016 found that 
organisational models were less important but 
that emphasis should be put on the individual 
needs of newly arrived migrants, i.e. quick skills 
assessment, language and literacy support, etc. 
The participants found it important to have high 
expectations and that integration was not only 
seen as an issue to be accomplished by second 
language teachers but by all teachers and the 
school community at large (i.e. including support 
staff, parents, municipalities, youth services and 
civil society). Like Crul et al., the participants in 
this peer learning event referred to the transfer 
to mainstream education and the continued 
availability of support in mainstream education as 
a main point of attention (European Commission 
2016e). In practice, the decision on the model to 
follow (direct integration or introductory classes) 
has recently seemed to depend less on pedagogical 
preferences than on the number of newly arriving 
children to be taught. In Germany, the pattern 
seems to be that the federal states (‘Länder’) which 
have received lower numbers of refugees opt for 
direct integration while integration classes are 
chosen where there are many. 
As for tracking, it is indeed often seen as an 
institutional obstacle to the educational mobility of 
socially disadvantaged children. However, it is not 
clear to what extent it explains the comparatively 
lower performance of refugee students arriving at 
the age of twelve compared to those who arrive at 
younger ages. The earlier a child arrives in a host 
country, the greater his or her chances are to learn 
the language of the host country and to start a 
successful education pathway. This fact is also true 
in systems which do not foresee early tracking in 
lower secondary education. As mentioned above, 
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during the last few years Sweden has also seen a 
downward trend in the education results of migrant 
children, which national experts have attributed 
to a higher proportion of students arriving in the 
country at an older age and to the characteristics 
of the school systems in the countries of origin.
In terms of defining educational success, Crul 
et al. put great emphasis on access to higher 
education. In countries such as the Netherlands 
and Germany, vocational education and training 
can, however, also be the start of a successful 
education pathway and professional career. 
Children arriving at a young age should indeed 
have the same opportunities to succeed as natives, 
including in terms of their chances to gain a 
qualification providing access to higher education. 
Nevertheless, for young migrants arriving at an 
age of 12, 14 or 16 who, in addition, might have 
only been to school in their home country for a 
few years, other education pathways should also be 
considered a success. Some of these teenagers will 
make their way to higher education if adequately 
supported. For others, the priority will be to ensure 
that they reach a school education certificate and 
that they acquire the skills necessary to succeed in 
an apprenticeship, instead of ending up as unskilled 
workers in low paid and insecure jobs. In countries 
such as Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Austria, the successful completion of vocational 
training provides good access to the labour market 
and opens opportunities for further learning. This 
is all the more true since for demographic reasons 
vocational education and training programmes in 
Germany are currently facing problems in filling 
all the available apprenticeship places with suitable 
candidates.
5. Conclusions 
For countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Germany, immigration is not a new phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, migrants still tend to have worse 
education results and some of the challenges 
identified 20 years ago are still relevant today. For 
example, a recent study in Germany found that 
neither in teachers’ initial training nor in their 
continual professional development is teaching 
in multilingual and multicultural classrooms 
systematically provided or demanded by students 
and teachers in all federal states (‘Länder,’ 
Mercator/SVR 2016). While this is disappointing, 
the good news is that policymakers know very 
well what needs to be done. Among experts and 
policymakers in the field there seems to be broad 
agreement on the appropriate policy solutions, 
notably early access to education, language learning 
and support, skills assessment, individualised 
support, teacher and staff training, and approaches 
involving actors in and around the school in school 
development (European Commission 2015, 
2016a; OECD 2015). Some of these measures have 
already been implemented in recent years, such as 
promoting access to early childhood education and 
early language support. The PISA data illustrate 
that such measures can indeed produce positive 
results in the medium term. Finally, the 2015 crisis 
also led to a strong mobilisation of policymakers, 
practitioners, and civil society. In the countries 
most affected, for example, the number of schools 
involved in integrating newly arrived migrants 
is unprecedented, also including schools on the 
academically oriented education tracks.
It is still too early to judge, but in this perspective 
the recent influx of refugees and the pressure it 
has created on education systems to provide viable 
solutions is also an opportunity to innovate and to 
overcome traditional obstacles. The extraordinary 
pressure that European societies, policymakers, 
schools, and teachers are faced with, on the one 
hand, combined with the knowledge about viable 
policy solutions, on the other hand, provides the 
basis for policy development in all the countries 
discussed in this paper even under divergent 
institutional conditions. This dynamic may 
eventually also spur the development of more 
inclusive education systems in the medium to long 
term. 
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1. Introduction
Until recently, many Europeans had only seen 
images of large refugee camps and desperate 
families trying to cross borders on TV screens. 
However, the unprecedented influx of refugees 
into Europe over the last two years, the largest since 
World War II,1 has made refugee scenes a reality 
for many European neighbourhoods. Feelings 
of empathy and shock have been increasingly 
accompanied by worries about the consequences 
that the refugee crisis will have for society, welfare 
institutions and labour markets. In almost all the 
EU member states these worries have influenced 
public opinion and political action, causing 
temporary closings of Schengen borders and 
resistance to a fair allocation of refugees across 
Europe. 
The refugee crisis soon became a political crisis 
that gave rise to populist parties. The topic was 
increasingly conflated with other migration 
issues: economic or educational migration, 
welfare migration and even internal EU labour 
mobility. Brexit, the unexpected vote of the British 
to leave the European Union, was also apparently 
1 See, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/global-
migration-hits-highest-level-since-world-war-ii.aspx.
influenced by migration concerns. The migration 
topic is suddenly determining the results of 
elections in EU member states and resulting in 
strong disagreements about how to deal with 
the crisis. Hence, the migration issue is acting 
like a catalyst in the European Union’s endgame, 
although it is only misused in the face of weak 
political structures. 
The current crisis can be seen as a crisis of Europe 
and its institutions rather than one of European 
migration. Refugees and internal labour mobility 
have not been the cause of the crisis. On the contrary, 
scientific evidence demonstrates that most of the 
current worries are unfounded. Recent empirical 
studies (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009 & 2016; 
Zimmermann, 2014a; Blau and Mackie 2016) 
point to the economic opportunities provided 
by immigration and suggest how Europe could 
achieve a fair and effective allocation of migrants 
that would preserve European principles and 
European unity. These empirical findings should 
be taken into account by European political actors 
in a spirit of evidence-based policymaking in 
their efforts to establish a functioning integration 
policy.
The following considerations will therefore put 
the so-called European migration or refugee 
crisis into perspective. On the one hand, there are 
undoubtedly enormous challenges which affect 
core values of the European Union that are the 
basis of the European idea. But on the other hand, 
the current crisis also offers great opportunities for 
a shrinking and aging Europe – especially in terms 
of enhanced labour mobility – as a basis for future 
growth and welfare. The analysis will mainly focus 
on the employment aspect of migration. To what 
extent are migrants, whether they are workers 
or refugees, able to find jobs or become self-
employed, finance their lives and contribute to the 
economic success of their host country? Are they 
harmful or beneficial for native workers? And 
which policies can foster and manage the inflow 
effectively?
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In Section 2 the chapter first investigates the 
challenges (and opportunities) related to migrant 
and refugee inflows. Section 3 then reviews 
some of the labour market effects, both for the 
migrants and for natives. Finally, Section 4 studies 
major policy approaches to ensuring the best 
performance of the host labour markets in Europe.
2. Challenges to face: those 
present and those to come2
Who should be taken care of? From a legal, 
political and social viewpoint, work migrants, 
family migrants, educational migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees are quite different categories.3 
Nevertheless, all of these categories may have a 
strong interest in seeking work, either through 
employment or self-employment, for at least some 
time. Hence, we cannot rule out economic motives 
for any type of migrant and neither should this be 
an argument for excluding them from a debate 
about optimal integration into labour markets. 
The current practice of many countries of limiting 
asylum seekers’ access to their national labour 
markets is problematic.4 Under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention recognized refugees are allowed to 
work immediately. However, since all EU member 
states have their own migration policies, the labour 
mobility of third-country nationals between EU 
countries remains restricted, including for those 
who have official refugee status. 
2 Also see Hinte et al. (2015); Zimmermann (2014a).
3 Asylum seekers and refugees are both special types of 
migrants, whereas in a legal sense asylum seekers or asylees are 
those who have formally filed an asylum application and refugees 
are those who have been granted refugee status (Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2016). These terms are often used much more 
broadly in the public debate, with refugees being considered to 
include all those fleeing unpleasant conditions in the home country 
(not necessarily applying for asylum, still waiting or preparing for 
the application, or not receiving formal status but still staying in the 
country) and asylum seekers those who plan to file an application. 
Here, we follow the more general interpretation while making it 
clear in the context when we focus on the legal terms. 
4 See Constant and Zimmermann (2016) for a detailed 
analysis of the current labour market access rights of legal asylum 
seekers in the EU member countries.
Some argue that an early integration of asylum 
seekers into the labour market would make it harder 
to maintain the distinction between economic 
migrants and refugees since it would incentivize 
migrants with purely economic motivations to 
apply for asylum. However, it is the current system 
itself that has corrupted this distinction. It could 
be made more successfully if there were (i) a well-
defined Europe-wide economic immigration 
channel outlined in an immigration law and (ii) a 
rigorous and effective asylum application system 
with early profiling, fast decisions and deportation 
when necessary. 
Why is labour mobility economically beneficial? It 
contributes to an optimal allocation of resources, 
and therefore generates higher and better output 
and more welfare. It supports a quick adjustment 
of labour markets, particularly after asymmetric 
regional shocks, and hence reduces unemployment. 
For a long time, visionary European leaders have 
been pushing to complete the Single European 
Labour Market, but it is still incomplete. 
Free movement of labour represents a core value 
of the European Union, as established in the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Already in 1951, the 
Treaty of Paris allowed for free movement of 
workers in the coal and steel industries, and in 
1957 the Treaty of Rome established the right 
of free movement of workers throughout the 
European Economic Community. Since then, 
the consensus in the European Union has been 
that by fostering growth through a more efficient 
allocation of labour between countries with labour 
surpluses and those with labour shortages, the free 
movement of labour can create greater economic 
welfare, increase European social-cultural 
integration, and strengthen a shared European 
identity. 
However, recent developments clearly demonstrate 
that this consensus, if not already broken, is 
in imminent danger. Even before the current 
situation, EU states tended to view any large-
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scale international migration as a threat to the 
sovereignty of their national and regional borders, 
their economies and their societies. Most member 
states have reacted in a backward-looking way 
to influxes of refugees by tightening controls on 
irregular access to their territories and, in some 
cases, on legal channels. However, as one might 
have expected, the increasing restrictions have not 
been effective in avoiding or controlling the influx 
of refugees and other migrants. Instead, they have 
resulted in migrants making increased efforts to 
reach Europe, which in turn exposes vulnerable 
migrants to greater risks.
The rising concerns about mobility in the political 
debates before and after the Brexit vote in many 
European member states demonstrate insufficient 
understanding of the substantial benefits of 
migration to the performance of the economy 
and a convoluted understanding of the value of 
a European Union of 28 member states. Despite 
the refugee crisis, it is still not too much labour 
migration but too little mobility of workers that is 
at the core of the European migration challenge. 
Both migration across regions within a country 
and between countries within Europe has been 
declining over recent decades. Interregional 
migration has played a much smaller role in 
economic adjustments in Europe than in the 
United States, where it has been an important 
component of the relative success of the American 
economy for many years. It is only recently that 
Europe has become more flexible, while the United 
States labour market has become less flexible. This 
has been partly a consequence of the EU Eastern 
enlargements and, more recently, a consequence 
of the economic divergence of European countries 
during and after the Great Recession. Migrants 
from outside the EU are typically more mobile 
and they also play a significant role in internal 
EU mobility (Jauer et al. 2016). Workers in the 
euro-zone countries have become more mobile 
than those in countries outside this zone (Arpaia 
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, internal mobility in the 
EU is far below the optimum level that could be 
achieved.
On the one hand, migration reacts to economic 
differences, namely wages and unemployment, 
but only slightly to welfare benefits. Ethnic 
networks play a dominant role, however. Migrants 
often select destinations because others of the 
same ethnic or local origin have chosen them 
before and can assist them in finding jobs and 
accommodation. The most important cause of 
immobility, on the other hand, is a lack of foreign 
language skills. Other major causes are rising 
female labour market participation and less 
mobile double-income households, an increase in 
the home ownership rate, the continued existence 
of barriers to the transferability of social security 
entitlements, insufficient recognition of formal 
qualifications, insufficient transparency of the 
European job market and online search engines, 
and persistent long-term unemployment, which 
leads to the increased relevance of social networks 
in overcoming individual and cultural barriers.
A further European challenge is demography 
and the shift in demand from low-skilled to 
highly-skilled workers. The UN’s Population 
Division currently estimates that 3% of the world’s 
population are international migrants – a number 
that has been very stable for decades, but all 
developed economies face a strong and increasing 
excess demand for skilled labour. This is brought 
about by technological change, population aging 
and, in the case of Europe, by a substantial future 
decrease in the native European workforce. 
Europe as a whole is thus increasingly drawn into 
a competition to provide the institutional settings 
for its companies to attract skilled international 
labour to fill the gaps. However, unlike traditional 
immigration countries, such as the United States, 
Canada and Australia, Europe has no standing 
in the international labour market for highly-
skilled people. Phenomena like immigration, 
return migration, onward migration and circular 
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migration are new challenges that Europe will 
rapidly need to learn to deal with in this phase 
of the internationalization of the labour market. 
How do refugees fit into this picture? Refugees can 
help alleviate Europe’s demographic disruptions, 
at least in the long run.
Can we manage migration and control our 
borders effectively? The correct answer is probably 
negative. The potential for migration is enormous. 
For instance, about 86% of the 14 million refugees 
in 2014 live in developing countries (World Bank 
2016) and few have so far migrated to highly 
developed countries. One obvious approach is to 
impose immigration restrictions: through legal 
measures, by tightening border controls or even 
by building fences and walls. A better approach 
would be to reach agreements with neighbouring 
states to collaborate on monitoring and managing 
migration flows. Such measures are being discussed 
in the context of protecting borders in southern 
Europe. However, if the factors that contribute 
to migration persist, political and geographical 
realities suggest that it will be difficult to control 
external borders sufficiently in the long run.
Furthermore, a common empirical finding in 
many countries is that imposing immigration 
restrictions often achieves opposite outcomes 
(more or different migrants) to those that were 
intended (fewer or other migrants).5 This is because 
efforts by immigrants to enter countries illegally 
tend to increase: if legal entry becomes difficult, 
workers who are highly motivated by push or pull 
factors will try to enter illegally. In addition, once 
they are in a country, workers will tend to stay or 
stay longer because returning is so difficult. As 
a result, return and onward migration collapse. 
And migrants who cannot easily move into and 
out of the host country are more likely to bring 
family members with them when they migrate, or 
to bring them in later when they realize that they 
cannot move back and forth. 
5 For an analysis of border control issues, see Massey 
and Pren (2012), Orrenius (2014), Massey et al. (2016) and 
Zimmermann (2014b). 
There are numerous examples of immigration 
restrictions that have backfired. A prominent 
example in the United States is the Bracero 
programme.  Under this free labour mobility 
programme, which began in 1942, workers from 
Mexico, mainly men, could travel into three 
US states along the border for temporary jobs – 
working primarily for growers in California and 
agricultural employers in Texas. The immigrants 
relied heavily on social networks that connected 
workers in Mexico with employers in the US. 
Although the programme was an effective system 
of circular labour migration aimed at temporary 
work, it was officially terminated in 1964 amidst the 
rise of the civil rights movement. As a result (and 
due to other restrictive immigration and border 
policies), Mexican workers and their families 
started to migrate into the US ‘illegally.’ Massive 
and costly increases in border enforcement had 
little deterrence effect on undocumented migrants. 
On the contrary, return migration decreased 
because the militarization of the border increased 
the costs and risks for Mexican migrants, so they 
stayed longer once they had managed to cross the 
border. In addition, they brought their families 
and began settling permanently throughout 
the US. Thus, barriers that were installed to 
reduce labour migration from Mexico to the US 
backfired and transformed a successful temporary 
migration scheme into a flow of a similar number 
of undocumented migrants, who eventually 
became de facto permanent residents in the US. 
Some recent research confirms these earlier 
findings. For example, a study that examines the 
period after the 1986 adoption by Congress of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act finds that 
for every million-dollar increase in the border 
patrol’s budget, the odds that a migrant would 
return home to Mexico in any given year dropped 
by 89% (Massey et. al 2015). 
As Zimmermann (2014b) shows, similar effects 
could be observed in Europe when guestworker 
recruitment ended in 1973. Turks, unlike most of 
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the other recruited ethnicities that originated from 
other member states of the European Economic 
Community, did not enjoy free mobility. While 
for other guestworkers whose countries became 
EU members the stock of immigrants decreased 
or stagnated, the numbers of Turkish nationals 
rose substantially. This occurred because the 
guestworkers stayed, brought their families to 
Germany, and had high fertility. 
From a global perspective, additional long-term 
challenges arise. With the inescapable progress of 
globalization in general, and given the advances 
in human mobility in particular, labour markets 
will inevitably become more integrated. In many 
countries the impending demographic disruptions 
will set in with full force in the coming years. 
Climate change, natural disasters and the rise 
of the BIC countries (Brazil, India and China) 
will pose additional labour market challenges. 
Expansion of the resources available to the 
developing world and a strong increase in human 
capital will generate more opportunities for 
global mobility. All of these factors will eventually 
require a global reallocation of resources. This will 
force international and domestic labour markets 
to undergo major adjustment processes. A strong 
demand for skilled workers together with the 
fight against extreme economic inequality, the 
creation of ‘good’ jobs, and increased employment 
of specific groups (such as the young, the old, 
females, low-skilled and ethnic minority workers) 
will need scientific monitoring and evaluation and 
a rising interest on the part of policymakers.  
3. Work integration 
experiences
There is now a large literature about the labour 
market consequences of immigration for all parts 
of the world, including Europe. Here, I provide 
a brief but focused overview. The questions of 
interest are: How do migrants integrate into the 
labour force and how quickly do they begin to 
perform in the education and economic systems 
of the host country? Do they affect the jobs, wages 
or educational chances of natives? And what is 
their take-up of welfare benefits? 
Some state of the art is covered in the handbooks 
by Chiswick and Miller (2015) and Constant 
and Zimmermann (2013). Assimilation to the 
economic status of natives has been shown to be 
very slow, and it is sometimes not even achieved 
by the second generation. Although theoretically 
possible, migrants typically do not take jobs away 
(Constant 2014), do not depress the wages of 
natives (Peri 2014) and do not abuse the welfare 
system (Giulietti 2014). The ‘natural experiment’ 
of the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 broadly 
confirmed these findings (see Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2009, 2016). Migrants from the 
new member states mostly found work without 
having a relevant negative impact on the labour 
market outcomes of natives. In spite of the 
negative public migration debate in the context 
of the Brexit campaign, these findings were also 
confirmed for the UK. Labour migration induced 
by EU enlargement was also beneficial for this 
country (Wadsworth et al. 2016), which received 
the largest additional inflow of migrant workers 
after immediately opening up its labour market to 
the new EU member states. A recently published 
report by a highly ranked commission of the 
National Academies of the US (Blau and Mackie 
2016) confirms the same positive outcome there: 
in general, migrants are good for the US economy 
and seldom harm the natives.
How do refugees fit into this picture? A number 
of studies have investigated the labour market 
integration of refugees or have compared their 
chances across different types of entry categories.6 
6 For Denmark and Germany, see, e.g., Constant and 
Zimmermann (2005a, 2005b), who look at entry categories and 
also study self-employment. See Devoretz et al. (2005) for Canada; 
Cobb-Clark (2006) for Australia; Aydemir (2011) for Canada; 
Bevelander and Pendakur (2009) for Sweden; Hartog and Zorlu 
(2009) for The Netherlands; Foged and Peri (2016) for Denmark; 
and Ceritoglu et al. (2015) and Balkan and Tumen (2016) for 
Turkey. Hatton (2013) and Tumen (2015) provide insightful 
literature reviews covering some of these studies. 
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Asylum seekers and refugees may be younger 
and better motivated than other non-economic 
migrants, but they integrate slowly, have problems 
finding employment, have more difficulties in 
organizing self-employment and hence also suffer 
from lower earnings. This is mainly a result of 
insufficient or lack of schooling and low host-
country language proficiency. A recent OECD 
(2016) report on refugees supports this general 
picture for 25 EU countries using the pre-crisis 
2014 Ad Hoc Module of the European Labour Force 
Survey. According to the report, 80% of all refugees 
are clustered in four member states (Germany, the 
UK, Sweden and France). A remarkable 20% of 
the working-age refugees have tertiary education. 
However, their allocation varies much across 
Europe and the size of this group has decreased 
with recent cohorts. About 42% have at most 
lower secondary education. In general, “refugees 
represent one of the most vulnerable groups of 
migrants in the labour market…. It takes refugees 
up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate 
as the native-born” (OECD 2016, pp. 5-6).
Refugees and asylum seekers often perform 
comparably to, but generally still worse than, 
migrants who came as family members. 
Immigration through a work status mostly leads 
to a superior integration path thereafter. These 
findings suggest that there are long-lasting effects 
of the legal status at entry into the country on the 
labour market potential of immigrants (Constant 
and Zimmermann, 2005a, 2005b). Hence, a 
selective immigration policy might be helpful to 
ensure individuals who can be more successful in 
the labour market are attracted. Such a selection 
might even be possible for asylum seekers and 
refugees when executed in a European context 
(see Section 4 of this chapter). 
The allocation of migrants and refugees within 
countries and among EU member states is an issue 
of substantial concern. Countries like Germany 
have for a long time had an internal quota system 
to allocate refugees and asylum seekers across 
states (‘Länder’), a strategy also applied in other 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (Hatton, 2013). 
Migrants were often placed outside major cities in 
local areas, which could cause social tensions and 
keep them away from attractive labour markets 
and ethnic networks. These regulations entailed 
no work permit being issued until refugee status 
was recognised. As a consequence, the medium-
term employability of refugees was likely to 
be negatively affected since major integration 
mechanisms were excluded. 
These policies were questioned and only recently 
have they been somewhat relaxed (Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2016).7 Early integration policies 
should be able to ensure a much better labour 
market integration of refugees. Such policies also 
need to deal with the fact that by their very nature 
many refugees are at first only temporary migrants 
and may wish to return to their home countries 
after the situation there has improved, or to move 
to another country for family or labour market 
reasons. Moreover, refugees move in ethnic and 
family networks and pursue economic interests 
when searching for a place to stay. This creates 
an opportunity to mobilize the diaspora for 
integration. Thus, refugees can also help moderate 
Europe’s demographic disruptions and meet 
the needs for mobile workers. However, this is 
much more difficult to achieve than is sometimes 
suggested in public debates and will take much 
more time and many more integration efforts. 
The main advantage of refugees is that they are 
typically young and highly motivated. 
Given the slow labour market integration of 
refugees, it is obviously unlikely that they will offer 
much competition to native workers. At worst, it 
is the group of the low-skilled natives and other 
migrants that can expect a negative impact. Tumen 
(2015) studies some of the major publications on 
the labour market consequences of refugee inflows 
7 For an overview of the current legal details of the labour 
market access of asylees, see Constant and Zimmermann (2016).
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from the perspective of ‘natural experiments.’ The 
argument he finds is that, unlike normal labour 
demand-driven migration that is endogenous and 
selective, a strong, fast and unexpected inflow of 
refugees may be considered exogenous and hence 
can more convincingly identify the true impact 
of migratory movements on the labour market 
outcomes of native workers. A counter-argument 
is that refugees may not be close enough in their 
profiles and reactions to labour migrants for it 
to be possible to learn much about the topic in 
general. Typically, the key empirical studies find 
no effects on wages and a negative, albeit small, 
effect on employment, largely in the unskilled 
sector.8 
The actual impacts of large refugee inflows depend 
on local institutional settings. For example, a 
study analysing the effects of the recent inflow of 
Syrian refugees into southeast Turkey shows that 
while wage levels were unaffected, the influx did 
in fact increase unemployment among the Turkish 
residents (Ceritoglu et al. 2015). However, a closer 
look reveals that the locals who lost their jobs 
mainly worked in Turkey’s large informal sector. 
There, the refugee inflows reduced the informal 
employment ratio by approximately 2.2%. The 
authors conclude that the prevalence of informal 
employment in Turkey amplified the negative 
impact of Syrian refugee inflows on native labour 
market outcomes. For unrecognized refugees, the 
informal sector is the only place where they can 
find work, as the Turkish government has not 
provided them with work permits.9
The Turkish case therefore shows the importance 
and necessity of considering granting immigrants 
access to local labour markets. Many refugees 
8 See Card (1990) for Cuba to the US; Hunt (1992) for 
Algeria to France; Carrington and Lima (1996) for Angola and 
Mozambique to Portugal; Friedberg (2001) for the Soviet Union 
to Israel; Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) for Burundi and Rwanda 
to Tanzania; Foged and Peri (2016) for Denmark; and Ceritoglu et 
al. (2015) for Turkey. See Borjas and Monras (2016) for a recent 
confirmation of these findings.
9 In the meanwhile, the Turkish government has relaxed 
labour market access for Syrian war refugees.
have usable skills and professional qualifications, 
and are committed to work. Nevertheless, until 
not so long ago they were effectively barred from 
seeking employment. Germany has also recently 
eased its restrictions on labour market access for 
asylees (Constant and Zimmermann 2016). This 
gives them a chance to earn their own living, to 
develop their professional skills further, and to 
achieve social integration.
Foged and Peri (2016) take up another important 
aspect of the refugee-native relationship. They 
study the massive influx of refugees to Denmark 
during the period 1991-2008 and its impact on 
the labour market outcomes of low-skilled Danes. 
Contrary to popular belief, they do not find an 
increase in the probability of unemployment for 
the unskilled Danish population. Instead, the 
findings suggest that the immigrants, who were 
mainly refugees from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, caused an ‘occupational 
upgrading and specialization’ of native Danish 
employees. 
The story behind these results is quite similar 
to what happened in Germany when the ‘guest 
workers’ arrived in the 1960s (Zimmermann 
1996). While immigrants are initially restricted 
to occupations and jobs consisting of manual 
tasks because of language problems, natives leave 
these jobs by specializing into more complex 
occupations with a primarily interactive task 
content. Accordingly, the influx of guestworkers 
had a positive effect on wages and the mobility of 
the native low-skilled population, who climbed up 
the job ladder.
4. Policy approaches
The above review has shown that, according to 
global evidence, migration is largely beneficial, 
although there may be significant differences 
between different types of immigration channels. 
Roughly speaking, economic migrants, in 
particular when they are screened by immigration 
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policies, are naturally easier to integrate into the 
labor market than refugees and asylum seekers, 
who are forced to migrate abruptly. But destination 
countries do not have much choice between the 
two kinds of migrants. International laws and 
the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 (signed 
by 144 nations) specify humanitarian obligations 
to refugees and asylum seekers. It outlines the 
obligations of the host countries to protect 
refugees and provides for non-refoulement, 
meaning that refugees should not be returned to a 
country in which their lives or freedom would be 
threatened. In the absence of clear international 
norms for “burden sharing” in the admission of 
refugees, foreign policy needs to achieve an earlier 
and better allocation between Europe and the 
world and within the EU. This is obviously not an 
easy task. A closed border policy for real refugees 
and asylum seekers is not only inhuman but also 
largely impossible to impose. It will only create 
misery, illegal migration and substantial economic 
and social costs. Similarly, there might be better 
policy approaches than simple border controls 
against illegal economic migration.
Given the substantial economic potential that 
migration has, the resistance against human 
mobility results from a misunderstanding of the 
facts, as well as ignorance or misuse of the topic 
for political purposes. Scientists certainly have a 
duty to share their knowledge with the broader 
public, the media and policymakers. Reports 
of Academies of Sciences like the National 
Academies of the United States (Blau and Mackie 
2016) are important for the debate. Those who 
understand have to stand up against political 
pressures and communicate by using the media 
properly. To do this, one has to deal with attitudes 
against migrants and refugees. Negative attitudes 
are often concentrated in parts of a country or in 
countries without a large number of migrants or 
refugees, or among people who misjudge the true 
impacts on the labour market and the economy 
(Bauer et al. 2000; Dustmann 2007; van Noort 
2016). Communication strategies to inform the 
public about these impacts and to profile successful 
individuals or contexts might help to moderate 
such attitudes. The inability of the political class to 
execute such a strategy is partly responsible for the 
currently perceived refugee or migration crisis. It 
is more a crisis of political leadership.
Managing migration is a somewhat difficult task. 
As pointed out in Section 2, economic research 
has shown that limiting labour migration does 
not necessarily stop immigration, particularly 
circular migration, as previous experiences (US-
Mexico, Europe after 1973) have shown. It may 
even result in more migration due to a decline 
in return migration and induced family and 
social migration, which change the nature of the 
process. In general, the relevance of emigration 
is typically misunderstood and underestimated 
in public debates. Labour migrants mostly return 
or move on when jobs are no longer available or 
when better alternatives appear. Refugees too 
can either return if the situation in the home 
country improves or move further on when other 
opportunities come up. Point systems provide 
transparency for migrants and the host country 
and have been shown to be effective to screen 
and guide mobility. The criteria may explicitly 
include integration indicators, such as education, 
language proficiency, job characteristics and social 
activities. An even better, but more controversial, 
approach is to use the labour market as a filter for 
migration. Those who have a job offer can come 
and stay, as long as the work relationship persists. 
Those who can no longer find a job have to leave, 
at least after a transition period, if they do not 
obtain a permanent residence permit. Circular 
migration contracts between countries may ease 
such relationships, which are very useful to meet 
demands for flexibility in host countries. Those 
who stay illegally may lose their right to return 
when a new job offer arrives. After a transition 
period, a world-wide regime of free labour mobility 
would probably only result in a modest increase in 
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labour mobility, as migration experiences suggest. 
Offering successful students the option of staying 
if they find a job after some transition period is the 
most effective long-term immigration policy.
Immigration regulations on asylum seekers 
and refugees are partly responsible for their 
weak performance in the labour market, as was 
discussed in the previous section. For instance, a 
refugee or asylum seeker could receive the right 
to move to the employment channel in a points-
based admission system as soon as she/he gets 
a decent job offer.10 They should be allowed to 
work as quickly as possible and not be restricted 
to a particular region within the country, or after 
recognition as a refugee even in their initial host 
EU state. This would improve their long-term 
labour market attachment. It is a well-known fact 
about long-term unemployment that being out 
of a job is detrimental to re-entry into regular 
employment; this also holds true for refugees and 
asylum seekers.
The objections against free labour mobility for 
asylum seekers and recognized refugees are that 
asylum procedures cannot be carried out if asylum 
seekers can freely move to other locations, and a 
fair distribution of refugees across member states 
presupposes that secondary migration is restricted. 
To clarify, the asylum procedure should be carried 
out in the country where the application was filed. 
However, this should not prevent job mobility 
within the country, as is now the practice in 
countries such as Austria and Germany (Constant 
and Zimmermann, 2016). Otherwise, taking up 
work is somewhat difficult for those not allocated 
to vibrant economic areas. Furthermore, Europe-
wide fairness comes into the initial allocation and 
asylum procedure. Asylum seekers can be seen as 
a burden, and it is considered that they should stay 
in the host country. However, it is in the interest of 
the whole EU area that refugees be able to move to 
10 While refugees are temporary migrants, in special cases 
this could also lead to a permanent residence permit and even 
citizenship of the host country.
where they are most productive and can finance 
themselves, on the condition that they have a 
work contract. If non-working refugees were to 
distribute themselves in a substantially unbalanced 
way, one could introduce compensation payments 
between countries. The profiling of refugees 
and asylum seekers in special arrival centres at 
Europe’s borders, directly organized and financed 
by the European Union, would take the heat out 
of the public debate and define a special role for 
countries such as Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain. 
The kind of profiling known from the work 
of labour offices can help to better predict the 
opportunities for migrants in host countries and 
their potential, in particular for the labour market. 
Profiling and integration need new institutions and 
procedures. For allocation to take place already 
at the borders one needs an initial temporary 
quota system across European member states 
guaranteeing a balanced distribution of asylum-
seekers across the EU following acceptable criteria, 
such as population size, GDP, unemployment 
rates, and existing related diasporas (Rinne and 
Zimmermann 2015). European solidarity still 
needs to be developed to execute either such a 
quota system or compensation payments. Since 
2015, Sweden, Hungary, Austria and Germany 
have registered above-average numbers of asylum 
applications, both per capita and in absolute 
sizes. In absolute terms, Germany took nearly 
half of the newly registered 2.3 million asylum 
applications from 2015 to September 2016. Other 
larger countries such as Italy, France and the UK 
have been much more reluctant. However, while 
the number of asylum applications in Germany 
further increased in 2016, restrictive policies in 
Austria, Hungary and Sweden led to substantially 
reduced numbers there. Hungary even seems to 
encourage registered asylum seekers to leave the 
country; its recognition rate in 2015 declined to 
practically zero (UNHCR, 2015).  
As an alternative to such quotas, Moraga and 
Rapoport (2015) have recently proposed an EU-
SECTION 3: LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION | REFUGEE AND MIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: EUROPE IN 
NEED OF A NEW POLICY AGENDA ~ Klaus F. Zimmermann
97
wide market for tradable refugee quotas. While 
offering asylum to refugees with valid claims 
is considered an international public good, it 
constitutes a significant financial burden on the 
particular receiving country. A market mechanism 
could efficiently distribute immigrants to countries 
with the lowest costs, including the direct costs 
of accommodation and administration, and also 
those of social and political distress. Furthermore, 
a market mechanism could be designed to take 
into account the preferences of the asylum seekers 
themselves, for example in terms of cultural and 
linguistic proximity. The resulting solution could 
therefore lead to a fair distribution of costs and 
may also increase public acceptance.
Integration courses and language classes need 
to be given early attention, if possible already 
in the profiling phase. Free mobility within the 
quota country should already be allowed before 
recognition of refugee status as early as possible; 
after recognition, mobility should be free across 
member countries provided that there is a 
concrete work contract. Like all migrants, refugees 
also generally migrate in ethnic networks. This 
offers the opportunity to mobilize a diaspora for 
integration.
Another strategy involves neighbourhood policies 
such as those currently developed with Turkey, 
Egypt and Libya. Circular labour migration 
contracts between the EU and African countries 
(like that between Spain and Morocco) could 
also be effective. In addition, in the long run a re-
vitalization of the EU-Mediterranean Economic 
Partnership concept could create a buffer zone of 
prosperity that filters the migration pressure.
5. Conclusions
Current events clearly indicate that Europe in 
general and the European Union in particular 
have arrived at a crucial stage in their history. The 
refugee crisis serves as a catalyst revealing that 
the ‘old continent’ is truly at a crossroads. There 
will either be more integration, coordination and 
common responsibility or the European Union 
could break apart.  
At this stage, the answer to any crisis must be 
‘more Europe.’ Recent developments have clearly 
shown that more integration is needed to address 
the economic, social and demographic problems 
of our time. If anything, the refugee crisis gives 
Europeans another opportunity to strengthen and 
modernize their bonds. Europe must certainly 
revisit its overall immigration policy; nevertheless, 
it must not lose its democratic ideals and the 
European idea. 
The free movement of EU citizens and workers 
within the European Union is one of the 
cornerstones of European integration. It is 
enshrined in the European Treaties. In a free and 
integrated Europe, there is no place for first and 
second-class citizens. Any intentions of restricting 
the free movement of labour as a fundamental 
right stand against Europeans’ well-understood 
interests in a dynamic and prosperous economy. 
Free labour mobility serves as a means to better 
allocate shrinking human capital capacities within 
the EU. In short, the free movement of labour can 
foster economic dynamism, promote economic 
growth and advance competitiveness. 
Europe therefore needs to join forces to expand 
the European dream, rather than stifle it or narrow 
it down well before it has reached its real potential. 
It currently seems that many EU member states 
want a ‘free ride,’ but the benefits of the EU come at 
a price. The current refugee crisis could therefore 
mark the dawn of a new era, but it also has the 
potential to mark the end of the European idea. 
Europe must now act jointly and seize the chance 
to reinvent itself to ultimately become the ‘United 
States of Europe.’ Only this model will put it on a 
level playing field with the US and China in the 
long term.  
SECTION 3: LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION | REFUGEE AND MIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: EUROPE IN 
NEED OF A NEW POLICY AGENDA ~ Klaus F. Zimmermann
98
Acknowlegements 
This work was begun when I was a John F. Kennedy Memorial Policy Fellow at the Center for European 
Studies at Harvard University and was completed as a Visiting Faculty member at the Department of 
Economics at Princeton University and its Industrial Relations Section. I am grateful to these institutions 
for their effective support. I also thank Rainer Bauböck, Amelie F. Constant and Milena Tripkovic for 
very valuable comments on various drafts of the paper.
References
Arpaia, A., Kiss, A., Palvolgyi, B. and Turrini, A., (2014). Labour Mobility and Labour Market  
Adjustment in  the EU, European Commission, Economic Papers 539, Brussels.
Aydemir, A. (2011), Immigrant selection and short-term labor market outcomes by visa category,  
Journal of Population Economics, 24, 451- 475.
Balkan, B. and S. Tumen (2016). Immigration and prices: quasi-experimental evidence from Syrian  
refugees in Turkey. Journal of Population Economics, 29, 657-686.
Bauer, T. K., Lofstrom, M. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2000). Immigration Policy, Assimilation of  
Immigrants, and Natives’ Sentiments Towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD  C ountr ies , 
Swedish Economic Policy Review 7  11ff.
Bevelander, P. and R. Pendakur (2009), The employment attachment of resettled refugees, refugees  
and family reunion migrants in Sweden, in: P. Bevelander, M. Hagstroem and S. Roennqvist  
(Eds.), Resettled and included? The employment integration of resettled refugees in Sweden,  
University of Malmö, 227-246.
Blau, F. D. and C. Mackie (2016) (Eds.). The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,  A 
Report of the National Academies, Washington DC. 
Borjas, G. J. and J. Monras (2016). The Labor Market Consequences of Refugee Supply Shocks, IZA  
Discussion Paper No. 10212.
Card, D. (1990). The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market, Industrial and Labor  
Relations Review 43, 245-257.
Carrington, W. J. and P. J. F. De Lima (1996). The impact of 1970s repatriates from Africa on the  
Portuguese labor market, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 49, 330-347.
Ceitoglu, E., H. B. Gurcihan Yunculer, H. Torun and S. Tumen (2015). The impact of Syrian refugees  
on natives’ labor market outcomes in Turkey: Evidence from a quasi-experimental design.  A n k a r a . 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
Chiswick, B. R. and P. W. Miller (2015). Handbook of the Economics of International Migration,  
Elsevier.
Cobb-Clark, D. A. (2006), Selection policy and the labour market outcomes of new immigrants, in  
D. A. Cobb-Clark and S.-E. Khoo (Eds.), Public policy and immigrant settlement,  Cheltenham, UK. 
Edward Elgar, 27-52.
Constant, A. F. (2014). Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers? IZA World of Labor: 10.   
SECTION 3: LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION | REFUGEE AND MIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: EUROPE IN 
NEED OF A NEW POLICY AGENDA ~ Klaus F. Zimmermann
99
Constant, A. F. and K. F. Zimmermann (2005a): Immigrant Performance and Selective Immigration  
Policy: A European Perspective, National Institute Economic Review, 194, 94-105.
Constant, A. F. and K. F. Zimmermann (2005b): Legal Status at Entry, Economic Performance, and  
Self-employment Proclivity: A Bi-national Study of Immigrants, IZA Discussion Paper No.  
1910.
Constant, A.F. and Zimmermann, K.F., (Hrsg.) International Handbook on the Economics of  
Migration, Cheltenham (2013).
Constant, A.F. and Klaus F. Zimmermann, K. F. (2016), Towards a New European Refugee Policy  t h a t 
Works. Forthcoming 2016: CESifo DICE Report – Journal of International Comparisons. 
DeVoretz, D. J., M. Beiser and S. Pyvnenko (2005). The economic experiences of refugees in Canada,  
in: P. Waxman and V. Colic-Peisker (Eds.), Homeland wanted: Interdisciplinary perspectives  o n 
refugee settlement in the West, New York, Nova Science. 
Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. P. (2007) Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration,  T h e 
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7, Article 62.
Foged, M. and G. Peri (2016). Immigrants’ effect on native workers: New analysis on longitudinal  data, 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8, 1-34.
Friedberg, R. M. (2001). The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 116, 1373-1408.
Giulietti, C., (2014). The Welfare Magnet Hypothesis and the Welfare Take-up of Migrants, IZA  
World of Labor 37.
Hartog, J. and A. Zorlu (2009). How important is homeland education for refugees’ economic position  
in the Netherlands? Journal of Population Economics, 22, 219-246.
Hatton, T. (2015). Refugee and asylum migration, in A. F. Constant and K. F. Zimmermann  
International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, Cheltenham (2013), 453-469.
Hunt, J. (1992). The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor market, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 45, 556-572.
Hinte, H., Rinne, U., Zimmermann, K.F. (2015). Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Herausforderungen und  
Chancen, Wirtschaftsdienst 95 744ff.
Jauer, J.,  Liebig, T. Martin, J.P. and Puhani, P.A., 2016. Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the 
Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and the United States. mimeo. 
Kahanec, M. and Zimmermann, K.F. (Eds.) (2009). EU Labour Markets  After  Post-Enlargement   
Migration. Berlin.
Kahanec, M. and Zimmermann, K.F. (Eds.) (2016) Labor Migration, EU Enlargement, and the Great  
Recession. Berlin.
Massey, D. S., Pren, K. A. (2012). Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: Explaining  
the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, Population and Development Review 38, 1ff. 
Massey, D. S., Durand, J. and Pren, K. A., (2015). Border Enforcement and Return Migration by  
SECTION 3: LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION | REFUGEE AND MIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: EUROPE IN 
NEED OF A NEW POLICY AGENDA ~ Klaus F. Zimmermann
100
Documented and Undocumented Mexicans, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41,  1015-1040.
Massey, D. S., Durand, J. and Pren, K. A., (2016). Why Border Enforcement Backfired, American  
Journal of Sociology 121, 1157ff.
Maystadt, J. F. and P. Verwimp (2014). Winners and losers among a refugee-hosting population, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 62, 769-809.
Moraga, J. F.-H. and H. Rapoport (2015). Tradable refugee-admission quotas and EU asylum policy,  
CESifo Economic Studies, 61, 638-672.
OECD (2016). How are Refugees Faring on the Labour Market in Europe? Working Paper 1/2016.  
European Union.
Orrenius, P. (2014). Enforcement and Illegal Migration. IZA World of Labor 2014. 
Peri, G., Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers? IZA World of Labor: 42. Rinne, 
U. and Zimmermann, K. F., Zutritt zur Festung Europa? Anforderungen an eine moderne Asyl  u n d 
Flüchtlingspolitik, Wirtschaftsdienst 95 (2015), 114ff.
Tumen, S. (2015). The use of natural experiments in migration research. IZA World of Labor.
UNHCR (2015), Asylum trends Hungary.                                                         
http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/pdf/resources/statistics/2015/asylum-trends-hungary-2015.html
van Noort, S., The Paradox of the Immigration Debate: Distorted Perceptions of the Influence of  
Immigrants on the Economy, Amsterdam (2016).
Wadsworth, J., Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G. and Van Reenen, J., Brexit and the Impact of Immigration 
on  the UK, LSE, Centre for Economic Performance, London (2016).  http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/brexit05.pdf
World Bank, Migration and Remittances. Factbook 2016. Third Edition, Washington DC (2016).
Zimmermann, K. F. (1996) European Migration: Push and Pull, International Regional Science  
Review 19, 95 - 128.
Zimmermann, K. F. (2014a). Migration, Jobs and Integration in Europe. Migration Policy Practice 6, 4ff. 
Zimmermann, K. F. (2014b). Circular Migration, IZA World of Labor 1.
SECTION 3: LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION | REFUGEE AND MIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: EUROPE IN 
NEED OF A NEW POLICY AGENDA ~ Klaus F. Zimmermann
101
EUROPE AND 
THE ‘REFUGEE/
MIGRATION 
CRISIS’:STARTING 
POINTS FOR 
POLICY DEBATES 
ABOUT PROTECTION 
AND INTEGRATION1
Martin Ruhs
University of Oxford
Introduction
Global forced displacement (internal and across 
borders) is now estimated to exceed 63 million 
(UNHCR 20162), a record high since the Second 
Word War.  The Syrian conflict alone has led to 
the displacement of over ten million people (just 
under half of Syria’s total population), including 
6.5 million internally displaced people and almost 
5 million refugees across borders (UNHCR 
20163). As is the case with most geopolitical 
shocks and displacement crises around the world, 
the great majority of Syrian refugees (over three 
quarters) are in neighbouring countries: Turkey 
(an estimated 2.7 million), Lebanon (1 million), 
Jordan (656,000), Iraq (228,000) and Egypt 
(115,000). 
The ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan 
and many other countries have also contributed 
to sharply rising numbers of people arriving in 
high-income countries to claim asylum, mainly 
1 This chapter draws on a forthcoming working paper by 
the author: Ruhs, M (2016) ‘High-income countries and the global 
refugee crisis: Assessing alternative pathways to protection.’   
2 See http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/
unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html 
3 For the most recent data, see http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/regional.php 
but not only in Europe. The legal pathways for 
people fleeing conflicts to reach high-income 
countries for the purpose of claiming asylum are 
either non-existent or are extremely limited. As a 
consequence, forced migrants who are trying to 
claim asylum in high-income countries must do 
so by engaging in illegal migration – defined here 
as the unauthorised crossing of national borders 
– which often involves dangerous journeys across 
land and/or sea.  
Over one million people (half of whom were 
Syrians and a quarter children) crossed the 
Mediterranean in 2015.4 While this number 
continues to be dwarfed by the much larger 
numbers of refugees arriving in countries 
neighbouring conflict zones (e.g. only ten per 
cent of Syrian refugees are currently in Europe), it 
constitutes a very large increase in recent historical 
experience (e.g. 216,000 people crossed the 
Mediterranean in 2014 and only 59,000 in 2013). 
In the first eleven months of 2016, 350,000 people 
reached Europe via the Mediterranean (a quarter 
of whom were Syrian), a considerable drop from 
2015. At the same time, however, the number of 
people dying/going missing while trying to cross 
the Mediterranean rose from 3,800 in 2015 to over 
4,700 in 2016. 
European and other high-income countries have 
struggled and, it is widely agreed, largely failed to 
find effective policy responses to the large inflow 
of refugees and migrants and to the growing 
refugee populations in the countries neighbouring 
Syria and other conflict zones. As a consequence, 
we are witnessing major humanitarian refugee 
crises, both in the conflict regions and in some 
high-income countries (e.g. Greece), and major 
political crises in many high-income countries 
about how to deal with the issue. The increased 
inflows of refugees and other migrants have been 
a major driver of the rise of right-wing parties in a 
range of European countries in recent years.  
4 For the most recent data, see http://data.unhcr.org/
mediterranean/regional.php 
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This short paper aims to establish realistic starting 
points for debates about more effective policy 
responses by European and other high-income 
countries to the displacement caused by the 
Syrian conflict and other global refugee crises. 
This may seem like a modest contribution, but 
given the current state of many policy debates 
about the protection and integration of refugees 
and migrants, greater agreement on basic facts 
and starting points would already constitute 
considerable progress. 
Starting points
I argue that to have a realistic chance of success 
any debate about new and more effective policy 
approaches by European and other high-income 
countries to what has become widely known as 
the ‘refugee/migration crisis’ needs to accept the 
following starting points. 
First, the policy challenge will not go away 
anytime soon. The scale of the forced internal 
and international displacement caused by many 
of the world’s current violent conflicts is unlikely 
to decline drastically in the near future. There is 
no meaningful end in sight to the conflicts in the 
countries that are currently among the largest 
refugee-producing states, such as Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Eritrea. To deal with this ‘new 
normal’ more effectively, there is a clear need for 
policy approaches that move from ‘emergency’ ad-
hoc responses to more considered and regulated 
responses based on a realistic understanding of 
the likely long-term nature of the issue, its root 
causes (rather than symptoms such as irregular 
migration and people smuggling) and the often 
enduring drivers of forced displacement. 
A second and related starting point is that the 
scale and nature of the policy challenges in 
high-income countries and the countries in the 
region (‘first countries of asylum’) are closely 
linked. The numbers of refugees who risk their 
lives to seek asylum in high-income countries 
depends, at least to a considerable degree, on 
the quality of protection and opportunities for 
human development provided in the countries 
neighbouring the conflict. While protection 
‘in the region’ will surely continue to play an 
important and, arguably, central role in addressing 
forced displacement and refugee crises, unless this 
protection provides opportunities for employment 
and access to services including education 
(especially for children, who constitute about half 
of all the refugees in the world), many refugees 
fleeing countries experiencing protracted conflicts 
will choose to seek protection and ‘better lives’ in 
high-income countries instead.            
Third, large-scale migration flows that were initially 
caused by conflict will inevitably lead to a ‘mixed 
migration’ of people with a range of different and 
sometimes multiple motivations from a variety 
of different countries (and not necessarily only 
from countries where conflicts are taking place). 
This includes refugees seeking protection but 
also many others whose primary reason for 
migration may be: ‘economic’ (e.g. to escape 
economic destitution or simply to access better 
employment opportunities that improve their and 
their families’ economic situations and human 
development); family-related (e.g. people seeking 
to join family members who are already in high-
income countries); and/or related to education 
and study (e.g. people wishing to gain access 
to better education). Although classifying and 
distinguishing between different types of migrants 
based on fixed categories (refugees, labour, 
family and study) is theoretically problematic 
and often highly contested in practice, it is clear 
that a significant share of the people arriving in 
Europe by boat over the past few years are not 
moving for the primary reason of protection. This 
is not surprising given the huge inequalities both 
across and within many countries. The primary 
reason why only three per cent of the world’s 
population are migrants despite these inequalities 
is that the restrictive immigration policies of high-
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income countries have kept most people out. Any 
perception of increased opportunities for legal 
or illegal migration to high-income countries 
can, therefore, encourage a range of people with 
different motivations and from different countries 
to make the journey. While this reality of mixed 
migration is not surprising, it does present high-
income countries with important and difficult 
issues of selection and removal/deportation of 
migrants who, for whatever reasons, have not 
been granted permission to stay. Any realistic new 
policy proposal needs to consider and put in place 
measures that address this selection dilemma. 
As a fourth starting point for debate, it needs to 
be recognised that the policy responses of high-
income countries to people fleeing conflicts are 
driven by a range of objectives relating to the 
national interest (however defined at a particular 
point in time), which often take priority over 
the objective of protection. While international 
laws and norms demand that policies toward 
asylum seekers and refugees need to be guided 
by humanitarian considerations, in practice 
there is a ‘domestic politics of protecting forced 
migrants’ in high-income countries, which can 
and does vary across countries and over time. 
The implication is that any realistic new policy 
proposal needs to seriously consider its political 
feasibility in different high-income countries. 
What is and is not politically feasible at any 
given time in a particular country is obviously 
not clear and can be debated. Taking account of 
political feasibility does not mean simply giving 
in to populist arguments, public anxieties and 
the rise of the far right, which can be observed 
in some countries partly as a result of the refugee 
crisis; it means recognising that policy makers are 
operating under certain constraints that need to be 
considered in any realistic policy debate. Calling 
for greater leadership and vision by politicians 
without paying attention to the structural and 
institutional factors that can act as variable policy 
constraints across countries is unlikely to result 
in the implementation of new, more effective and 
sustainable policy solutions to the refugee crisis. 
Fifth, the protection provided to people fleeing 
conflicts and violence must remain a central 
criterion for assessing potential policy responses 
to forced displacement within and across borders. 
It is helpful – and important – to distinguish 
between at least three dimensions of protection. 
The first dimension is the scale of protection 
provided, i.e. how many people are protected by 
the policy? The second dimension relates to the 
selection of the beneficiaries, i.e. who receives 
protection under the policy, who is excluded and 
why?  A third important dimension of protection 
relates to the conditions and quality of protection 
provided. At the most basic level, one can 
distinguish between temporary and permanent 
protection. Compared to full refugee status 
under the Geneva Convention, the different types 
of subsidiary/temporary protection status are 
typically associated with significantly fewer rights 
and more insecurity for refugees. Different policy 
responses may involve trade-offs between these 
different dimensions of protection. For example, a 
policy (e.g. temporary protection) may offer basic 
physical protection to a large number of people 
but the quality of protection (e.g. opportunities for 
longer-term human development and integration) 
may be limited, so there may be a trade-off between 
the scale and quality of protection provided.
The sixth important point is that a considerable 
share of the refugees who have arrived in recent 
years will stay in Europe permanently. The 
precise share will depend on a range of factors, 
including whether refugees are given permanent 
or temporary protection status. However, even 
many of those admitted under a temporary 
protection regime may not be able to return home 
and will therefore seek to stay in the host country 
permanently. All this means that the admission 
and protection of refugees always raises important 
questions about integration. As the contributions 
to this e-book discuss, ‘integration’ relates to a 
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wide range of issues and policy spheres including, 
for example, the labour market, education, culture 
and citizenship rights.  The admission and the 
integration of refugees are not separate issues. 
They are interrelated policy challenges that need 
to be analysed and addressed together.       
Seventh, cooperation among high-income 
countries in their policy responses to the global 
displacement crisis is important but cannot be 
assumed. The failure of European countries to 
agree to implement a more effective common 
policy approach to people fleeing from Syria and 
other conflict areas over the past few years shows 
that, in practice, the degree of solidarity and 
responsibility-sharing among EU countries is fairly 
low (at least in this area of refugee protection). 
This does not mean that more cooperation cannot 
be achieved but it cannot simply be assumed as 
the precondition for new policies. Countries need 
to be given incentives and reasons to cooperate, 
as appeals for greater solidarity to address this 
global humanitarian crisis have, at least so far, not 
been enough to foster greater supranational and/
or global cooperation in practice. 
Finally, it should be clear at the outset of any 
policy debate that no single policy will on its 
own be sufficient to ease the humanitarian and 
political crises and reduce the uncontrolled 
migration flows caused by conflict and forced 
displacement. More effective policy responses will 
require a package of policies and a comprehensive 
approach that includes new policy interventions 
in and outside the region of conflict. In this sense, 
any major displacement crisis such as the one we 
are currently witnessing in Syria requires a global 
solution that includes both high-income countries 
and the nations in the conflict region. 
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FROM REFUGEES TO 
WORKERS’: WHAT 
CHALLENGES?
Iván Martín 
European University Institute
In his keynote contribution, Prof. Zimmermann 
highlights the difficulties in the labour market 
integration of refugees. He refers to a recent OECD 
study1 based on the 2014 EU Labour Force survey 
ad hoc module on the labour market situation of 
migrants and their immediate descendants. This 
study concludes that “the employment outcomes 
of refugees improve over time, as they integrate 
more into the labour market and society, but it 
takes them up to 20 years to catch up with the 
native-born (65%)” (page 21). Figure 1 below 
summarizes this statistical evidence. However, 
even though these labour market integration 
difficulties are well-researched and there is ample 
evidence of them,2 it is still worth shedding a 
critical light on this statement. 
1  European Commission/OECD (2016), “How are refugees 
faring on the labour market in Europe?, Working Paper 1/16, https://
www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/Arbeitsmarktintegration-
von-Fluechtlingen-EK-OECD-Arbeitspapier-092106.pdf. 
2  See Martín, Iván et alia (2016), From Refugees to 
Workers. Mapping Labour Market Integration Support Measures for 
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in EU Member States, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung and Migration Policy Centre, pp. 16-17, http://cadmus.eui.
eu/handle/1814/43504. 
First, it implicitly assumes that refugees are 
(unemployed) workers very much like the native-
born of working age (15-65), but this is not the 
case. Because of their traumatic experiences (in 
their countries of origin or during their journeys 
to their countries of asylum), because of their 
lack of language and cultural knowledge of their 
host societies, and because of their different 
educational or work experiences (if any) in their 
countries of origin, refugees have a different 
psychological, social and even legal status, and 
they cannot be easily compared with workers in 
destination countries. They must first be activated, 
and this activation can take several years, very 
much as it takes several years to socialize and 
‘activate’ a young European to become a young 
European worker. As a matter of fact, it is not pure 
coincidence that the labour market integration 
performance of refugees is only comparable to 
that of family reunification beneficiaries who 
arrive in the European Union: they too take up to 
20 years to reach employment and activity rates 
similar to those of the native-born and other legal 
migrants (see Figure 1 above). This can best be 
explained because they too, upon arrival, cannot 
be considered workers even if they are of working 
age. On the other hand, 53% of these recently-
arrived refugees are between 18 and 34 years old, 
i.e. they have practically all their active lives ahead 
of them, so investing in their activation is also a 
good investment for the host societies. 
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Figure 1. Employment rate by reason of migration and years of residence in the European Union, 
15-64, 2014
Source: OCDE (2016), p. 21. The data cover 25 EU countries.
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Another important qualification to the ‘20-year 
lag’ relates to the reference year used to underpin 
this statement. The EU LFS ad hoc module was 
implemented in 2014, when there were only 1.8 
million refugees having arrived in Europe over the 
last 25 years in the 25 EU countries covered by the 
survey. In 2015, 1.3 million persons claimed asylum 
in Europe, and there were more than 592,000 
additional ones in the first six months of 2016. 
This means that between 2015 and 2016 European 
countries received the same number of asylum-
seekers as over the last 25 years. Obviously, drawing 
conclusions on their labour market integration on 
the basis of how refugees arriving over the last 25 
years fared up to 2014 risks comparing situations 
which are not comparable. Not only has the scale 
of the challenge dramatically increased but policies 
have also changed. In the very title of his keynote 
contribution, Prof. Zimmermann underlines that 
Europe is “in need of a new policy agenda.”  
The review of national policies undertaken in 
the framework of the study ‘From Refugees to 
Workers,’3 carried out by the Migration Policy 
Centre of the EUI, reveals a clear policy trend 
within the European Union (with the notable 
exceptions of France and the United Kingdom) 
to facilitate the integration of asylum seekers 
and refugees into national labour markets.4 This 
is a dramatic departure from the common policy 
pattern before 2015, when most of the countries 
instead tried to prevent or delay the labour market 
integration of asylum-seekers. 
Many of these countries are investing substantial 
resources in facilitating and speeding up this 
integration, and are designing and implementing 
all kinds of measures to support the process. 
The nine country case studies carried out for the 
study ‘From Refugees to Workers’5 inventoried 
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid., 42-43.
5  See the country case studies for Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom in Volume II of the study. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/43505/Study_fromRefugeesToWorkers_2016_Vol_2.
pdf?sequence=1. 
94 of these measures in the fields of skills and 
needs assessment, skills development (including 
language courses), job intermediation, recognition 
of skills and qualifications and incentives for 
economic integration, together with a plethora 
of integrated programmes putting together many 
of these measures. The comparative analysis of 
these measures suggests the emergence of a kind 
of ‘standard’ labour market integration package. 
The four key elements in this package are: 1) early 
skills assessment; 2) an ‘introduction’ programme 
including general cultural orientation, but 
sometimes also socio-professional orientation and 
even some training; 3) intensive language courses; 
and 4) access to general job intermediation 
services. Evidence on the effectiveness and impact 
of these measures is not yet available. The study 
just managed to identify some success factors 
based on the perceptions of the actors involved 
(see pages 44-50). What is clear, however, is 
that there is no quick fix, that the labour market 
integration of refugees (precisely because they 
are not workers on their arrival) is a complex 
and gradual process, and that there is no model 
of success to build on anywhere in the European 
Union. However, assuming that the measures 
implemented and the resources mobilised have 
at least some impact over the short to medium 
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term, they will fundamentally change the context 
and process of refugee labour market integration 
in Europe with respect to what we knew before 
2015, and hopefully they will reduce the above-
mentioned 20-year period. 
Nevertheless, many challenges remain, including 
in terms of policy interventions to facilitate the 
labour market integration of refugees (which 
we call REFMISMES – Refugee Labour Market 
Integration Support Measures). The study ‘From 
Refugees to Workers’ identifies the following main 
ones:
Fragmentation of REFMISMES 
A general overview of REFMISMES in all the 
countries studied shows a plethora of new 
initiatives by all kinds of public and private actors 
but a high degree of fragmentation and a thorough 
lack of coordination in their implementation. 
There are too many actors taking initiatives and 
intervening at the local, regional and national levels 
without any kind of coherent strategy or actual 
exchange of information, and there is a desperate 
need for coordination across government levels 
and between actors. 
Need for multilevel 
governance mechanisms
This dispersion and fragmentation of labour-
market integration support measures for refugees 
and asylum seekers highlights the need for 
powerful multilevel governance mechanisms to 
deal with current challenges in an integrated way 
(and this might also include the European level). 
The labour-market and more generally the social 
integration of refugees and asylum seekers take 
place at the local level, and initiatives to facilitate 
the process are often taken and implemented by 
local and regional actors. However, asylum policy 
is largely national, and this creates a tension that 
must be addressed with appropriate exchanges of 
information, coordination mechanisms, resource 
transfers and integration across actions.
Huge administrative 
obstacles remain
Even once they are entitled to work, asylum-
seekers and refugees face huge administrative 
obstacles to accessing the labour market. These 
are linked to the structure of the benefits they 
receive, a lack of long-term residence permits, a 
need to implement labour market tests before 
offering them jobs (as in the UK and France) or 
assignment to specific regions of residence. This 
is obvious, for instance, in the mismatch between 
the geography of labour-market demand and the 
territorial distribution of refugees and asylum 
seekers highlighted in several of the country case 
studies: e.g. Germany, Denmark and Austria.
The need for specific 
tailor-made measures
One consensual finding emerging from the 
country case studies is that asylum seekers and 
refugees have specific needs, profiles and incentive 
structures which explain their systematic 
underperformance in the labour market in relation 
not only to the population in general but also to 
other migrants. Their labour-market integration 
therefore requires specific targeted support 
measures, in particular for specific groups such 
as women (often with children). ‘Mainstreaming’ 
refugees – i.e. referring them to the general active 
labour market policies and support measures 
offered by public institutions to national workers – 
is not enough, even if this is the most widespread 
policy implemented so far in this field. 
An increase in resources is 
required commensurate with 
the social and economic 
stakes 
Despite the difficulties encountered in the 
comparative analysis, one clear preliminary 
conclusion for most of the nine countries studied 
is that more financial human and institutional 
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resources need to be dedicated to promoting 
the labour-market integration of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Even if all the countries have 
approved successive budget increases in the last 
year or so, the resources available do not match 
the magnitude of the economic, social and even 
political stakes. Extraordinary challenges require 
extraordinary responses. 
More information is required
Another element common to all the country 
case studies is an emphasis on the gap between 
the available collected information on refugees 
(both individually and as a group) and the 
information required to design effective labour-
market integration measures and policies. A 
typical example of this is the ad hoc module on 
migrants in the EU Labour Force Survey, which is 
only conducted every six years (in 2008 and 2014 
so far). If no decision is taken, we will have to 
wait until 2020 to have some statistical overview 
of the labour market performance of this last 
wave of refugees. In order to ensure a learning 
curve across Europe on this key development, 
more systematic collection of information on 
actions is needed. However, there is also a need 
for more systematic evaluation (in terms of impact 
and cost-effectiveness) of all these actions and a 
specific follow-up on the labour market outcomes 
for this specific group of workers.
Further research needs
Researchers also have an important role to play 
in facing the challenges set by the arrival of an 
unprecedented number of refugees in Europe. 
The ‘From Refugees to Workers’ study was only 
conceived as a first step aiming at an inventory of 
existing REFMISMES in a number of EU Member 
States and at undertaking a very preliminary 
analysis of them. However, there is much more 
that can be done in terms of research on better 
policies in this field:
• There is an acute need for more data and more 
information on refugees and asylum seekers, 
on their qualifications and skills, on their per-
sonal and professional profiles, and on their 
spatial distribution (in relation to the distri-
bution of labour demand across the labour 
market). This can only be done through repre-
sentative surveys of current and past refugees; 
those carried out to date among refugees have 
been too partial and too scattered. 
• There is also a need for more studies tracking 
refugees, following up on their professional re-
cords and their labour-market outcomes over 
time.
• Finally, there is a need for more (comparative) 
case studies of REFMISMES, with deeper and 
wider analysis of different kinds of labour-
market integration support measures. It would 
be extremely useful to extend the comparative 
country case approach to more EU Member 
States, and also to non-EU countries with dif-
ferent but relevant experiences of integrating 
refugees into their labour markets.
• For the refugees who arrived in 2015 and 
2016, becoming workers is certainly the best 
first step towards becoming new citizens and 
new Europeans. Therefore, although the ques-
tion of labour market integration support 
measures for refugees and asylum-seekers and 
their impacts may seem technical, it will prove 
crucial for Europe’s future.
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WHERE AND WHEN 
TO START THE 
INTEGRATION 
PROCESS? 
Alessandra Venturini  
European University Institute
The attention of the media and politicians is 
focused on the integration of refugees and, 
more generally, on the integration of all foreign 
migrants. Studies looking for the most efficient 
policies suggest the need for better skill-matching 
and a rapid transition to employment to avoid 
periods of isolation, which reduce integration 
capabilities. Labour-market integration research 
shows, however, that migrants tend to congregate 
in ‘migrant jobs’ and also tend to remain there, with 
very little probability of exiting (Strom et al 2013). 
Thus, policies which advocate a rapid labour-
market transition should also offer continuing 
training (one day a week, two days a month etc.) to 
help asylum-seekers and migrants really integrate 
into the labour market. However, this debate only 
focuses attention on the last phase of the migrant 
integration process on the one hand, and on the 
asylum process, which already starts before the 
move, on the other hand.   
The phases and actors that influence the process of 
integration for labour migrants are numerous but 
the sequence is clear. The multilateral nature of 
responsibilities means that the level of governance 
of asylum and refugee admission systems should 
be much broader and more complex. International 
coordination is needed to help nation-states face 
this human, economic and governance challenge.
The migration process starts in the sending 
country. The first actors that influence migrant 
performance are, therefore, the government, 
private organisations and associations and the 
families of the migrants in the country of origin. 
Their actions (e.g. signing bilateral agreements) 
can reduce the cost of migration and can favour 
integration by providing accurate information 
(not least pre-departure training) on the labour 
market, languages courses, and the social rules 
prevailing in the destination country.
Figure 1: The actors and instruments of integration for labour migrants
From INTERACT: Venturini A., 2016.
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Then, in the country of destination the 
institutional actors who produce and implement 
the legislation that determines admission to the 
country, the acquisition of citizenship and access 
to welfare affect the migrant-integration process. 
They produce a self-selection because they affect 
the migration-destination choice. However, they 
can also produce an active selection affecting the 
quality of inflows. The cap on the H1B visa for 
STEM workers in the U.S. and the EU Blue Card 
Directive are examples of this.
In addition, there are also labour-market actors 
in the destination country. Firms, trade unions 
and welfare institutions all play a very important 
role in the labour-market integration of migrants. 
Their actions are not so much at the national 
as at the local level. If the integration process is 
not successful, other local-level actors provide 
integration policies (language courses, training, 
support measures etc.) which should favour a 
return to work.
The integration process briefly described above is 
impacted by all these actors and actions and varies 
enormously according to the laws implemented 
and  the functioning of the labour market, in 
addition to the quality of the migrants. The 
same legislation that defines the rules for entry 
into a country can produce full labour-market 
integration in one case and low integration in 
another. Take Germany and Italy. The former 
has 4% unemployment, the latter 12% (with 
more than double this figure in the south and 
among the young). Therefore, the same selection 
at entry will not produce the same result in 
the two different labour markets. There are, 
however, some national groups which show 
very high labour force employment rates1 in all 
destinations. Take, for instance, the Filipinos, 
where the efforts of the Filipino community before 
departure and their support at destination spur 
1 We refer here to a probability of being employed equal 
to 1.  See Di Bartolomeo A., Kalantaryan S. and Bonfanti  S., 2015, 
Measuring the Integration of Migrants: a Multivariate Approach, 
Interact Research Report 2015/1 http://hdl.handle.net/1814/34679
employment integration. Thus, the integration 
of labour migrants is a long process that starts 
in the sending countries before departure, and 
the destination countries should invest in it 
with bilateral agreements and compulsory pre-
departure training to smooth the passages in the 
following phases. Labour migration is thus mainly 
an international bilateral phenomenon which is 
impacted by the actions of both the sending and 
destination countries.
The forced migration of asylum seekers, instead, 
is much more complex: it is not simply an 
international and a bilateral problem. The move 
starts in an area of conflict and, depending on the 
management of the phenomenon, many different 
actors intervene. These include the countries of 
first asylum, the arrival countries, the countries of 
final destination and the countries of resettlement. 
Their interventions affect the final integration of 
the refugees in the country of destination. Thus, it 
is a multilateral phenomenon.
First of all, asylum seekers show up as illegal arrivals 
in the most proximate region. However, this is 
not only a regional problem because migrants go 
where it is easiest to arrive, typically to the nearest 
safe regions. The countries of destination can 
be divided into two groups: countries of arrival 
and transit, where migrants arrive irregularly by 
land or sea; and then the asylum seekers’ final 
destination countries. The policies implemented 
by the transit countries affect the numbers, quality 
and timing of entries in the country of final 
destination. However, the policies implemented 
by the country of final destination (i.e. national or 
skill selection) affect the integration process in the 
arrival country too, and can transform integration 
into a permanent or a temporary phenomenon. 
In addition, the countries of arrival invest most of 
their public and private resources in first assistance, 
while the countries of permanent settlement are 
mainly left to deal with the integration process. 
This issue is in part articulated in the debate on 
intra-EU solidarity and on the mechanisms for 
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implementing migrant relocation among EU 
countries, but the strong implications for asylum 
integration are mostly neglected.
However, refugees are not a regional problem 
but a global one. This process is also affected by 
other potential countries of resettlement.  If the 
resettlement ability of UNHCR improved and 
if it were settling, say, a million Syrians in 2016, 
instead of 100,000 as they did in 2015, things 
would change. The pressure on the border 
countries of arrival would be reduced, many 
lives would be saved and the integration process 
simplified. While spontaneous arrivals only affect 
nearby countries, resettlement policies cover 
distant countries too. Asylum responsibility is 
global because political conflicts are distributed 
around the world (Petterson and Wallensteen 
2015). When Vietnamese boat people fled through 
China in 1970, it was perceived as an international 
problem. The Middle East refugee crisis is not 
only a European responsibility. The number of 
countries interested in the resettlement of asylum 
seekers could also increase and might include 
China and Russia, which are important actors in 
the international political and economic arenas. 
After all, many of these problems have economic 
roots. 
The actions of countries of first asylum determine 
the EU asylum pressure on border countries.  In 
the case of Syria, it is well known that Lebanon 
– a small country with 4.3 million citizens – 
hosts 1,200,000 Syrian refugees, and Jordan 
– another small country – hosts 850,0002. 
 When Lebanon decided to close its border, 
Turkey accumulated some 2,500,000 refugees 
in less than a year.  During the same period, 
Greece received about 800,000 asylum seekers3 
 and the flow only decreased when the EU made 
an agreement to finance first assistance in Turkey4. 
2 IOM 2015.
3 IOM 2015.
4 EU-Turkey agreement http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm
 International solidarity versus putting all the 
burden on the countries of first asylum should be 
the question at the centre of the debate and at the 
heart of the actions of other destination countries.
EU countries concentrate on intra-EU solidarity, 
namely the redistribution of asylum seekers and 
the redistribution of the cost of first assistance, 
or on the best job-matching policies to spur the 
social and economic integration of asylum seekers 
in the societies and labour markets of destination 
countries. These problems are of a manageable 
size, but more attention should be devoted to 
the process of forced migration, to supporting 
countries of first asylum, and to dealing with their 
increased impoverishment and growing regional 
instability. 
An important tool to favour coordination would 
be better forecasting of the asylum dynamic. This 
would help to provide timely assistance, avoid 
deaths on the journey to a safe land and optimize 
human and economic resources in the destination 
areas. To some extent, the modelling of future 
asylum dynamics is possible. The estimates by Tim 
Hatton (2016) of previous refugee flows are a point 
of departure and an attempt at forecasting should 
be tried.  A monitoring unit could be attached 
to UNHCR, which is the agency best placed to 
understand how many internally displaced people 
(IDP) will move. Asylum outflows could then be 
forecast on the basis of IDP information (see the 
growth rate in Fig. 3). Bilak et al. (2015) estimate 
the global number of asylum seekers to have been 
37 million in 2015. The newly displaced amount 
to 3.8 million in the Middle East, 3 million in 
Central Africa, 1.4 million in South Asia, 1 million 
in West Africa, 700,000 in Europe, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, 400,000 in East Africa, 400,000 
in the Americas and 200,000 in South-East Asia. 
Therefore, the whole world has its crises and there 
will be others. Think, for example, of a North 
Korean refugee event.
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According to the IOM, 86% of internally displaced 
people live in developing countries, i.e. countries 
of first asylum, and are potential asylum seekers. 
Figure 2: Internally Displaced People in the World
Figure 3: Changes in IDP figures over the last decade
Political conflicts are by no means limited to the 
Middle East, although the largest increase in the 
last ten years took place there (see Figure 3). The 
rest are distributed around the world and for 
Ref: UNHCR, 2014
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that reason our approach has to be global and 
governance needs to be multilateral.
Better management of the refugee process would 
also allow policies tailored to the needs and desires 
of different refugee groups to be implemented – to 
those who wish to stay for a short time and to those 
who instead want to resettle or to become citizens of 
the destination country. This kind of management 
will solve many integration policy dilemmas. 
What should have priority? Language courses, 
civilization courses, cultural courses, professional 
training courses or only labour-market skill 
matches at the lowest level? The complexity of the 
actors involved in the asylum process risks only 
emphasising labour-market integration before a 
minimum of social integration is assured. Without 
strong coordination, differentiated integration 
according to the country of destination’s ‘model’ 
will prevail. This is because the actors who define 
migration policies at the national level and the 
functioning of the labour market, which differs 
from one country to another, will dominate the 
entire process.
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Lancaster University
1. Introduction:  
Integration and Otherness
1.1. Integration
“Integration is a reciprocal process in which 
the efforts of those who are permitted to 
remain in Austria must without doubt 
be greater because the basic values of 
Austrian society are non-negotiable and 
must therefore be followed” (S. Kurz 
Integrationsbericht 2016, 5).
“A static and essentialist notion of culture 
would not do justice to the reality of a 
pluralistic and changing migration society. 
Indeed, at the “end of the road” there 
awaits us neither a perfectly assimilated 
society, nor a patchwork of diverse social 
groups that has become estranged from 
itself, but a plural togetherness that must 
continually be re-negotiated” H. Fassmann 
Integrationsbericht 2016, 85).
The two quotes taken from the same report on 
immigrant integration in Austria indicate two 
significantly different positions on a continuum 
from total rejection of the ‘other’ to total acceptance 
of the ‘other’. In between, we detect many other 
approaches to culture and integration: ‘integration’ 
understood as ‘assimilation,’ ‘integration as living 
in parallel societies,’ ‘integration as respect for 
the other’ and so forth. Importantly, the second 
quote, written by a so-called Austrian expert 
committee on integration (Expertenrat) consisting 
of an interdisciplinary group of scholars in various 
fields specializing in migration studies (linguists, 
demographers, legal scholars and political 
scientists), journalists, architects and urban 
planners, as well as various NGOs, emphasizes 
the danger of essentializing culture as static and 
homogeneous, as a discrete category, something 
which you possess or do not, something which 
one can acquire as an ‘entity,’ or cannot. According 
to Heinz Fassmann, chair of the Expertenrat, 
integration should be perceived as negotiating 
and co-constructing a pluralist society whose 
practices are always open to change. By contrast, 
the Austrian Minister for Integration (and Foreign 
Affairs), Sebastian Kurz, who commissioned the 
report, argues that immigrants are obviously 
required to invest more work in coping with 
the norms and values of the host society.1 Thus, 
learning and accepting the constitutive values 
of the host society becomes the sine qua non of 
successful integration. 
As David Miller (2016, 9) maintains, “In earlier 
times … immigrants were left to their own devices 
so long as they did not become involved in illegal 
or antisocial behaviour.” Nowadays, Miller (ibid, 
9ff.) argues,
the contemporary democratic state cannot 
take such a hands-off view: it wants 
and needs immigrants to become good, 
upstanding citizens. And achieving this 
may involve encouraging or even requiring 
them to shed some of the cultural baggage 
they bring with them. 
It is obvious that such requirements cannot be 
easily translated into policies. Which cultural or 
1 Also see “50 Punkte Plan zur Integration” (2015) of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Integration (file:///C:/Users/RW/
Downloads/50_Punkte_Plan_zur_Integration%20(1).pdf)
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religious beliefs are perceived as not being fit for 
Western societies or actually clash with common 
and widely accepted routines and knowledge? 
While this paper cannot address the important 
political and philosophical debates on this matter 
(but see Miller, 2016), it is important to emphasize 
that perceptions of rights and obligations (apart 
from fundamental human rights) on the part of 
immigrants and the host society are often strongly 
influenced by contextual factors (such as the 
number of immigrants, their countries of origin, 
levels of xenophobia in the host country, time since 
arrival, levels of education, gender politics and so 
forth). This is why I will first discuss some models 
elaborating the many dimensions of ‘integration.’ 
I will then proceed to the currently observable 
culturalisation of integration policies. Moreover, 
I will focus on two Europe-wide tendencies: 
the implementation of ever more and stricter 
language and citizenship tests; and secondly on 
the discourse about an ‘unwilligness to integrate,’ 
which shifts the blame for current complex socio-
political problems on to the strangers arriving.
Integration can obviously not be reduced to 
a cultural dimension. Ager and Strang (2008) 
introduce a useful conceptual framework that 
defines the core domains of integration (pp. 169–
70)2 (Fig. 1, below). In this model, they propose 
four dimensions. First, they distinguish between 
markers and means (such as employment, housing, 
education and health), defined as key aspects of 
integrating into a society. 
2 In this context, also see Carvill et al. (2016), Delanty 
et al. (2011), Krzyżanowski & Wodak (2009), Messer et al. 
2011), Penninx et al. (2008) and Schmiederer (2013), who all 
discuss different models and forms of political, legal and cultural 
integration. Moreover, I also rely on the Migration Policy Index 
2015 (MIPEX), but I have to restrict myself to cultural – and, even 
more specifically, linguistic-communicative – integration in this 
paper due to reasons of space and expertise.
The second dimension in this model relates to 
social connection, i.e. investigation of the processes 
that mediate between foundational principles and 
public outcomes in the first dimension (markers 
and means). In other words, how do feelings of 
‘belonging’ evolve, when are migrants accepted 
and when do they feel accepted in communities 
in practice? For example, while analysing data 
from 48 focus groups with migrants from different 
ethnic origins in eight European member states 
in the EU-funded project XENOPHOB, Delanty 
et al. (2011) were able to illustrate in much detail 
that foundational rights (such as having acquired 
citizenship), fluency in the host language and 
so forth do not necessarily imply access, respect 
and acceptance. Access to housing and the labour 
market remains difficult due to prejudices and 
discriminatory beliefs. Social bonds, social bridges 
and social links are viewed as essential mediators in 
transcending various thresholds and gatekeepers 
in the complex process of integration (Ager & 
Strang 2008, 179–81). 
The third dimension in this model is what 
Ager and Strang call ‘facilitators.’ These include 
language and cultural knowledge and conditions 
of safety and stability. Such facilitators were 
studied, for instance, in a recent ethnography of 
a Pakistani family moving to the UK (Capstick, 
2015). The study was carried out over several years 
and included the entire trajectory from applying 
for language tests, visas, residence permits and 
Figure 1: Integration Model (adapted from Ager 
& Strang 2008, 170).
SECTION 4: CULTURAL INTEGRATION | INTEGRATION AND CULTURE: FROM ‘COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE’ TO 
‘COMPETENCE IN PLURALITY’ ~ Ruth Wodak
118
work permits up to settling in a small town in 
Lancashire. Capstick (2015, 228) concludes his 
study by stating: 
By employing the concept of ‘cultural 
brokerage’ to emphasize the bridge it 
provides between dominant and non-
dominant knowledge, the decisive role of 
brokers in negotiating the links between 
individuals’ everyday non-dominant 
literacies and dominant institutions’ 
bureaucratic literacies enables researchers 
to explore issues of power when examining 
the relationship between local and global 
contexts in migration. This is because 
literacy events like completing a visa 
form invoke broader cultural patterns 
of literacy practices, such as registering 
marriages, and provide opportunities 
for migrants to appropriate bureaucratic 
literacy practices in order to make 
successful visa applications. For example, 
the British Pakistani immigration 
solicitor in Preston understands both 
the Mirpuri tradition of providing work 
for spouses of family members as well as 
the British government’s immigration 
and employment law relating to visa 
requirements and visa sponsors’ salaries. 
The literacy events which instantiate these 
practices, such as the completion of visa 
forms by a cultural broker who is able to 
draw on her understanding of dominant 
and non-dominant contexts, are shaped by 
the priorities of individuals who have much 
to lose if visa applications fail. Thus, when 
bureaucratic literacies have significant 
personal as well as practical consequences 
for the whole family, migrants are able 
to draw on wider community networks 
which allow them to comply with the 
institutional requirements which shape the 
family’s lives in both the UK and Pakistan. 
It becomes apparent that without cultural and 
literacy brokers this family would never have 
been able to enter the UK legally and successfully. 
Alongside these cultural and linguistic facilitators, 
perceptions of safety and stability are particularly 
relevant if, for instance, refugees have encountered 
traumatic events during their flight. 
The fourth and final dimension in the model is 
about citizenship and rights, which Ager and 
Strang consider the constitutive foundation 
for integration. Of course, the meaning of 
citizenship varies across settings, due to national 
traditions, policies and identity politics (p. 176). 
It also becomes apparent, however, that the four 
dimensions in the model discussed above are 
connected and related with each other in very 
intricate, complex and context-dependent ways, 
which have to be investigated both quantitatively 
(through surveys, document and policy analysis, 
and interviews) and qualitatively (through 
focus groups, ethnography, online ethnography, 
discourse and semiotic analysis of images and 
other genres, and so forth) in order to be able to 
assess positive and negative forms of integration. 
1.2.  Negotiating culture
When following the dominant political and media 
debates across Europe and the EU (and beyond), 
one is struck by a quite consistent hierarchy of 
values, which is presented as the hegemonic value 
system of the West. Apart from the central role of 
the national language which needs to be acquired 
(Wodak 2011, 2012, 2015a, 90ff; see below), 
specific areas are highlighted and perceived as 
salient for ‘us,’ for democratic secular European 
states which have signed the Human Rights 
Conventions and other international treaties (such 
as the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention) and 
which have also – it is assumed – implemented 
gender equality, anti-discrimination laws, high 
standards of justice and education, and so forth. 
Subsequently, a huge Manichean contrast emerges 
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between (an educated, liberal and progressive) 
West and (a retarded, undemocratic and 
uneducated) East, two solidified and homogenous 
blocs with nothing in between. Accordingly, we 
observe a culturalization of discourse (Yilmaz 
2016, 17) through which a right such as freedom 
of speech is transformed into a cultural value, 
although rights have certainly not developed via 
cultural evolution but rather as a result of political 
struggles, revolutions and abrupt breaks with the 
past (e.g. Chanock 2000). Indeed, as Soysal (2009, 
5) argues, culture has become the dominant frame 
for political issues and policies such as citizenship, 
security, the economy and so forth. It seems that 
culture can be defined as a floating/empty signifier 
onto which politicians, media and lay persons are 
able to project whatever problems or categories 
they choose (Yilmaz 2016, 18ff.).
It is important, therefore, to discuss culture in 
more differentiated terms. Miller (2016, 141ff) 
draws a line between public and private culture. 
He argues that we can distinguish, on the one 
hand, the culture of the wider society (i.e. its 
language, symbols and institutions) and, on the 
other hand, different religions, forms of art and 
literature, a variety of cuisines and respective 
mother tongues. But where, how and when should 
this thin line be drawn? Immigrants will probably 
wish to retain many symbols of their own culture 
and integrate them with the host culture. The host 
society, however, expects identification with its 
national identity and (banal) symbols (Billig 1995; 
Rheindorf & Wodak 2016). A problem arises most 
vehemently – as can be observed across Europe 
and beyond – in the case of religion, i.e. when 
specific religious beliefs and practices collide with 
elements of the host society’s culture. Miller (2016, 
ibid, 149) concludes that
[f]ull cultural integration requires that 
members of the indigenous majority 
understand why the private cultures of 
immigrants need to be accommodated 
and offer ungrudging support for the 
measures needed, and that the immigrants 
themselves understand and embrace the 
public culture of the society they have 
joined.
In view of the highly controversial debates about 
the burqa and the headscarf as metonymic tropes 
for Muslim and indeed Islamist religion and a 
related oppression of women, Miller’s proposals 
might be considered rather utopian (Wodak 
2015b, 151 ff.).
Reviewing anti-Muslim rhetoric in the 1990s and 
the first decade of the 21st century reveals that 
specific iconic images of the ‘female’ have become 
the ultimate ‘other.’ Countless political debates 
have surrounded and continue to surround the 
so-called ‘headscarf ’ (hijab: a scarf that covers the 
hair and sometimes the shoulders) and the burqa 
and niqab (both of which cover the hair, the face 
except for the eyes and the entire body) as symbols 
of uncivilised barbaric Islam and of oppressed 
women who should be liberated by the values of 
Western culture. In this enterprise, interestingly, 
right-wing populist movements have aligned 
with some left-wing intellectuals and parties, 
together with many feminists, all assuming and 
presupposing that all veiled Muslim women 
are forced to cover their hair, faces or bodies 
and that the West faces a twofold challenge and 
responsibility: to protect the secular nature of the 
public sphere by banning ostentatious religious 
symbols and to liberate oppressed Muslim 
women. In this context, Hammerl (2016) points 
to many hypocritical, contradictory and fallacious 
arguments: the niqab is accepted if worn by rich 
Saudi tourists, but the burqa is not accepted if 
worn by poor Afghan refugees; the liberation of 
Muslim women is called for by right-wing populist 
politicians who, simultaneously, campaign against 
Free Choice or equal pay for women and men. 
Furthermore, I argue that the debate about culture 
and Islam is primarily fought in an attempt to 
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discipline the female body (Wodak 2015b). 
This anti-Muslim discourse is instrumentalised 
to cover up other socio-political and – most 
importantly – socio-economic agendas. Indeed, 
appeals to liberate women from ‘textual-sexual 
oppression’ (Amin 2015) unite more voters 
around a right-wing populist agenda than do anti-
modernisation and anti-globalisation agendas. 
Such a dichotomisation renders it very difficult, 
if not impossible, for progressive Muslim women 
to criticize fundamentalist patriarchal positions. 
Marsdal (2013) convincingly deconstructs in 
detail the traditional left-right cleavage with 
respect to a change in voting behaviour related to 
social class. Analysing developments in Norway, 
he emphasizes that votes for (moral) values have 
replaced votes for parties: 
 …[c]lass issues are shoved into the 
background and value issues come to the 
fore. Tensions over economic distribution 
and fairness are demobilized. This takes 
place, however, at the top level of party 
politics, and not in society. In society, 
economic and social inequalities and 
tensions have been rising over the last 
decades, not only in Norway or Denmark, 
but also all over Europe. The political 
demobilizing of class conflicts does not 
take place because most voters have come 
to emphasize value issues more than 
class issues, which they do not have, but 
rather because, under the neo-liberal élite 
consensus on class issues, confrontation 
on moral and cultural issues (‘values’) has 
become the only available means of party-
political and ideological demarcation […]. 
Economic policy debates are dull and grey. 
Then, someone says something about the 
Muslim veil and media hell breaks loose 
(ibid, 51–52).
This observation provides evidence for Yilmaz’s 
claim about a ‘hegemony of the cultural paradigm’ 
(Yilmaz 2016, 19): “[T]he culturalization of 
discourse has changed the understanding of 
politics as the site where problems caused by 
cultural encounters are handled” (ibid, 18).
Next to religion, language and language skills have 
played a major role as markers of cultural difference 
in contexts of immigrant integration. In contrast 
with religion, however, language competence is 
used less to demonstrate unalterable otherness 
and more as a test of immigrants’ capacity and 
readiness to assimilate. 
In the following section, I first provide a brief 
overview of multilingualism policies in the 
European Union as the broad context for the 
subsequent implementation of national language 
and KoS (Knowledge of Society) tests in the form of 
NAPs (National Action Plans). I draw primarily on 
surveys conducted by the Council of Europe. I then 
summarise two empirical case studies which serve 
to illustrate some complex challenges to cultural 
integration. First, I present the results of a study of 
Austrian political and media discourse (2015/16) 
regarding the term Integrationsunwilligkeit 
(‘unwillingness to integrate’). This term is 
employed in order to legitimize punitive measures 
for migrants and refugees already living in Austria 
if they are perceived to reject ‘our values’. This 
discourse emerged as a reaction to the terrorist 
attacks in Paris in January 2015; some politicians 
linked potential terrorism and radicalization to 
Integrationsunwilligkeit allegedly manifested by 
male Muslim adolescents. Consequently, debates 
about positive measures for integration became 
less important and less prominent in the public 
sphere. Second, I discuss the results of an ongoing 
study – INPUT – about language acquisition by 
children with and without a Turkish background in 
correlation with parental linguistic input. INPUT 
provides evidence that socio-economic status 
overrides ethnic origin, i.e. children who receive 
more support from their parents and grow up in 
HSES (high socio-economic status) families learn 
German faster than children from LSES (lower 
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socio-economic status), regardless of migrant 
background. These results put into question many 
school curricula designed specifically for migrants 
(children and adults) while neglecting other 
relevant socio-economic variables. 
2. Language competence and 
language tests
2.1. EU multilingual vs. national 
monolingual policies
European multilingualism has been defined as an 
essential component of the future construction 
of a European identity, or of European identities 
in the plural, and for the preservation of 
national, regional, local, societal and individual 
multilingualism. The importance of language 
learning, for example, has been repeatedly stressed 
by various European authorities in declarations of 
political intent on matters of language, education 
and pedagogy (e.g. Article 2 of the European 
Cultural Convention, 19 December 1954; 
‘Recommendation 814 on Modern Languages in 
Europe’ from the Council of Europe, 5 October 
1977; the final KSZE document of 1 August 
1975). In the 2000 Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties, the EU committed itself to European 
multilingualism. This was echoed by the Council 
of Europe’s Resolution from the Committee of 
Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) 
‘Recommendation concerning modern languages 
(98).’ The last of these warns explicitly “of the 
dangers that might result from marginalisation of 
those who lack the skills necessary to communicate 
in an interactive Europe” (ibid.) and states, inter 
alia, that
[S]teps should be taken to ensure that 
there is parity of esteem between all the 
languages and cultures involved so that 
children in each community may have the 
opportunity to develop oracy and literacy 
in the language of their own community 
as well as to learn to understand and 
appreciate the language and culture of the 
other (ibid, Appendix 2.2).
The recommendations also stress that governments 
should “[c]ontinue to promote bilingualism in 
immigrant areas or neighbourhoods and support 
immigrants in learning the language of the area 
in which they reside” (ibid, Appendix 2.3.). It 
is important to emphasise that the Council of 
Europe endorses a more nuanced notion of 
plurilingualism than does the European Union 
(i.e. the Commission). Nevertheless, in a ‘White 
Paper on Education and Training’ issued by 
the European Commission it is stated that “[l]
anguages are also the key to knowing other 
people. Proficiency in languages helps to build up 
the feeling of being European with all its cultural 
wealth and diversity and of understanding 
between the citizens of Europe” (European 
Commission 1995, 67, my emphasis). Between 
2005 and 2007, the EU recognised the relevance 
of language and multilingualism to policy by 
adding a multilingualism portfolio to the remit 
of the Union’s Commissioner on Education and 
Culture. The key document of that period – ‘The 
new framework strategy for multilingualism’ 
(European Commission 2005) – sets out the 
Commission’s “commitment to multilingualism 
in the European Union” (ibid. 1) and its aim of 
“promoting multilingualism in European society, 
in the economy and in the Commission itself ” 
(ibid). By arguing that multilingualism is not 
only good for the European economy but also 
for a ‘social Europe’ and the democratisation of 
the EU, it places multilingualism between major 
EU discourses: that on democratisation and that 
on the knowledge-based economy. In the same 
period, the EU also proposed – for the first time 
– a policy-relevant definition of multilingualism: 
“multilingualism refers to both a person’s ability 
to use several languages and the co-existence 
of different language communities in one 
geographical area” (ibid, 3). The document states 
that: 
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The European Union is founded on 
‘unity in diversity’: diversity of cultures, 
customs and beliefs – and of languages ... 
It is this diversity that makes the European 
Union what it is: not a ‘melting pot’ in 
which differences are rendered down, 
but a common home in which diversity is 
celebrated, and where our many mother 
tongues are a source of wealth and a 
bridge to greater solidarity and mutual 
understanding (ibid, 2).
In 2007, however, in discourses related to the 
Lisbon Strategy of the early 2000s, we witness a 
(return to) rhetoric oriented towards skills and 
competences (Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2011; 
Wodak 2011a, b). The European Multilingualism 
Strategy has recently adopted a new and broader 
understanding of the social, political and 
economic role of languages and multilingualism. 
Sadly, in the wake of the 2008 crisis and because 
of the transfer of the Multilingualism Portfolio of 
the European Commission to Education, Culture 
and Youth in 2010, most of the key provisions 
of the policies elaborated above have not yet 
been implemented. It is, however, clear that 
multilingualism and support for both individuals’ 
and collectives’ language identities form part and 
parcel of European language policies. 
These policies – as will be illustrated below – 
contradict national language policies in some EU 
member states in many respects. National policies, 
however, exert a major influence on the language 
requirements for migrants from non-EU countries. 
In fact, many national politicians endorse the so-
called Leitsprachenmodell (a model which proposes 
that the language of the majority should serve for 
all communicative purposes), thus contradicting 
the European language policies mentioned above, 
which emphasise multilingualism, the equality of 
languages and diversity. As sociolinguist Michael 
Clyne famously stated, “[E]uropean integration 
was never intended to mean homogenization. One 
of its aims has always been unity within diversity 
and this should be one of its contributions to the 
world” (Clyne 2003, 40). 
2.2. Language Requirements for 
Access to Legal Status
The current 28 member states of the European 
Union (EU) determine who belongs or does 
not belong to the European Union, and thus 
who remains ‘outside’ and who is allowed to 
venture ‘inside,’ via naturalisation regulations 
(e.g. Bauböck & Goodman-Wallace 2012). 
Naturalisation conditions pertaining to language 
knowledge vary enormously. In 1998, only six 
states had citizenship and/or language tests; by 
2010, the number had grown to 18; and by 2014 to 
23 (see Table 1; note, however, that the situation is 
constantly changing). Moreover, the requirements 
and the content of tests also vary. Orgad (2010, 
69–70) rightly states with respect to German 
citizenship tests that they
…mirror not only what German culture 
is, but also what the Germans want it to 
be ... Although the Länder tests have been 
replaced by a federal test, they indicate 
an ideological concept of Kulturnation. 
By adopting these policies, Germany 
embraces a strict rule of forced cultural 
assimilation.
Many European countries are promoting a re/
nationalisation with respect to language and 
culture – in spite of being part of the multilingual 
and multicultural EU. The concept of ‘language 
competence in the host country’s language’ as a 
salient prerequisite for belonging has become part 
and parcel of new citizenship laws, regulations 
and requirements, and is advocated or even 
championed not only by the far right but also by 
mainstream political parties in government.
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Table 1: Countries that participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2013 surveys and reported language 
requirements for residence and citizenship (no comparative data exist for earlier periods) (LIAM 
Survey Report 2014, 57)
Council of Europe, 2014 56 Report on 3rd LIAM survey 
 
Table A14:  Countries that participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2013 surveys and reported language 
requirements for residence and citizenship  
 Residence  Citizenship  
 200716 2013 200717 2013 
Austria X X X  X 
Belgium – French 
community  
   X 
Czech Republic  X  X 
Denmark X X X X 
Estonia X X X X 
France X X X X 
Germany X X X X 
Greece X X X X 
Ireland     
Italy  X   
Liechtenstein  X  X 
Luxembourg    X 
Norway X X X X 
Netherlands X X X X 
Poland   X X 
San Marino     
Spain   X X 
Sweden     
Switzerland (cantons) X X X X 
United Kingdom X  X X X 
N = 20 10 13 11 16 
 
  
                                                          
16 Interpretation of data on slide 5, PowerPoint presentation by Claire Extramiana, Language requirements for adult migrants in 
Council of Europe member state: report on a survey, 26 June 2008 (Council of Europe Seminar – www.coe.int.lang-migrants  
 Events). 
17 Ibidem.  
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Table 2: Citizenship and language requirements in selected EU countries between 2007 and 2013 
(and changes planned or envisaged) (A indicates a language test before entering; B a language test 
required for a work permit; C a language test required for citizenship) (LIAM survey report 2014, 
63)3
3 Final Report on the 3rd Council of Europe Survey 2014, Linguistic Integration of adult migrants (LIAM): Policy and practice (www.
coe.int/lang-migrants), by Claire Extramiana, Reinhilde Pulinx and Piet Van Avermaet.
Council of Europe, 2014 62 Report on 3rd LIAM survey 
 
Table B2: Changes between 2009 and 2013 and changes planned or envisaged on 14 member states 
STATES PRIOR TO ADMISSION TO THE COUNTRY RESIDENCE CITIZENSHIP 
Albania 
Since 2008 interview 
(students) 
Change planned 
Since 2008 interview 
Change planned  
Austria 
Since 2011  
Language level A1 
for certain residence permits 
Since 2006  A2 for renewal of 
residence permits, since 2011  
B1 for long-term residence 
 
Since 2011 B1 certificate 
 (A2 in 2006) 
Belgium   Since 2012 A2  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Language requirement Level not indicated (2012) 
Language requirement 
Level not indicated (2012) 
Cyprus  Since 2010 A1-A2  
Czech Republic   
Since 2009 A1 
envisaged in 2015: A1 test long-
term residence, A2 test 
permanent residence 
Interview since 1993 
B1 test and society in 2014 
Denmark Abolition of A1- introduced in 2010 
Since 2012 A1- for a residence 
permit on the ground of spousal 
reunification, level A1- for 
religious ministers and level A2 
written/B1 oral for permanent 
residence 
(A2/B1/B2 in 2003) 
B1/B1 plus oral in 2013 
(B2 and society test in 2006) 
 
France 40h since 2008 Change planned 
Since 2007 A1.1; envisaged: A1 
reception and integration 
contract and A2 renewal 
residence permit 
B1 oral since 2012 
(interview in 1993) 
 
Greece  
Since 2010 courses are no longer 
compulsory for  
long term residence 
 
Luxembourg A1.1 planned in 2009, not adopted in 2013   
Netherlands  
Since 2010 A2 
(2007: Old migrants A1/A2; 
New migrants A2) 
 
Norway  
300h of compulsory courses 
As from 2014 600h (3000h 
possible) and test for permanent 
residence necessary for 
citizenship 
As from 2014: 600h of lessons. 
Aiming Level B1 but A2 for 
exemption from courses 
(in 2005 300h) 
 Poland  Envisaged  
United Kingdom 
A1 oral for spouses (2011) 
(points system from 2007 
to 2010) 
Since 2013 B1 
(progression by one level up to 
B1 in 1971) 
Since 2013 B1 
(progression by one level up to B1 
in 1971) 
Total no of changes: 
18 actually in place  
and 9 planned 
3 actually in place   
and 2 envisaged 
8 actually in place  
and 5 envisaged 
7 actually in place  
and 2 planned 
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In the following, I summarize some results from a 
survey conducted in 36 European countries (thus 
including more than the 28 EU member states) by 
the Working Group Linguistic Integration of Adult 
Migrants (from the Language Policy Division 
of the Council of Europe; LIAM) in 2013/14. 
This survey illustrates the variation across the 
countries investigated and draws a comparison 
between the surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009 
(see Tables 1 and 2; 20 countries responded to all 
three surveys). The key document opens with the 
following mission statement:
The findings reported here, considered 
in the context of Recommendations and 
Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers 
and the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, underline the 
constant need to reflect critically on the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of 
aspects of our language integration policies 
while taking fully into consideration the 
implications for human rights, the rule 
of law and participation in the life of 
democratic society. This is a logical and 
necessary step in the continuous process 
of ensuring that any requirements enacted 
and accompanying language provision 
actually correspond to the real needs and 
capacities of migrants in their diversity, 
and that they reinforce their motivation 
to develop their plurilingual profile within 
a continuing process of integration. 
While of course language is an important 
instrument in this process, in itself it is not 
an indicator of how successful integration 
actually is. (p.1) 
More than half of the participating countries 
(20/36) indicated that knowledge of the language is 
required for purposes other than entry, residence 
and citizenship. For 12 countries, other purposes 
included obtaining a work permit/gaining access 
to the labour market. In six other countries a 
language requirement had to be met to obtain a 
long-term residence permit, often in the case of 
family reunification. Two countries attached a 
language requirement to higher education and 
training programmes. Nine countries reported 
a pre-entry language requirement (usually A1, 
only one country requires A2).4 These are Austria, 
Albania, Germany, Finland, France, Liechtenstein, 
the Netherlands, Poland (only in the case of certain 
regulated professions) and the UK. 
Several states offer significantly more than 
others in terms of language lessons and second 
language acquisition: migrants are obliged to take 
a language course in 12 of the 23 countries that 
attach a language requirement to the granting 
of a residence permit. Of the 22 participating 
countries that attach a language requirement to 
obtaining a residence permit, 14 provide official 
language courses. Attendance is compulsory in 
four countries and optional in eight. The CEFR 
reference levels range from A1 to C2. The shortest 
course lasts 75 hours, the longest 3,000. To bring 
learners to level A2, one country provides a course 
lasting 75 hours, another 180 hours, and a third 
a 364-hour course. Language courses for adult 
migrants are provided by adult education centres, 
schools, institutions of HE and institutions funded 
by Ministries of Culture, Internal Affairs or 
Employment – or by NGOs or volunteers. 
In 26 countries, migrants are legally obliged to 
demonstrate a specified level of competence in 
a/the language of the host country in order to 
obtain citizenship. Nineteen countries that attach 
a language requirement to citizenship also attach 
one to residence. In 2007, 12 of the 20 countries 
that participated in all three surveys indicated that 
they had such legislation; by 2013, 17 countries 
had language requirements (A) prior to entry, (B) 
for residence and/or (C) for citizenship.  
4  Council of Europe. Common European Framework of 
Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. (CEFR) 
Council of Europe/CUP, 2001 (available in 38 languages). www.
coe.int/lang-CEFR and www.coe.int/lang-migrants  
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Moreover, 18 countries organise a knowledge-of-
society (KoS) programme for migrants seeking a 
residence permit. Attendance is obligatory in eight 
countries and optional in 11. In nine countries 
migrants are required to take a KoS test. In almost 
all cases, KoS tests for citizenship are in written 
form. Four countries (Germany, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania and the UK) have multiple-choice 
tests; three countries (Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK) have computer-based ones. In 
Greece, the test is part of an oral interview with 
a representative of the Naturalisation Council. 
In Switzerland, some cantons have a written test 
(possibly computer-based), while others examine 
KoS in an oral interview. In Lithuania, the written 
test can be replaced by an oral test in cases of 
special need.
In sum, the following states require language for 
residence and citizenship: Austria since 2011, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, France and the Netherlands 
since 2012, Denmark and the UK since 2013. 
Altogether there were 18 changes between 2009 
and 2013 with no further ones planned in 2013. 
Furthermore, if one considers the 42 states which 
participated in at least one of the three surveys, 
15 states have introduced a legal language 
requirement since 2008. In most cases, knowledge 
of the language is required for residence and 
the acquisition of citizenship. This applies to 19 
countries, mostly in Western Europe. Another 
notable trend is an increase in the amount of 
legislation concerning language requirements 
from 2009 to 2013 compared with 2007–2009. 
From 2007 to 2009, 11 new laws were passed; in 
the period from 2009 to 2013, 18, with nine new 
ones planned after 2013. Lastly, a distinction exists 
between the so-called interventionist countries in 
northern Europe and more permissive policies 
in the south, but there are also less demanding 
countries alongside these two groups. In Eastern 
Europe, the issue of migration management is less 
important, given the low levels of immigration. 
The authors of the survey conclude that 
The ability of a democratic state to integrate 
migrants depends equally on their own 
willingness – which needs to be supported 
as regards language learning – and on the 
intercultural sensitivity of the community 
of citizens. This must be enhanced by 
educating all citizens in linguistic and 
cultural diversity, which has proven to 
be an invaluable source of enrichment 
throughout European history (ibid, 33).
The Goethe Institute (Germany) has quickly 
responded to the obvious necessity of teaching 
German to refugees from the current war zones in 
the Middle East. In this way, both language teachers 
and volunteers have been involved with children 
and adults aiming at level A1 immediately after 
the refugees have applied for asylum (see https://
www.goethe.de/en/spr/flu.html). As advertised on 
the Goethe Institute’s homepage, 
Self-learning courses, speaking exercises, 
videos and information on dealing with 
authorities, in everyday life or in finding 
a job. All offers work on smartphones and 
tablets. An interactive vocabulary training 
in 16 languages, which  can be used without 
any prior knowledge; many offers are 
helpful as an adjunct to classroom courses.
The British Council adapted its programmes for 
incoming refugees in 2016 (see https://www.
britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/english-
language-teaching-migrants-refugees). In Austria, 
German courses are offered by the City of Vienna 
and the Ministry of Integration (https://www.
wien.gv.at/english/social/integration/learning-
german/young-people.html). Moreover, the 
Ministry of Integration delivers obligatory ‘value 
courses’ (one day for 8 hours), which every refugee 
whose application for asylum has been accepted 
has to attend.5 In these courses, the participants 
5  See https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/
announcements/2016/03/the-ministry-for-integration-the-public-
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are taught Western values. Intercultural aspects 
related to religion, gender politics and so forth 
are discussed. Sweden also provides courses for 
Swedish language after the arrival of refugees 
(http://www.thenewbieguide.se/just-arrived/the-
refugee-guide-to-sweden/swedish-for-refugees/). 
No numbers or statistics exist to date about the 
quantity of language courses available (both 
official and voluntary) and about their effects and 
success across European member states.6
2.3. The Culturalisation of 
Discourse about Linguistic 
Integration
Detailed linguistic analyses illustrate how the term 
Integrationsunwilligkeit came to briefly dominate 
Austrian political and media discourse. To trace 
the ‘life history’ of this term, we combined 
qualitative and quantitative linguistic methods to 
show its frequency, collocates, contextualization 
and instrumentalization in legitimizing ever-
stricter policies (see Rheindorf 2016 and Wodak 
2015a for extensive analyses and discussion). 
The discourse on integration is represented 
by a corpus of 3,200 texts compiled from 
11 national newspapers in Austria (i.e. Der 
Standard, Die Presse, Heute, Kleine Zeitung, 
Kronen Zeitung, Kurier, Oberösterreichische 
Nachrichten, Österreich, Salzburger Nachrichten, 
Tiroler Tageszeitung, Wiener Zeitung) and four 
magazines (Profil, News, Biber, Die Zeit). In early 
employment-service-austria-and-the-austrian-integration-forum-
present-austria-wide-cooperation-in-providing-values-courses-
for-refugees/. 
6  Also see http://www.eaea.org/en/policy-advocacy/
adult-education-and-the-refugee-crisis.html, https://ec.europa.eu/
epale/en/content/erasmus-offers-free-language-courses-refugees 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/austria-
multiplication-of-guidebooks-and-courses-for-refugees-on-
austrian-society (accessed 20/11/2016). Obviously, official 
institutions largely depend on support from civil society and many 
people who offer their help voluntarily. Some countries allow 
refugees and asylum-seekers to access language classes immediately 
upon arrival; others demand official asylum status before access is 
allowed.
2015, the discourse on integration converges 
with two other discourses, that on educational 
reform (which focuses on teachers taking on new 
responsibilities with respect to the integration 
of children with migrant backgrounds) and that 
on terrorism (focusing on so-called Islamic State 
as an initially external but increasingly internal 
threat embodied by radicalized young adults and 
schoolchildren sympathizing with or joining the 
terrorist group). The convergence of these three 
discourses constitutes the immediate discursive 
context of the term Integrationsunwilligkeit in 
Austrian political discourse.
‘Integration’ is primarily discursively constructed 
as cultural and, more specifically, linguistic 
assimilation (Permoser & Rosenberger 2012). 
Among other things, this has meant that language 
policy in Austria regarding languages other 
than German and the constitutionally protected 
linguistic minorities (Croatian, Romanès, 
Slovakian, Slovenian, Czech, Hungarian and 
Austrian Sign Language) is somewhat restrictive 
(de Cillia 2012; de Cillia & Vetter 2013). For 
example, schools acting individually have 
repeatedly tried to prohibit children with 
migration backgrounds from speaking their L1 
(mother tongue, native language) during breaks 
while on the school grounds (de Cillia 2012; e.g. 
Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Disciplining those 
who do not comply has been an integral part of 
related discourses for decades, most notably in 
the form of the ‘Integration Agreement’ – a part of 
Austrian residence law (since 2003, amended in 
2005 and 2011). The provisions of the Integration 
Agreement only apply to immigrants from non-
EU states, who must sign it if they want to obtain 
a right of residence. Its language requirements 
specify three stages: A1 before immigration, A2 
within two years under penalty of deportation, 
and B1 within five years of residence in Austria. 
The discourse on Integrationsunwilligkeit 
comprises 280 texts from the aforementioned 
sources, published between 20 January and 5 
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February 2015. Its onset is marked by three 
events: a resolution passed in the regional 
parliament of Styria explicitly linking the terrorist 
attacks in Paris to “a lack of integration” and 
calling for a legal definition of “Tatbestände,” 
– i.e. punishable offences under the heading 
of Integrationsunwilligkeit (Resolution 3237/6, 
20.01.2015) – and two subsequent newspaper 
interviews promoting the concerns of the said 
resolution. The two interviews were given on the 
same day by two prominent politicians of the 
centre-left SPÖ, Franz Voves and Hans Niessl, 
then Governors of the Austria Federal Provinces 
of Styria and Burgenland respectively. Both were 
campaigning in regional elections and were faced 
with declining electoral support and increasing 
pressure from the right-wing populist Freedom 
Party (FPÖ) propagating a politics of fear and 
securitization (Wodak 2015a, b). The supposedly 
divergent behaviour they identified as indicative 
of ‘unwillingness’ comprised absences from 
class at school, wearing a ‘headscarf,’ speaking a 
language other than German in school breaks and 
disrespecting female teachers. 
The measures suggested to counteract these 
undesirable behaviours can only be qualified as 
punishments, ranging from community service 
to severe fines of €1,000 to (on failure to pay) 
imprisonment, loss of welfare, loss of citizenship 
or even deportation. It is not surprising that the 
two interviews triggered a strong response, more 
so than the resolution itself, because the latter had 
not included any specific suggestions of punishable 
behaviours or punishments. To indicate the 
terminological effect that these interviews had 
on discourses on migration and integration in 
general, and in the Austrian media in particular, 
Figure 2 shows the average frequency/week of the 
term Integrationsunwilligkeit on the World Wide 
Web (Austrian domains only) and in Austrian 
newspapers for the past decade. Figure 3 focuses 
on the same data for a more narrowly-defined 
period centred on the discourse strand analysed 
here. 
Figure 2: Average use/week on the Web (Google Analytics for Austrian domains) and in national 
newspapers of the term Integrationsunwilligkeit (2005–2015)
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Both figures indicate that the gradually increasing 
use of the term on the Web was not matched 
by a corresponding use in the Austrian media. 
Indeed, the term and its derivatives remained a 
marginal phenomenon up until the interviews 
and subsequent reporting, when their use peaked. 
At least in the short run, the interviews established 
the term as a fixture in the Austrian media and, by 
implication, public discourse.
This discourse strand stands out from the overall 
discourse on integration by articulating the alleged 
lack of integration or unwillingness to integrate in 
terms of (a) schoolchildren, (b) Islamist terrorism 
and (c) punishments. Those suspected and accused 
of being ‘unwilling’ are mainly schoolchildren, also 
referred to as boys and sons more frequently than 
as girls and daughters. Indeed, familial relations 
play an important role as this group is also 
represented as families and parents, fathers more 
frequently than mothers. The third most common 
form of representation is linked to a topos of 
difference, emphasizing their alleged difference as 
migrants, immigrants, Turks, foreigners, Muslims 
or minorities. The fourth most common way of 
representing this group is by reducing them to the 
quality of being the ‘unwilling’ in a nominalized 
form. Less frequent are neutral representations as 
(fellow) human beings, women and men.
This, then, marks a notable shift in the political 
discourse on integration, which is now informed 
by three main argumentative patterns:
• Integration through achievement: if Austrians 
are an industrious and diligent people and 
foreigners are not, then to be successful (by 
demonstrating such qualities) is to become 
(more) Austrian. Note that the seemingly 
liberal evocation of the ‘entrepreneurial 
migrant’ is embedded in a strictly paternalistic 
view of integration in which migrants must be 
pushed if not forced for their own good (de 
Cillia & Preisinger 2012).
• Integration through language competence: if 
the national language of Austria is German, 
then to acquire language competence in 
German is to become (more) Austrian. 
• Integration through punishment: if 
noncompliance with desirable behaviours 
Figure 3: Average use/week on the Web (Google Analytics for Austrian domains) and in national 
newspapers of the term Integrationsunwilligkeit (2014–2015)
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is indicative of (cultural) otherness, any 
means of enforcing compliance will help 
the offenders become (more) Austrian and 
prevent radicalization.
The former two arguments have been employed 
to legitimize hegemonic politics implemented 
in policies for a considerable time. The third 
argument, however, is a recent innovation tied to 
the discursive construction of religious and cultural 
tensions between a homogenous Self (white, 
Christian, German-speaking) and the Other 
(coloured, Muslim, non-German-speaking) living 
within the Austrian borders, and thus an internal 
threat to national integrity. Where previously 
policies had referred to both the need to integrate 
and to criteria with which to measure the success 
or failure of integration, the terminology has now 
obviously shifted to accommodate a vague blaming 
strategy (scapegoating). Moreover, the focus of 
media and political attention seems to have shifted 
from ‘integration’ to an ‘unwillingness to integrate,’ 
providing an example of the culturalisation of 
discourse on integration.
2.4. The salience of social (in)
equality in (second) language 
acquisition
In contrast to many expert opinions and much 
migration research, socio- and psycholinguistic 
research confirms that the socio-economic 
status of small children has more impact on the 
acquisition of language (L1 and L2) than ethnic 
origin. Indeed, this is not surprising as these 
results confirm some sociolinguistic theories that 
have been foundational since the 1970s, e.g. by 
Basil Bernstein and his collaborators (Bernstein 
1971a, 1971b). When Bernstein wrote about 
language he was not referring to systems of 
grammar, syntax and vocabulary, the structures of 
language systems, but to the social relationships 
that make up institutions, such as families. He 
was interested in the way social relationships align 
and order ideas, characterized as the grammar of 
the social in contradistinction to the grammar of 
linguistics. He argued that working-class children 
participate in different kinds of social interaction 
with parents than middle-class children do and, 
even more importantly, that fractions within the 
middle classes are oriented to meaning in different 
ways.
In the INPUT project, the researchers study 24 
parent-child dyads living in Vienna, Austria, i.e. in 
a predominantly German-speaking environment 
(see Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015 for details). Half of 
the children are bilingual and mainly speak Turkish 
at home and mainly German in kindergarten, and 
the other half are monolingual German-speaking. 
Their ages range from 3 to 4 years. The groups are 
balanced in terms of socio-economic status (SES) 
and almost balanced in terms of gender: Austro-
Turkish HSES vs LSES, monolingual HSES vs 
LSES (Korecky et al., in press).7 The main caretaker 
was identified as the person that spent the most 
time with the target child or the person whom the 
child was most closely attached to (in all cases but 
one, this was the mother). Whereas HSES parents 
are known to use more conversation-eliciting 
speech acts, LSES parents often show a behaviour-
directing conversation style. The most salient 
interim results, among many, are that the cleavage 
between HSES and LSES input and output is 
stronger among Austrian monolingual speakers 
than among Austro-Turkish children, and that 
a surprisingly large proportion of HSES Austro-
Turkish children develop some of their German 
language skills earlier and faster than typical LSES 
native speakers of Austrian German. 
In the following, I focus only on pragmatic 
variables such as the acquisition of speech acts, 
although the project has been investigating a 
wide range of linguistic indicators (the data were 
collected via interviews, participant observation, 
7 The data in this study are part of Project SSH11-027 
“Investigating Parental and Other Caretakers’ Utterances to 
Kindergarten Children (INPUT),” which is supported by the 
Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF). 
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story-telling, picture descriptions and competence 
tests). Directive speech acts in particular provide 
an interesting testing ground for exploring 
different conversation styles (e.g. Hoff et al. 2002). 
Parental conversation style is closely related to the 
socio-economic status of families. Parents from 
HSES backgrounds,8 who mostly have a broader 
knowledge of child development and child care 
issues (Rowe 2008), are more responsive to their 
children’s verbalizations, initiate and sustain 
conversation with their children more frequently 
and encourage them more often to talk by asking 
them questions (Hoff 2003). HSES parents also 
tend to formulate requests in an indirect way, 
e.g. in the form of questions, such as “Why don’t 
you pick up the toys for me?” On the other hand, 
parents from LSES backgrounds, who often 
experience greater social stress and are thus more 
focused on goal-directed caretaking settings 
than on play situations, reportedly use more 
behaviour-directing speech acts (Hoff-Ginsberg 
1991) such as direct commands and prohibitions 
(e.g. “Put it here!”, “Don’t touch it!”). Speech 
acts are, of course, important characteristics of 
parenting styles (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). 
Speech acts occurring in child speech and child-
directed speech are assertives (e.g. assertions and 
statements), expressives (e.g. complaints, praise 
and greetings), commissives (e.g. promises, offers 
and threats) and directives (e.g. requests and 
questions). 
Suffice it to state here that all groups of children 
prefer assertive speech acts, whereas all groups of 
parents use directive speech acts most frequently. 
Expressive speech acts are more frequent in 
child speech than in child-directed speech, 
but commissive speech acts are rare among 
8 SES was assessed via the highest level of education of the 
main parental caretaker (cf. Czinglar et al. 2015). Children of parents 
that had obtained at least a high-school diploma according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97, 
cf. OECD 1999) were classified as high SES, whereas children of 
parents that had lower levels of education (e.g. compulsory school 
or an apprenticeship) were classified as low SES. 
both children and parents from both language 
backgrounds. In monolingual and bilingual 
children, we find similar SES differences: HSES 
children use more requests, whereas LSES 
children use more real questions. This SES 
difference is greater in bilingual than monolingual 
children. Regarding requests, both monolingual 
and bilingual HSES children use more indirect 
requests, whereas both groups of LSES children 
clearly prefer direct requests, but here the SES 
difference is greater in the monolingual than the 
bilingual group. Hence, language acquisition (both 
L1 and L2) is highly dependent on the parents’ SES 
and their linguistic input (i.e. the family language 
environment). LSES children (both Austro-
Turkish and monolingual children) use similar 
conversational styles and their progress is slower. 
In sum, HSES monolingual children do better than 
HSES Austro-Turkish children; all HSES children 
do better than all LSES children. Austro-Turkish 
LSES children perform better than monolingual 
LSES children (e.g. Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015). 
The following two explanations might play a 
role. On the one hand, families that have taken 
the initiative to migrate from one country to 
another in order to improve their living situations 
tend to show greater mobility (including social 
mobility) and higher educational aspirations 
than families that have always stayed in the same 
place, regardless of SES (Block 2016). On the other 
hand, HSES families in the majority population 
have well-established networks that help them to 
acquire good jobs and high-quality education for 
their children. HSES migrant families do not have 
these relations, they have to focus on building 
them up successively, which may put them under 
greater social distress than autochthonous HSES 
families. These results confirm new theoretical 
sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic approaches 
which elaborate both Bernstein’s class-centred 
sociolinguistic theory, such as Block’s (2016) 
studies on ‘declassing’ and ‘reclassing’ resulting 
from migration and transnationalism, and 
SECTION 4: CULTURAL INTEGRATION | INTEGRATION AND CULTURE: FROM ‘COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE’ TO 
‘COMPETENCE IN PLURALITY’ ~ Ruth Wodak
132
Pennycook’s insights into new urban developments 
in a globalised world, condensed in the concept of 
‘metrolinguistics’ (2015). As migrants frequently 
lose their former class position in the host country 
and have to resituate themselves in a new social 
environment, they preserve “their multi-stranded 
relations that link together their societies and 
communities of origin and settlement” (Block 
2016). Social divisions thus seem to be smaller in 
migrant communities than in the host country, 
i.e. in Austria. This fact together with the greater 
pressure for assimilation that is experienced by 
all families with migration backgrounds may 
be reflected in the linguistic input that they give 
to their children. It is obvious that these results 
should be considered when devising new language 
policies, both for children and adults. Indeed, we 
could assume that SES differences are likely to 
be even stronger among large groups of refugees 
escaping from war zones, as families are usually 
able to escape if they have savings and can pay 
people to smuggle them abroad. Moreover, we 
might ask how the results of the INPUT project can 
be applied when dealing with severely traumatised 
children, regardless of their SES. Finally, what 
happens if parents do not choose to leave but are 
forced to do so without much previous planning? 
Does this situation have any specific impact on 
bilingualism among their children? 
3. Conclusion
The Council of Europe (2016) emphasizes that 
linguistic integration depends on the higher or 
lower value accorded to the languages present 
in their repertoire before migrants arrive in the 
host society. The degree of success in integrating 
languages into the repertoire is obviously not 
quantifiable. Frequently, linguistic experts are 
not involved in designing the various test items, 
which are also not standardized across languages 
and countries. It should be emphasized that the 
success of linguistic integration strongly depends 
on the motivation and attitudes of adult migrants, 
their SES, the time spent in the host country, their 
level of education, their religious routines, their 
gender identities and their access to work and 
housing. Accordingly, migrants may
• decide to not change their repertoire, i.e. to 
not learn the main language of the host society 
systematically;
• wish to change their repertoire, but be unable 
to do so due to lack of time or self-confidence;
• aim to functionally rearrange their repertoire 
without attempting normative adaptation 
as part of a single-identity language strategy 
marked by the migrant’s language of origin;
• aim to rearrange their linguistic repertoire 
in order to achieve ‘linguistic naturalisation,’ 
involving a gradual dropping of the language 
of origin;
• aim to rearrange their functional repertoire 
but with two joint languages of identity.
It is up to migrants to decide for themselves which 
of these language strategies is best suited to their 
goals in life and the management of their identity. 
In any case, the fact that migrants may wish to 
choose among these various types of adaptation 
implies that arrangements need to be made for 
listening to migrants’ views and for designing and 
managing tailor-made courses.
To acquire plural competence, both migrants and 
the host country have to invest much energy, work 
and money. This competence does not only consist 
– although it is certainly important – of acquisition 
of the majority language. Successful integration 
implies knowledge of relevant language games in 
all domains of life, indeed for many people (both 
migrants and the host population) a Gestalt-
switch. Motivation, learning, curiosity, patience 
and respect are necessary prerequisites for being 
able to understand each other’s way of life, always 
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on the foundations of human rights and the 
respective societies’ constitutions. As mentioned 
above, the situation for refugees has to be analysed 
separately: some conclusions certainly refer to all 
newcomers in a new society but some factors – 
such as trauma – usually only refer to refugees.
With respect to the culturalisation of political 
debates, i.e. the emphasis on cultural differences 
between the host society and newcomers, 
specifically regarding religion and gender, results 
imply that much work will have to be invested 
in order to convince both sides that living with 
plurality and difference should be encouraged. 
Of course, plurality should always remain within 
the boundaries of the respective constitution and 
human rights norms. Integration and competence 
in plurality obviously imply a long and difficult 
process over many years, challenging old belief 
systems and traditional ways of life. As Miller 
(2016) suggests, newcomers will have to shed 
‘some cultural baggage’ and the host society will 
have to offer support in this endeavour.
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FROM EASTERN 
ENLARGEMENT 
TO JIHAD: THE 
DOUBLE CHALLENGE 
FOR MIGRANT 
INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPE
Anna Triandafyllidou 
European University Institute
While the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
tensions and even terrorist violence or war along 
ethnic/national lines in Europe, during the last 15 
years religion has emerged as the main fault line 
along which people are divided. After decades 
of Basque or Northern Irish terrorism, the war 
in Yugoslavia and the partition of the country, 
and related concerns that the situation of ethnic 
minorities in Central Eastern Europe could 
become an unmanageable challenge, today we are 
witnessing a weakening of ethnic tensions. Ethnic 
and national minority claims for more political 
space and independence are channelled through 
national institutions, e.g. the process of devolution 
in Britain and the Scottish referendum, or through 
international mediation and arbitration (see, e.g., 
the EU Roma Strategy, or the OSCE Ljubljana 
principles). It is the religious claims of minorities 
that are now seen to represent the most difficult 
challenges because, it is argued, they go against 
the very nature of secular liberal European 
democracies.
This is paradoxical, since religious minority claims 
do not challenge national sovereignty or territorial 
integration and could actually be accommodated 
in line with the path followed in each country in 
earlier times to make space for native religious 
minorities. Indeed, European societies are much 
less secular than they often portray themselves 
to be (several countries have recognised official 
religions; most countries have religious education 
integrated in their national education systems; 
many allow or support religious schools; and many 
offer support to religious organisations).  How 
are we then to explain this paradox that ethnic 
and national minority challenges are seen as less 
problematic than those of religious minorities? 
Fear and suspicion towards religious minority 
claims are coupled with a renewed emphasis 
on the nation-state as the most important 
geopolitical and socioeconomic unit. As the 
intensification of globalisation and the erosion 
of national sovereignty (particularly in Europe 
through the European integration process), along 
with the recent global financial crisis and that 
of the Eurozone, send alarm signals to citizens, 
the nation-state re-emerges as a safe haven in an 
uncertain, even if closely integrated, international 
environment. In the early 21st century, the nation-
state becomes a last refuge from the storms of 
European and global crises. Citizens become 
increasingly diffident of global governance 
processes like the G8 and G20 and of EU policies 
generally – whether those on public finance or 
migration management – and they turn to their 
national institutions for socioeconomic security. 
We are thus witnessing a contradictory process 
where on the one hand religion is perceived 
as a main dimension that organises social and 
political life at the global level, and on the other 
hand national identity and the nation-state are 
re-emerging as the main community of allegiance 
and belonging in a post-industrial society. Both 
processes find their roots in the political and 
symbolic reorganisation of the world order that 
emerged in 1989 after the collapse of communism. 
They are, of course, supported and fuelled by the 
recent socioeconomic crisis in Europe, which 
has intensified inequalities within and across 
countries, making citizens increasingly worried 
about their future.
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The societal transformation that Bauman (1998, 
2000) and Sennett (1998) already described 
and analysed in the late 1990s has acquired 
a particular configuration and intensity in 
Europe in the post-1989 period. The defeat of 
communism as a political and economic system 
has brought with it the reconnection of Europe 
(Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003) but has also 
led to a dominance (if not outright hegemony) of 
consumer culture and of the free market economy 
that Bauman and Sennett, among others, critically 
analysed (Baumann 2000). Differences between 
left-wing and right-wing ideologies have thus 
become somewhat vague, and citizens have 
been left to wonder what the alternative is. In 
this context, the European Union offered an 
institutional framework to reconnect Europe 
and overcome the legacies of World War II and 
the divisions of the Cold War. The notion of 
European identity and European culture brought 
together the different nations of Europe and their 
minorities, even though this did not happen on 
a level playing field since cultural hierarchies 
and closures towards specific minority identities 
persisted (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). 
Despite the important economic and political 
challenges posed by the reconnection of Europe, 
the 1990s were characterised by a certain 
ideological enthusiasm that the reconnection of 
the continent ended a past of wars and division, 
and that the European Union would offer a 
platform for both economic and geopolitical 
integration, while European identity would 
become intertwined with national identities, 
enriching and not replacing them. Not only were 
the 1990s a decade of European enthusiasm and a 
drive for unification, they were also characterised 
by increased attention to cultural and religious 
diversity in Europe. Multiculturalism was 
celebrated in many countries (e.g. the UK, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) as the most appropriate 
way to accommodate cultural and religious 
diversity and build an inclusive citizenship. This 
pro-diversity policy also extended to the then 
newly independent states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which were strongly encouraged to 
recognise their national minorities and provide 
appropriate guarantees of their rights, as provided 
for in relevant European and international legal 
instruments (Triandafyllidou and Ulasiuk 2014). 
Indeed, the end of the Cold War and the implosion 
of the communist Other were celebrated in the 
1990s, both as a liberation from Europe’s past 
tragedies and as the start of a new global era 
without deep ideological antagonisms – the “end 
of history” as Francis Fukuyama called it in his 
well-known book (Fukuyama 1992).
The new millennium started, however, with a 
profound geopolitical, cultural and existential 
shock for Europe and the West. The terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 signalled the end of the post-1989 
euphoria. While the US government proclaimed 
the War on Terror, intervened in Afghanistan and 
again attacked Iraq, Europe was facing important 
internal and external challenges. Urban violence 
erupted in northern English cities in the summer 
of 2001, and French suburbs followed suit in 
2005. National grievances of second-generation 
children who were failing both in school and 
the labour market were then coupled with global 
cultural crises like that over the Danish cartoons 
of Prophet Mohammad in 2006. While extremist 
and jihadist forms of Islam were emerging as a 
global terrorist threat, more moderate versions 
of Islam and European Muslims started being 
portrayed as unfit to live in European liberal and 
secular societies. The Madrid (2004) and London 
(2005) bombs did nothing but reinforce this view: 
that certainly not all Muslims are terrorists, but 
there is something fundamentally wrong with 
Islam as a religion that makes it inappropriate for 
European democratic societies and impossible to 
accommodate in a secular state. 
Islam emerged forcefully as an important 
‘civilizational’ dividing line within Europe during 
the same period in which the post-1989 European 
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re-unification enthusiasm started to fade away. 
Indeed, the magnitude of the economic and 
political challenges of the transition of Central 
Eastern European countries from communism 
to free market capitalism and liberal democracy 
became increasingly felt in Europe in the late 
1990s, when several of the former communist 
countries experienced a second round of economic 
and political decline. Discussions about their 
integration into the European Union seemed to 
reach their objectives when the Helsinki summit 
of 1999 reaffirmed the political will of the EU15 
to integrate the new countries, possibly in one 
big enlargement wave by 2004. Thus, economic 
objectives were subsumed to the overarching 
political goal of re-uniting Europe, provided 
the new member states became fully fledged 
democracies and subscribed to European values, 
which included the accommodation of national 
minorities and the abandonment of irredentist 
claims or border disputes. 
In a way, it was the very success of Eastern 
Enlargement, along with the emergence of 
international jihadist terrorism and urban 
tensions among post-migration minorities and 
native majorities, that paved the way for Islam to 
become the necessary European Other. Not only 
had communism collapsed and with it the overall 
Cold War geopolitical and symbolic framework, 
but the Central Eastern European countries 
were fully subscribing to the by-then hegemonic 
western European model. The communists had 
been successfully ‘reformed’ – there was a need 
for a new Other at the European and global levels 
against whom a united Europe and Western/
European values could be reaffirmed.
Muslims emerged as a convenient Other, both 
internally and externally – they were accused 
of creating ‘parallel societies’ within European 
countries and they also posed a threat to European 
security through terrorism. Indeed, a number 
of thinkers and politicians advanced the claim 
that it was impossible to accommodate Muslims 
in European societies because their cultural 
traditions and religious faith were incompatible 
with secular democratic governance. 
While for a good part of the 2000s this debate 
gained momentum and actually led to a public 
repudiation of multiculturalism by a number of 
European leaders (Angela Merkel in October 
2010, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy both 
in February 2011), there were other important 
developments in Europe which changed the course 
of things and shifted the focus from religion and 
Muslims to other ‘Others.’ Indeed, the debate on 
migration and diversity was further complicated 
by the intensification of intra-EU mobility after 
the 2004 enlargement and the 2007 accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania in the context of a 
progressive lifting of restrictions on access by the 
new member states’ citizens to the labour markets 
of the old member states. There had been rising 
concern that intra-EU migration included welfare 
tourism. While the expulsion of (Romanian) Roma 
from France by Nicolas Sarkozy’s government in 
2009 caused widespread condemnation, a much 
broader rejection of Central Eastern European 
immigrants gained high currency in Britain in 
the 2010s. Such discourses were initially only 
promoted by extremist and populist parties, such 
as UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), 
the Front National (in France) and the party 
of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, but they 
gradually expanded into the mainstream political 
discourse. What was initially seen as mainly an 
issue involving second-generation migrant youths 
and Muslim communities had become a wider 
anxiety that national governments and national 
majority groups were losing control over their 
territories, labour markets and national identities. 
The European integration process thus shifted from 
being the epitome of Western cultural, economic 
and political dominance over communism – the 
victory of democracy over authoritarian rule – to 
posing a threat of national control over important 
social and economic issues being lost. The result of 
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the Brexit referendum in June 2016 can certainly 
be viewed through this lens too.
Today we are, therefore, faced with a complex 
socio-political reality where Muslims and Islam 
continue to be stigmatised as unfit for secular 
and liberal democracy, while at the same time 
fear is mounting among public opinion that the 
European integration process is stripping states of 
their power and leaving their national populations 
unprotected from a cultural and economic invasion 
by newcomers. If the newcomers are Muslims 
they are seen as culturally dangerous and eroding 
our way of life; if they are white, Christian and 
European, such as Poles or Romanians for instance, 
they are seen as welfare scroungers and as stealing 
our jobs. This leads to a divisive debate that cuts 
across religious and national lines. In a post-1989 
and post-9/11 era, but also a post-enlargement 
era, religion and the nation compete with one 
another to provide ontological and socioeconomic 
security to European citizens, with both offering 
a Manichean view of a world divided between Us 
and Them as an anchor. Indeed, extreme events 
like the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 
2016, the shootings and explosions, again in Paris, 
in November 2015, and in Brussels in March 2016, 
do nothing but confirm these discourses of fear, to 
use Ruth Wodak’s expression (Wodak 2016).
Concluding remarks
It was at the turn of the millennium that Zygmunt 
Bauman warned of the pitfalls of the increased 
freedom and intensified mobility of late modern 
and post-industrial societies. Bauman pointed out 
that enhanced freedom and mobility were eroding 
stable reference points for identity, such as class, 
kinship, ethnicity, religion and even locality. The 
emancipation of the individual from the forces 
of nature was reaching a new level where this 
very emancipation was again put in jeopardy 
as an economic logic was taking precedence 
over non-economic challenges (Bauman 2000). 
The new world order, according to Bauman, 
was characterised by excessive de-regulation, 
liberalisation and flexibilisation, leading to 
estrangement and uprootedness (see also Sennett 
1998). 
While Bauman’s analysis certainly holds true in 
that it presents the most important challenges that 
late modernity and globalisation set to citizens, 
what he did not foresee is that old solidities had not 
gone away but instead remained under the surface 
and could be activated, despite today’s changing 
circumstances of production, life, mobility and 
communication (Atkinson 2008, Lee 2011, 
Levitt 2007). Indeed, as Castells (2010a; 2010b) 
has foreseen, very few people in the world can 
afford to be, or feel they are, cosmopolitans. Most 
identify with their urban milieux, while others 
rediscover their anchoring in religion. Collective 
identifications do not disappear but are instead 
transformed and re-invented in this fragmented 
yet networked society.
At this very moment in Europe, the old solidities 
of nationalism and religion are re-emerging 
with unexpected strength. This process has to 
do with the ways in which European integration 
has moved from being a political and ideological 
project to one that is dictated by economic logic 
and felt to be detached from local and national 
realities. This process is, however, also related to 
the overall challenges that globalisation raises for 
citizens, not only socioeconomic ones but also 
existential ones. Thus, while national identity and 
the nation-state are seen to better respond to the 
socio-economic vulnerability of the European 
citizen today, animosity towards Europe’s largest 
minority religion responds to a necessity for a 
higher level of community that affirms European 
values and superiority in the world.
This analysis of the re-emergence of nationalism 
and religion is, of course, neither deterministic nor 
teleological. Even if people are in search of solidity 
in a liquid world, such solidity is not necessarily to 
be found in closure, discrimination and prejudice. 
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Indeed, we should not lose sight of the largely 
successful integration of Muslims in different 
European countries today, and nor of new forms 
of transnational solidarity. Through the power of 
information and communication technology we 
now feel much more related to (and are actually 
more informed about) what is happening in other 
regions of the world (e.g. the Middle East, but not 
only there) and how this affects our own lives – 
whether through a surge of incoming refugees 
or through a decrease in oil prices. International 
terrorism and foreign fighters from European 
countries joining ‘Islamic State’ in the last two 
years are one side of this coin, showing how 
cultural and political globalisation can transform 
local integration problems and grievances 
by linking them with geopolitics breeding 
transnational extremism. At the same time, the 
various Indignados and Occupy movements 
across Europe, youth mobilisation in support of 
the Arab spring and Ghezi Park movements, and 
transnational commemorations of the victims 
of international terrorism in Paris testify that 
globalisation can also reinforce solidarity and 
mobilisation for common transnational causes, 
such as peace, equality or democracy, across 
national boundaries.
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THE CULTURAL 
INTEGRATION 
OF IMMIGRANTS 
AND REFUGEES: 
SHIFTING 
NARRATIVES AND 
POLICIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION1
Tamás Szűcs 
European Commission
The unprecedented flow of immigrants and 
refugees since summer 2015 together with its only 
loosely controlled nature pose major dilemmas 
to the potential host societies and to the new 
arrivals themselves, as well as to policy makers 
and to academic research. An abundance of 
conceptual frameworks, integration models and 
interdisciplinary considerations have already been 
developed to meet this challenge “on a continuum 
from total rejection of the ‘other’ to total 
acceptance of the ‘other,’”2 while sustainable long 
term solutions are most likely to be found in the 
large space between these two poles. Their position 
within this spectrum and ability to be implemented 
depend both on the specific histories, traditions 
and socio-economic circumstances of the host 
nations and the various ethnic and religious 
compositions of the newcomer communities. 
The role of culture in tackling the recent migratory 
and refugee crisis, and indeed the necessity of 
cultural integration, has been moving to centre 
stage even beyond the academic discourse, both 
in terms of public debate and policymaking. 
1 This chapter reflects the personal views of the author. The 
European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use of 
the information contained herein.
2 See Ruth Wodak’s contribution in this volume. 
For a comprehensive understanding of this 
phenomenon it is worth first putting these 
discussions in a broader perspective by reviewing 
the recent EU approach to managing migration 
in general. Second, the latest concrete initiatives 
to integrate and promote diversity should also 
be examined closely in this light to see what 
can actually be realistically expected from the 
various cultural integration projects in the current 
circumstances and the extent to which they fit into 
any theoretical approach.
The present contribution will first outline the 
shift in public attitudes to migration and their 
impact on the stances taken by EU and Member 
State authorities. It will then show that there has 
been important continuity in the EU’s principles 
and policies regarding the management of legal 
migration since the adoption by the Council in 2004 
of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration Policy. The chapter concludes with 
some reflections on normative political theories 
on immigrant integration that could provide both 
critical and constructive perspectives from which 
to assess the EU’s efforts in this area and facilitate a 
more balanced political and public discourse.
Shifting narratives and 
declining public support for 
integration 
Since late last year, there has been a gradual 
but clear shift in public and political discourse 
towards considering immigrants as a security 
threat rather than focusing on facilitating their 
integration. This can be observed by looking at the 
various formal and informal European Council 
conclusions and discussions and the media across 
Europe. Most recently at the European Council 
in October,3 leaders focused almost exclusively 
on reinforcing the protection of external borders, 
tightening controls on all routes and preventing 
illegal migration. The informal summit of 27 
3 European Council conclusions on migration, 20 October 
2016
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Member States (the first without the UK) in 
Bratislava in September4 was dominated by a 
similar discourse and ended with the adoption of 
a ‘roadmap’5 for the future. Equally significant are 
the changes in the positions of the traditionally 
most open host countries. After Bratislava, 
Chancellor Merkel stated clearly that “illegal 
immigration must be stopped” (although she still 
promised that Germany would take “hundreds 
of legal refugees every month” from Greece and 
Italy). Soon afterwards, on a visit to Africa (Niger, 
Ethiopia and Mali) to explore whether the Turkish 
model could be used there, she promised an aid 
package worth up to €77 million to fight against 
terrorism and human trafficking, and she warned 
young Africans not to undertake the dangerous 
journey to Europe without clear plans. A number 
of restrictive measures have also been introduced 
during this year by Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and others. At a ‘special summit’ for 13 
EU and Balkan leaders in Vienna,6 some Central 
and Eastern European leaders proposed that new 
migrant hotspots and refugee camps for asylum 
seekers should be built in Turkey, Libya or Egypt. 
The Visegrad 4 countries also coined a new phrase, 
“flexible solidarity,” with which they are trying 
to block the adoption of a new permanent crisis 
relocation mechanism under the Dublin system7 
(with tacit support during Council discussions 
from Austria, France, Spain and others).  
These developments prompted President Juncker 
to state that countries unable to participate in the 
redistribution of asylum seekers must participate 
more in the reinforcement of the EU’s external 
borders. Providing protection, preserving the 
European way of life, and defending Europe at 
home and abroad were also key elements in his 
4 Statement - informal meeting of the heads of state or 
government, 23 September 2015.
5  Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap.
6  Summit 24. September 2016 : Press : Federal …  invitation 
and President Tusk’s remarks : Remarks by President Donald Tusk 
before the summit on migration along the Balkan route.
7  A permanent crisis relocation mechanism under the 
Dublin system: Proposal for a Regulation. 
State of the Union speech delivered in the run-up 
to the Bratislava Summit, where the establishment 
of a European Border and Coast Guard was 
announced. This was followed by a concrete 
legislative proposal in October, in addition to 
further measures against terrorism and ones 
strengthening the EU’s external borders. At the 
same time, a new European Fund for Sustainable 
Development was also suggested for Africa and the 
Neighbourhood countries to address one of the 
root causes of migration. Its External Investment 
Plan may allow investments to increase by up to 
€88bn. 
The shifting narratives also reflect the prevailing 
public mood, which has changed dramatically 
during the last few years. According to the latest 
Eurobarometer figures published in July 2016,8 
immigration (48%) and terrorism (39%) remain 
the top two concerns of European citizens, well 
ahead of the economic situation (19%) and 
unemployment (15%). 
8 The Spring 2016 Standard Eurobarometer was 
conducted between 21 and 31 May 2016. A total of 31,946 people 
were interviewed in all EU Member States and in the candidate 
countries. The ‘First results report’ was published on 29 July and is 
available online here. 
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In 20 Member States immigration is the number 
one concern for the EU and it is among the top 
two concerns in all countries except Portugal. 
Terrorism is the number one concern in 8 Member 
States and among the top two concerns in all 
countries except Greece. 
Partly reacting to these trends, a large majority 
of EU governments appear to be keen to proceed 
quickly with implementation of the first two pillars 
of the European Agenda on Migration, adopted 
in May 2015.9 Since then, many Commission 
proposals have been adopted to reduce the 
incentives for irregular migration and to ensure 
better border management, and most of these have 
already made significant headway. In September 
and October 2016 three major progress reports10 
and six new or follow-up initiatives were sent to 
the EP and the Council. At the same time, despite 
9 A European Agenda on Migration 
10 First progress report on the Partnership Framework 
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration 
on 18 October 2016, Communication on progress towards 
an  effective and genuine Security Union on 12 October 2016, 
and a Communication on the Sixth Report on Relocation and 
Resettlement on 28 September 2016.
having a comprehensive legislative proposal11 on 
the table, the Heads of States and Governments 
seem to be making somewhat slower progress on 
the third pillar – creation of a strong common 
asylum policy – mainly due to heated internal 
disputes. It is also noticeable that there is an 
increasing tendency to deal with migration 
and security together as well as to “mainstream 
counterterrorism” into education and cultural 
policies.
Towards a new policy on 
legal migration 
Against this ‘securitized’ background, perhaps it is 
not surprising that less attention is paid – especially 
by the media – to the fourth pillar, the development 
of a new EU policy on legal migration. In this 
domain, work had already started long before the 
11 The proposal to reform the Common European Asylum 
System (Dublin reform) was adopted in May 2016: Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third country national or a stateless person (Recast)  
Table 1: Spring 2016 Standard Eurobarometer
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migratory and refugee crisis. For several years the 
focus had already been on maintaining a Europe in 
demographic decline as an attractive destination 
for immigrants by using targeted measures, many 
of which are discussed in other contributions to 
this e-book. 
For this particular chapter, the most relevant recent 
measures to integrate diversity are in the European 
Commission`s Action Plan12 on the integration 
of third-country nationals of June 2016. This is 
actually one of the follow-up proposals to the 
JHA Council’s mandate in 2014 which reaffirmed 
the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration Policy, already adopted in 2004. 
These set out a common approach to immigrant 
integration across the EU and it is worth noting that 
the Council decided to reaffirm these principles 10 
years later. They were basically unchanged, even 
though at the time of their adoption they were 
only intended to be an “indicative description 
which should be further developed.” The Action 
Plan also builds on the EC’s European Agenda for 
the integration of third-country nationals set out 
in 2011, calling for a strengthened and coherent 
approach to integration across different policy 
areas and government levels. 
The current proposal targets the more than 20 
million third-country nationals legally residing 
in the EU, irrespectively of the reason why they 
migrated or for how long, but some actions 
specifically target newly-arrived refugees who face 
specific problems. It is based on the experience 
that integration policies work best when they are 
designed to ensure coherent systems to facilitate 
participation and empowerment for everyone 
in society: for both immigrant and native 
communities. This means that integration should 
go beyond participation in the labour market and 
mastering the language, and become a dynamic 
two-way process; not only should migrants be 
expected to embrace fundamental EU values and 
learn the host language, but they should also be 
12 Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals 
offered meaningful opportunities to participate 
in the host country’s economy and society. The 
involvement of migrants themselves in the design 
and implementation of integration policies and 
projects is essential to improve their outcomes, 
but none of these actions should be at the expense 
of measures to benefit disadvantaged groups or 
minorities in the host countries. 
The Action Plan itself actually provides a common 
policy framework to help Member States to develop 
their national integration policies and it describes 
the potential support from the EC. Among its five 
main areas, in this chapter we shall only focus on 
that of active participation and social inclusion, 
which includes actions to support exchanges with 
the receiving society, immigrant participation in 
cultural life and fighting discrimination. In general 
terms, this means that the Commission will (co-)
finance projects to promote intercultural dialogue, 
cultural diversity and common European values 
through culture, films and the arts (Creative 
Europe) and also projects to promote social 
inclusion involving youth and sport (Erasmus+). 
A number of other funds/programmes will also 
be mobilised to promote participation in political, 
social and cultural life and to foster better 
understanding between various communities. 
An innovative element, also featured in President 
Juncker’s 2016 State of the Union speech, is that 
it gives greater priority to activities dedicated to 
the integration of refugees within the European 
Voluntary Service.
By working together with the EP and the Council, 
Member States will be encouraged to strengthen 
their integration policies to increase migrant 
participation in local democratic structures, to 
invest in projects to fight prejudice and stereotypes 
and to implement legislation to combat racism, 
xenophobia and discrimination. Civic orientation 
programmes are also encouraged to foster 
integration and respect for EU values. Of course, 
the success of integration policies also depends on 
adequate funding. The EU has already supported 
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integration actions in all Member States through 
dedicated funding and the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds for a long time. In the previous 
cycle (2007-2013), €825 million were spent from 
the dedicated European Integration Fund, and 
its mid-term evaluation demonstrated that the 
projects involved would not have been carried 
out otherwise and that they contributed to the 
reinforcement of NGO and local activities. In 
addition, the European Social Fund (ESF) co-
funded actions that reached more than 5 million 
people.13 This funding, however, represented just 
part of the overall investment carried out within 
Member States. Under the current Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020, € 765 million 
has already been earmarked for the dedicated 
fund, but as this would mean a slight decrease, 
the EC suggested strategically using the various 
shared management funds to support integration. 
Especially in the European Social Fund (ESF – €21 
bn) and in the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF – €21.4 bn), large amounts are 
available to potentially promote – among other 
goals – cultural integration.
Innovative paths in the 
latest concrete projects
The capacity to implement the Action Plan in 
general and the speed with which it happens is 
in the hands of EU leaders, whose visions show 
a fair degree of variation. This is likely to have an 
impact on whether and how the available funds 
will be used as, of course, it depends primarily on 
the Member States themselves. The Commission 
on its part decided to launch an innovative call 
for applications in the framework of the cross-
sectoral strand of the Creative Europe programme 
in April 2016 as a follow up to the Culture 
Council conclusions from November 2015 to 
support cultural, audio-visual and cross-sectoral 
projects facilitating the integration of refugees and 
13  In 2014-15, other funds, such as Erasmus+, funded more 
than 200 projects dealing with refugees or addressing challenges 
related to the inclusion of refugees.
enhancing mutual cultural understanding. The 
expectation was that a limited number (10 -12) 
of high quality consortia from the cultural sectors 
would be established to create and test initiatives 
– “creative partnerships.” These transnational 
projects were designed to help refugees to socialize 
and express themselves even without them 
immediately being able to speak the host country 
language, to become learning platforms, to foster 
respect for diversity, intercultural and civic 
competencies, and to help host country citizens 
understand the values and cultures of refugees. 
This call eventually attracted 274 applications – 
more than three times the original expectation. 
Therefore, the initial budget (€1.6 million) 
was increased to € 2.35 million, with which 
12 projects will be (co-)financed involving 
60 organizations from 20 countries.14 As can 
be seen from Table 2, Italy and Sweden are 
the best-represented countries with 17 and 9 
organizations respectively. The table also gives 
a certain indication of the degrees of interest 
of various actors across Europe. Common 
threads in the winning projects were related to 
storytelling, the digital arts and training and 
workshops for participants. Each of the projects 
will receive an average of just under €200,000 
and will run until 2018.
14 Selection results: Creative Europe/Support for Refugee 
Integration, Call EACEA 12/2016
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In September 2016 a regular call for European 
cooperation projects was also launched in line 
with the EU Common Basic Principles referred 
to above15 (with a total budget of €35 million for 
2017) and one of its priorities is specifically to 
help the integration of refugees in the EU through 
showcasing and co-creating activities of a cultural 
and audio-visual nature across Europe. The focus 
of successful projects should be on fostering 
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, and 
respect for other cultures. 
Political theory and the 
real world
One may legitimately ask whether the principles 
underlying EU policies on the integration of 
refugees and other newcomers are defensible and 
to what extent they concur with the reality on the 
ground. These are questions to be addressed to 
15 Call for proposal: Support to European Cooperation 
projects 2017 EACEA 45/2016.
normative political theorists. While historically 
immigration has not been a major topic in political 
philosophy, it has recently become the subject of 
an increasingly contentious debate which so far 
seems to have been dominated by a human rights-
based cosmopolitan approach embodied most 
eminently in the seminal work of Joseph Carens,16 
even though its underlying advocacy of open 
borders can be qualified as somewhat utopian in 
the current European and global political context. 
Especially at a time when traditional integration 
mechanisms are being seriously challenged and 
critical decisions are made by governments, it 
would be useful to thoroughly consider the ‘realist 
approach,’ primarily represented by David Miller,17 
which places immigration in a nation-state 
context. He argues that “it is implausible to regard 
16 J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford University 
Press, 2013.
17 Most recently in his latest book: D. Miller, Strangers in 
Our Midst, Harvard University Press, 2016
Creative Europe: Culture
* Provisional code which does not prejudge in any way the definitive nomenclature for this country,
 which will be agreed following the conclusion of negotiations currently taking place under the auspices of the United Nations.
2016 - Support to Refugee Integration Projects - Demand by Country (project leader + partners) - Submitted/Selected projects
Table 2
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global equality of opportunity, as opposed to 
global sufficiency, as setting limits to national self-
determination.”18 Of course, in such an immensely 
complex and politically highly sensitive matter 
a third claim that “a more desirable task for the 
political philosophy of immigration is to find ways 
in which the joint requirement of global equality of 
opportunity and collective self-determination can 
be coherently upheld”19 deserves equally careful 
assessment.
Notwithstanding these theoretical debates, and 
presumably sometimes even without awareness 
of them, the daily management of mass migratory 
movements has clearly shifted towards a fairly 
restrictive approach, not just in Europe (as shown 
above) but also in Australia (which was already 
strict but is becoming even stricter) and the US 
as well. A clear distinction between refugees 
and economic migrants remains one of the 
cornerstones for each regime. At the same time, 
if we examine the calls for the above-mentioned 
latest integration projects promoted by the EU 
together with their designs and results, we find 
that they aim to facilitate the kind of ideal full 
cultural integration described by David Miller: 
“full cultural integration requires that members 
of the indigenous majority understand why 
the private cultures of immigrants need to be 
accommodated and offer ungrudging support for 
the measures needed, and that the immigrants 
themselves understand and embrace the public 
culture of the society they have joined.”20 This 
approach sits easily also with the EU Common 
Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy, 
which in practice have provided very useful 
18  In Miller, D, Migration and justice: a reply to my critics, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 
published online 09 September 2016. 
19  In Kollár, E., Global equality of opportunity and self-
determination in the context of immigration, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, published online 04 
October 2016 
20   Miller, D., Strangers in Our Midst, Harvard University 
Press, 2016, p 149.
guidance21 during the implementation of cultural 
integration policies, even though the efficiency of 
these policies varies substantially across Member 
States, reflecting their specificities and dispositions 
towards migration in general.
One of the areas where Member States differ most 
concerns the limits of humanitarian obligations 
and the reciprocal relationship between values 
and fundamental rights in terms of the migration 
crisis. This also relates to broader academic 
debates on the culturalisation of civil and human 
rights agendas and the institutionalisation of 
culture.22 One characteristic example where these 
differences emerged was provided during the 
latest Council discussion on the integration of 
third-country nationals in the context of its 2016 
Annual Dialogue on the Rule of Law.23 While 
some Member States argued that there can be 
no limits to the EU’s humanitarian obligations 
towards refugees, others claimed that while the 
right is not limited the capacity to offer protection 
is. All ministers agreed that European states and 
societies as a whole, including migrants, must 
adhere to fundamental EU values, but there was no 
consensus on whether or not reciprocity requires 
active tolerance and obliges Member States to 
accommodate cultural and religious diversity.
It remains to be seen whether, when and where on 
the ‘acceptance-rejection continuum’ a consensus 
can be formed on these (and a wide range of 
other) issues. The Common Basic Principles 
(since 2004) rest on the premise that “if the flow 
of legally residing immigrants is orderly and well 
managed, Member States may reap benefits.” Even 
though the premise does not hold in the current 
situation, the Principles have still proven relevant 
21   Research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising 
Opportunities, a policy review prepared by
Prof Russell King and Dr Aija Lulle for the EC, 2016, p 67.
22    Soysal, L., Introduction: Triumph of culture, troubles of 
anthropology, Focaal 55, 2009, p7.
23  For details and a short summary of the session, and 
especially the Presidency non-paper for the Council, see http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2016/05/24/
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in the handling of the mass movements of refugees 
and migrants during the last few years. Equally 
useful has been the invaluable contribution of 
academic research offering advice on devising and 
implementing concrete integration projects.24 The 
political and public discourse would also benefit if 
political theory could help to develop a coherent 
and principled response to cases of unregulated 
flows of refugees and migrants – a response which 
takes into account the possibilities and constraints 
of the ‘real world,’ which could give guidance 
to policymakers, and which could facilitate the 
achievement of public consent for a legitimate 
politically feasible and morally defendable cause.
24  Ample proof can be found in the 160-page comprehensive 
summary of EU-funded research projects Research on Migration: 
Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities, A Policy Review, 
prepared by Prof Russell King and Dr Aija Lulle for the European 
Commission in 2016.
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